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Chapter 1: Introduction
Spain was one o f  the first cases in the current “third wave o f democratization” 
that has swept over the world since April 25,1974. Long before the current 
fascination in the Political Science literature with the importance o f  “social capital,” 
Spanish civic life was built around community, in public squares, festivals, outdoor 
malls and the like. However, political life in Spain varies widely by its internal 
regions. The intent o f this study is two-fold:
1. To leam how elites in the regions o f Spain devised strategies to ensure regional 
political stability during the transition to democracy in their region, and
2. To leam how the Spanish have built their democracy around community life, 
known as communitarianism in Political Science literature.
As Myron Weiner observed, in order to explain democratization, one should examine 
the “strategies available to those who seek a  democratic revolution” (Weiner in 
Huntington 1993,38-39).
The study o f the consolidation o f democracy at the sub-state or regional level 
has broad implications for countries with strong regional divisions (cleavages) 
attempting to make the transition firom authoritarianism to democracy. It is a useful 
starting point for policy makers who are interested in the “best practices” models, or 
models to avoid.
The Research Problem and Thesis Statement
What follows is essentially a  “report from the field” that hopes to lay the 
groundwork for future hypothesis-testing and studies o f  the phenomenon identified. It
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IS a  study that, according to Van Evera’s criteria (1997, 89fQ, attempts to make a 
contribution to the larger literature on democratization, and political leadership in a 
democratizing context, by performing a “historical evaluative” function o f  a specific 
set o f actors at a specific time and place. To a lesser extent, it is hypothesis-generating 
within a larger theoretical framework.
The bulk o f the political science literature on democratization is still largely 
focused on understanding and classifying the strategies, behaviors, and institutional 
arrangements made by national elites during the relatively brief “transitional” phase, 
i.e. the short period o f time during and directly after the change o f  regime type from 
authoritarianism to at least a nominal democracy.' In general, two areas have been 
neglected in this now-large body o f scholarship: an in-depth consideration o f what 
occurs after the transitional phase in a given country that helps the democratic regime 
survive over a long period o f  time {viz., democratic consolidation), and secondly, the 
role of non-national elites in democratic consolidation. The dissertation will examine 
the second neglected area in some depth.
In this dissertation, I examine three selected regions in Spain—Cam/nnya. 
Galicia, and Andaluciat—os a  series o f case studies o f  a successful consolidation o f a
‘An example is Barbara Geddes (1997).
^ o te  on regional names: even the names o f  the regions themselves are freighted with 
regional tension: the Catalans prefer “Catalunya instead o f "Cataluna because the 
tilde over the “n” is a symbol o f  Castillian suppression o f  their language. Therefore. I 
will follow the following convention on regional names: either they will be rendered in 
their English, equivalents: Andalusia, Galicia or Catalonia, or in their “authentic” regional 
languages: Galicia, and Cafa/w^a.
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democratic regime.
Statement of the Problem and Research Question
Why has democracy been successfully consolidated throughout Spain despite 
significant inter-regional variations in approaches and strategies among regional elites, 
variations that some o f the literature (e.g. Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989) predicts 
will lead to a  breakdown o f democracy? What role was played in the process o f 
democratic consolidation by strong inter-regional cleavages in Spain, such as separatist 
movements, and ethnic and linguistic differences? Against this remarkable backdrop, 
the research question is, "what strategies do regional elites use to promote democratic 
stability in their region o f Spain?”
General Theory
According to Van Evera’s (1997) criteria, all hypotheses must be derived from 
a more general theory, along with explanations and antecedent conditions (pp. 8ff.). 
This is similar to the requirement o f audiaiur et altera pars. The general theory 
employed here is that o f Huntington (1993), Putnam (1993), and, to a lesser extent, 
Wildavslg (1989). Although Huntington is very skeptical o f ”single-fkctor” 
explanations, he does conclude that two factors— (I) political leadership, and (2) 
economic development— are the keys to both democratic transitions and longer-range 
consolidation (pp. 311-316). Putnam noted that regional variations in Italian 
democratic institutionalization (and institutional performance) can be explained by 
variations in regional "economic context and political tradition” (p. 10).
The assumption behind why regions o f countries matter for democratization is
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that “context matters”; context being equated with the underlying society. Putnam 
(1993,8) phrases it well: “the practical performance o f [democratic] institutions, we 
conjecture, is shaped by the social context within which they operate.” Therefore, 
societal variations must be accounted for, and “societies” tend to vary by regions of 
countries, i.e. very seldom is a country o f any size composed o f only one society. 
Wildavsky concurs that it is futile to try to understand leadership without 
understanding the society within which it is embedded, which he calls a “regime.”
I borrow from all three theories to develop a hybrid theory that purports to explain 
regional variations in democratic institutionalization by variations in regional political 
leadership, acknowledging regional context as important antecedent conditions. These 
antecedent conditions, in turn, shape leadership potential to bring about democratic 
stability in that region. As the literature review makes clear below, however, there is 
no general body o f theory on the role o f regional political leadership in a country 
undergoing democratic transition/consolidation. Therefore, it is the intent o f this study 
to make an original contribution to the theory in this important new area of 
comparative politics scholarship, in addition to the historical-evaluative function 
mentioned at the outset.
Hypothesis
Within any theory worthy of the name. Van Evera continues, is a "prime 
hypothesis” that is the “overarching hypothesis that frames the relationship between a 
theory's independent and dependent variables in the study” (p. 11). The prime 
hypothesis o f the theory under consideration here is:
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Regional elites’ strategies and behaviors ^  democratic stability— degree of 
democracy.
While 'degree o f democracy” is the ultimate dependent variable, the focus will 
be on the independent variable (regional elites’ strategies), and the intermediate 
dependent variable (democratic stability).
The prime hypothesis can be restated in the form o f a testable hypothesis, as 
follows:
The variation in behavior and strategies o f regional elites in Spain, conditioned 
by regional factors to be defined, resulted in variations in democratic stability in each 
region.
The nature o f the independent, intervening and dependent variables can be 
depicted more clearly as follows:
{Int. Factors}
I
E(s,b) — indicators of democratic stability. [ -  level o f democratic 
consolidation.^]
X
Regional economic and social conditions 
where the study variable is the behavior and strategies o f  regional elites, regional 
economic and social conditions are the antecedent condition variables, international
^Please see the definition o f  Democratic Consolidation, below fora  fuller explanation. 
In short, this phrase means the institutionalization o f key democratic practices.
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factors are an intervening variable» democratic stability is the study dependent variable 
and finally, degree of regional democratic consolidation (D.C.), is the ultimate 
dependent variable, which will remain unstudied. Because o f  more direct links with 
the international community, international factors are postulated to be more strongly 
causative in one o f the cases (Catalonia) than the others. Regional economic and 
social conditions are, in the words o f Hempel and Van Evera. "antecedent condition 
variables” meaning that they are variables "whose presence activates or magnifies the 
action o f  a causal law or hypothesis” (Van Evera 1997.9-10).
It was impossible to spell out all o f the possible antecedent condition variables 
affecting E(s,b), but below are those variables that were assigned beforehand, based 
upon prior research and theorizing:
X, = Regional institutional structure and the actors position within it.
X , = Regional actor's position vis-à-vis national (and in some cases international)
actors and institutions.
The focus o f this study is on the variation in regional elites’ "leadership style.” 
which is operationalized as elite strategy and behavior, or E(s.b)^ composed o f four 
components, which are spelled out below:
E(s,b)f =  The basic "exit” or “voice” option (Hirschman 1970) o f regional elites;
i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a democratic 
system.
E(s, b)2 = Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents;
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e.g., a  populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperation strategy.^
E(s, b)3 — Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites.
E(s,b)^ = Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites;
e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the 
center/national elites).
Style is defined as the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by 
regional elites in pursuit o f both electoral gain and "higher” values like democracy and 
regional political and economic advancement. Although one could attempt to quantify 
"real change,” a more usefiil rule of thumb would be, do the citizenry and fellow elites 
perceive or believe that real change and more of the "higher values” have been 
implemented after the political leader came into power than before? And, since this 
reaches to states of mind, subjective Judgements are necessary on the part o f the 
researcher.
The difficulty o f "proving” that leadership is a  cause has been treated at some 
length in the literature. This problem has been succinctly described by Aaron 
Wildavsky:
[Although] conceiving o f leadership as a causal relationship is an 
advance...there are as many types o f  leaders as there are kinds of 
causes, and there is much difficulty in distinguishing one from the other 
in assigning them relative weights in different situations (1989.94).
'* The diSerence between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise 
some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular 
unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, 
regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived "payoffs” (usually 
electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).
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The difficulties identified by Wildavsky are addressed in this study by utilizing 
a standard set o f  variables (above) across regions to operationalize "leadership style," 
and through the use o f the concept o f "elite culture” from Diamond (1999) below; i.e. 
it is the judgement o f  fellow elites, not the distant analyst, that matters in assessing the 
degree o f ‘‘intended real change.” The focus on elite culture (beliefs, perceptions) 
helps escape problems identified with the approach o f McFarland and Greenstein^ that 
constraints in which a leader acts, eg. "general social forces” or the “environment.” are 
too vague to operationalize. Finally, by identifying a limited number o f  political 
institutional contexts (or ‘‘regimes”) in which these elites operate, and creating ideal- 
typical models based upon the combination o f  style and context, the study avoids the 
problem o f infinite regress identified by Wildavsky.
Each o f the component variables of leadership styles are hypothesized to be 
both dichotomous and continuous, and to show a wide range o f variation when 
continuous.. Each o f these component variables o f leadership style could theoretically 
matter to democratic stability and bridging social capital in the following ways.
^The books cited, respectively, are Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in 
Pluralist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 157-158, and Fred L 
Greenstein, “The Impact o f  Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away 
Underbrush,” ÆPS/t 61 (1967), pp. 629-641.
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Regional Elite 
Leadership Style
Democratic stability Social capital
E(b,s)l "choice o f exit or 
voice options”
i f  exit option-low 
voice option-medium to 
high
if  exit option-low; 
voice option-medium
E(b,s)2 if populism-medium to 
high
if  intra-elite cooperation- 
low to high, depending on 
intent o f pacting/exchange
if  populism-medium to 
high
if  intra-elite cooperation- 
very low to medium, 
depending on intent of 
pacting/exchange
E(b,s)3
"characteristic relations 
with national 
elites/organizations”
if  cooperative-medium to 
high
if confrontational-very 
low to medium, 
depending on purpose o f 
the challenge
if  cooperative-medium to 
high
if  confrontational-low to 
medium, depending on 
purpose o f the challenge
E(b,s)4
"characteristic relations 
with international 
elites/orgs”.
if  cooperative-medium to 
high
if  cooperative-low to 
medium, depending on 
use o f funds and expertise
Concepts and Variables
The key concepts m this study are "regional elite actors,” "democratic 
stability,” "social capital.” "institutions.” "elite strategies and behaviors.” and 
"Democratic Consolidation.” Less crucial, but still important, are "international 
factors.”
Regional elite actors refers to government officials in Spain's autonomous 
regions, and leaders o f "peak” civic organizations/institutions at the regional level; i.e., 
leaders o f  the highest-level organizations representing business, labor, ethnic and the 
particular indigenous interests o f  that region. These are leaders who are constantly in
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include shared mind-sets, recurring social practices, etc. They are important to this 
study because, as Putnam notes, 'they shape actors’ identities, power and strategies” 
(1993, 8)
Elite strategies and behaviors will be operationalized to mean:
1. Strategies— calculations, plans and intentions o f the identified political actors 
as they and other elites understand and/or perceive them;
2, Behaviors— will be operationalized to mean elite actions that were actually 
observed.
[nternationai Factors will be operationalized to mean only those identifiable 
links between international and regional elites whose purpose was to directly assist a 
region in Spain during the phase o f democratic consolidation (Phase 3 in my 
definition, below).
The final key variable is Democratic Consolidation, the ultimate dependent 
variable. In attempting to come to grips with this variable, the purpose is not to 
perform an exhaustive literature review on the concept, but rather to clarify the 
relationship o f the independent variables to the ultimate dependent variable.
Definitions o f the concept "democracy” represent some o f  the oldest and most 
contentious discussions in political science. A review o f  the literature going back to 
the incarnation o f  the study o f  politics as a science (about 120 years ago) would reveal 
literally hundreds o f definitions and usages o f the term, and many o f these uses o f 
democracy were contradictory or self-serving (Huntington 1989, 11-16). In fact, a 
literature review by Collier and Levitsky in 1997 indicated that there were no fewer
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than “550 subtypes o f democracy” cited in 150 recent studies o f the phenomenon 
(Diamond 1999,7). It is therefore with a great deal o f humility and perspective that 
anyone should propose yet another understanding o f democracy, or specific sub­
components o f the term.
First, some background discussion to the formal definition o f democratic 
consolidation is in order. The concept “democratization” is a multi-dimensional term 
that is used in the literature for the sake o f convenience and not clarity. It describes a 
host o f  historical and theoretical “moments” (or phases) on the road to self-governance 
that have vague beginning and ending points.
Democratization is usually broken down into two large component-phases 
known in the literature as transition” and “consolidation.” A book on the 
consolidation o f democracy in neighboring Portugal insists that:
...the issues o f democratic transition and consolidation are both 
conceptually and empirically distinct. Whereas transite legists seek to 
discover the origins o f a democratic regime, consolidologists search for 
variables that keep a regime robust, stable and durable (Manuel 1996.
1-2) .
Dankwart Rustow wrote a  seminal article (1970) on the phases o f 
democratization in the article. “Transitions to Democracy.” He uses the terms 
“Preparatory,” “Decision,” and “Habituation,” to describe the distinct phases in 
democratization. This terminology is still preferred by some writers today (Pridham et 
a i, 1984) because o f  its seemingly greater precision and accuracy than the terms.
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was unfair to the prospects for developing democracy elsewhere in the world, and, as it 
turns out, the assumption was empirically inaccurate as well (Przeworski and Limongi 
1997,156ff.),
More recently, Larry Diamond has contributed a synthetic work on the subject 
o f democratic consolidation, drawing on his two decades o f work and collaboration in 
this field, and his thorough knowledge o f  a voluminous number o f cases and studies. 
He reminds us o f  the dangers o f  teleological assumptions that plagued the first 
generation o f  political scientists (at the turn o f the 20“' century); i.e. there is nothing 
inevitable, permanent, or intrinsically "good" about democratic governance; rather it is 
the result o f  deliberate choice and can be undone almost as easily as it was created 
(1999,273ff.). His normative concern centers around preventing a "^ ird  reverse 
wave” by helping to consolidate the currently fragile democracies, and even moving 
beyond that to an enlarged 'fourth wave,” which would include much o f Asia. 
Especially relevant to this study is his concern with the process o f democratic 
consolidation, and his indicators o f  the process. His indicators are sub-divided into 
"norms” (or political culture) and "behavior,” much like my E{b,s). above. The most 
important shared norms and behavior, he reaffirms, are on the elite level because of 
their disproportionate influence on the process, but any complete account should 
include the intermediate and mass level as well (1999.65-70). Elites, for Diamond, 
are loosely defined as the, "most significant leaders o f  opinion, culture, business and 
social organization” (p. 69). But Diamond does not distinguish among levels o f  elites, 
as this study proposes to do.
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Obviously» no one constitutional-institutional configuration can serve as an 
absolute model for democratic consolidation. I propose the following working 
definition. My definition is composed o f three phases. The first two are widely used 
"markers” in the literature to identify that a transition has taken place, and the process 
of democratic consolidation is well underway (and that the democratic mechanisms are 
in place); the third phase is an equally important criterion to identify the substance o f 
democratic consolidation.
Democratic Consolidation; Phase 1 (Transition)- A relatively brief phase in which 
the decision is taken by political elites to inaugurate a democratic regime-type, 
often by engaging in pacts and constitution-making. Phase 2: At least two 
open, genuinely contested elections for the most powerful political positions 
have been held in which the entire adult population is eligible to vote.® and at 
least one peaceful transfer o f administration has been made from one party to 
another. Phase 3: An institutionalization o f democratic attitudes and practices 
begun during the transition stage into more permanent structures or practices, 
including at least, the institutionalization o f “uncertainty”'’ as defined by 
Przeworski. and the acceptance o f all parties o f the political rules o f  the game, 
especially rules governing succession. A respect for basic differences and a 
modicum o f trust exhibited between and among the population as a whole.
This definition follows that o f Huntington (1993.7), Schmitter (1990,2 Iff) 
and Whitehead (in Pastor, ed. 1989).
The third part o f this definition is now acknowledged to be o f paramount 
importance in the most recent literature. Although "convoking elections” is a crucial
“Note that the entire adult population should be eligible to vote, but a  small number 
may be disqualified under objective legal criteria, such as universally-applied codes o f 
criminal conduct.
^"Uncertainty" is described by Przeworski (in OT)oimell et al. 1986:1) as that counter­
intuitive state that is accepted by true democrats in which those who assume power do so 
with the knowledge that their power is temporary and not secure—vtr.. “uncertain”—and 
that they will peacefully vacate office as soon as their public mandate expires.
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first step, it is not enough to bring about a genuine consolidation o f democracy (see 
especially Rosenberg 1991). As Karl (1991,36) notes; '"The notion that you can 
simply have elections and resolve conflict is false; it will not work."'" Diamond calls 
Phase 1 regimes, hollow "electoral democracies," and cites Pakistan as an example 
(1999, 72-73). In the same vein. Touraine (1991.268) attempts to move beyond 
elections in his definition o f democracy, which is as follows: "the free choice o f a 
government which represents the interests o f the majority and respects the 
fundamental rights o f all human beings to live according to their beliefs and basic 
interests." The spirit o f Touraine's definition will help guide this study, but it is still 
necessary for clarity and agreement to have technical markers o f the phenomenon 
under discussion, as in the definition offered above.
'" a  short, popular synthesis o f  this new literature can be found in the article. "In Failed 
States, Can Democracy Come Too Soon?” by Michael Massing, New York Times. 
February 23,2002, electronic edition.
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own, although the institutionalization o f  attitudes into permanent structures (or "habits 
o f the mind”) is still under way and will take more time, especially in regions like 
Galicia (see chapter three, below).* * Again, the main purpose for wrestling with the 
meaning o f democratic consolidation at such length here is to help guide the 
formulation and research o f the causal variables.
It should be reiterated that the focus o f this study is on explicitly political 
factors, although it is acknowledged that social and cultural factors provide a floor 
upon which political actions take place. Moreover, it is argued that these political 
factors have been controlling in the process o f democratic consolidation, not the social 
or cultural factors; while the latter play a role in "distant” or "antecedent” causation, 
do not control the actions o f elites.'" These political factors would include the nature 
o f exchanges, bargains, compromises, leadership style (as defined above), scandals, 
etc.
* ‘Most analysts date the end o f the Spanish transition to the year 1982 due to two 
events: the survival of a coup attempt in 1981, and the general election in October. 1982 
which resulted in the second rotation in power from one party to another. The most 
authoritative statement is that o f Linz and Stepan (1996,108).
'"Although this is an assertion to be treated in the subsequent study, this claim enjoys 
plausibility and empirical proof from a wide variety o f  other recent studies. Thus 
Diamond (1999,162) concludes, "The most striking finding here is the autonomy o f the 
political,”  a  surprisingly assertion from a former adherent to the Lipset structuralist 
school. See also Manuel (1996,2), who similarly questions the guiding assumptions o f 
the earlier generation o f  democratic and developmental scholars (i.e. the post-World War 
II generation).
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Justification
The primary Justification o f this work is that it is a  practical study that could be
o f use to policy-makers who want to encourage the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy in similar cases. The general Justification for the study o f elites in politics
is that it has a long pedigree and proven utility in political science. In any political
system^ they are the primary actors, viz.. those by which and through which political
activity and concrete policy actually comes into being. Thus. Fenno asserts that,
[EJlective politicians...are so crucial to the operation o f the political 
system. There is...a huge mismatch between the central importance of 
elective politicians...and their peripheral importance in political science 
scholarship. One o f the reason for this mismatch is the reluctance 
and/or inability o f political scientists to observe elective politicians 
personally and at close range (1990, 1 ).
The recent scholarship o f Diamond (1999) reaffirms that, “elites matter most for the
stability and consolidation o f  democracy, not only in their behaviors but also in their
beliefs elites also play a crucial role in shaping political culture and in signaling
what kind o f behavior is proper and improper.....there has been strangely little
attention to the political culture o f elites in new democracies and little thought on how
to measure if’ (p. 66).
More specifically, why focus on regional elite strategies and behaviors as they
affect democratic consolidation? The question o f which is the most appropriate or
“proper” level o f  government in which to practice democracy is as old as political
philosophy itself. It resonates in the works o f  Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau (who
sang the praises o f  the small republic, like his native Geneva), the current debate over
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“devolution” and ail o f  those who call themselves “federalists,” whether America’s
founders, or our contemporaries. The proper size and “sphere” o f government is one
o f the dominant themes o f  the The Federalist papers. It is often forgotten that the
Founders saw as much-if not more—virtue for democracy in smaller government than
in a very large state government; a  large state regime was only desirable in a
democracy if  “checked” by local and state democratic governments. Madison, in
particular, recognized that some o f the most vital functions o f democracy could only
be practiced in a “small republic”;
It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a 
mean, on both sides o f which inconveniences will be found to lie. By 
enlarging too much the number o f electors, you render the 
representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances ... 
(Madison 1789, The Federalist^^o, 10).
As Pumam (2000) points out, Jefferson went so far as to suggest a constitutional
amendment to strengthen democracy by bringing it home to the people; that by:
[MJaking every citizen an acting member o f  the government, and in the 
offices nearest and most interesting to him, [it] will attach him by his 
strongest feelings to the independence o f his country, and its republican 
constitution (Jefferson quoted in Pumam 2000.336).
The contemporary communitarian movement makes the point that the traits so 
vital to democracy-e.g. seff-govemment, mutual self-help, participation, vibrant 
neighborhoods and cities, among others-can only be practiced in a bounded area in 
which citizens can realistically come to know (and trust) one another. As an extreme 
example. Inis Claude (1968) points out that it makes little sense to talk about an 
international “community” unless one is referring to a handful o f  elites who regularly
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Theoretically, how can regional elites afîèct the quality and level o f social
capital within their region? Two main lines o f argumentation will be suggested here,
one borrowed from Putnam (2000). First, social capital can be neither created nor
maintained at the state level, especially in a large, diverse state such as Spain, because
social capital is, by its nature based upon iterated, interpersonal contact o f  the type
that can only occur within a relatively small geographical space. Pumam quotes the
famous American philosopher John Dewey, and his biographer Robert Westbrook, to
make this point:
“Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly 
community.” “Only in local, face-to-face associations.” adds Dewey 
biographer Robert Westbrook, “could members o f a public participate 
in dialogues with their fellows, and such dialogues were crucial to the 
formation and organization o f the public” (Pumam 2000.337).
Secondly, although it is at least theoretically possible to create social capital at
the regional/community level, it is quite another matter to maintain it. The foremost
proponent o f the concept, Putnam, admits as much by specifically calling upon
American elites in a  wide variety o f settings to help create new stocks o f social capital
(Pumam 2000,404-414), much as Progressive elites did in an earlier era. In Making
Democracy (1993,167-169), the manifestations o f social capital that are
repeatedly cited by Pumam are regional institutions that were deliberately created or
altered by regional elites-both civic and political elites, e.g. mutual-aîd practices like
rotating credit associations. More broadly, Pumam notes that political instimtional
reform changes political practice, including enriching stocks o f social capital, or
overcoming problems o f a “low social capital equilibrium”:
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As institutionalists would predict, institutional changes were 
(gradually) reflected in changing identities, changing values, changing 
power, and changing strategies (Putnam 1993, 184).
In addition, regional elites can thwart or affect the pacing and timing o f
democratic measures, short o f  taking the drastic exit option; that is, they affect the
path o f democracy. Secondly (as will be seen in the review o f the literature below),
regional elites have seldom been studied for their role in democratic consolidation.
Regional elites are not usually studied as autonomous actors engaged in strategic
games with other elite actors at the regional, national and international levels; when
mentioned at all, they are usually depicted as engaging in subservient, avoidance, or
coping behaviors vis-à-vis national and international elites. As we will see below, the
return o f "regionalism” as a fashionable academic study usually bypassed, or
marginalized the role of regional elites; instead it has focused on culture, class, the
center-periphery dichotomy and theories o f federalism, which are undoubtedly
important fields o f study in their own right (Rokkan and Urwin 1982).
Long before Europe was a continent organized politically around states.'^ it
was a continent organized around regions, fiefdoms and small republics and
principalities, united by contiguous territory, language, ethnicity and/or religion. Thus,
the "territorial dimension” has been, and will continue to be, o f extraordinary
importance to understanding European politics, and politics in many other areas o f  the
"Only since the treaty o f  Westphalia recognized their legal existence in 1648 have 
states formally existed, and most European states came into existence long after then. 
Thus, in the scope o f  recorded human political history, formal states represent only a  
small ffaction o f that history.
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world (Sharpe 1987; Rokkan and Urwin, eds., 1982; Eisenstadt and Rokkan, eds. 
1973). In fact, many future "scenarios” o f political organization from well-respected 
scholars suggest the demise, or at least fragmentation, o f the nation-state (Nye 2000; 
Russell 1994, 84). In addition, a United Nations report from a panel o f experts 
suggests that, if  current trends continue, in the future states will become even smaller 
and more "region-like” with the emergence o f  about 300 additional states in the next 
150-200 years (for a total o f  almost 500 statesi). It would behoove the discipline to 
understand why regionalism retains such a vital political force, and how and why 
regional elites are harnessing this force.
Sharpe (1987,152ff.) suggests four concrete ways in which territory shapes 
politics, the first three of which he asserts have been critically neglected in the political 
science literature'^:
1. How the unique character o f every polity is shaped by its unique territorial 
location;
2. How an individual’s physical location can override his economic class, party or 
other affiliations in political matters.
3. How the tendency towards increasingly large political entities (or o f large
'^Sharpe (1987, 148ff.) notes that political science has been dominated by economic 
(class) and individualistic (behavioral) analysis because, under the dominant positivistic 
paradigm, it seeks generalizable laws across space (territory) and time; territorial-based 
politics implies uniqueness, and thus has been demoted by the "covering-law” model still 
dominant in political science.
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scale) undermines democratic responsiveness and accountability,'^
4. Territory defines who the polity is, and is one o f three essential ingredients o f
the definition o f the state (population and a recognized government being the 
other two).
Beyond this general justification for studying elites and the effect o f territory 
on politics, why study regional politics in Spain? Spain is widely acknowledged to be 
one o f the three European countries where territorial cleavages (and core-periphery 
cleavages) matter the most (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1987; Rokkan and Urwin 
1982, Heiberg 1982; Diaz Lopez 1982; Sharpe 1987).'^ Other scholars note how 
regional politics (or "micronationalism”) in Spain shapes everything from labor 
negotiations to party politics to national governments (Gunter et al., 1986). My own 
trips to Spain and on-the-ground observation confirmed the importance o f regionalism 
in Spain and guided me to this topic. The perceptive observer notices dramatic 
differences in language, dress, customs, and most importantly, political practice. For 
example, the region around Madrid resembles any other modem metropolitan city, 
while large-scale protests (hundreds o f thousands o f people) were observed in both 
Galicia and Andalusia.
In addition, EU policy, at Just about the time that Spain joined the EC/EU, had
'^This, of course, was Rousseau s classic argument for a small republic, and the 
subject o f the celebrated argument for federalism in the U.S. in the Federalist No. 51.
'^The other two being Belgium and. Switzerland.
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begun to favor regionalism (a “Europe o f the regions”), a marked shift from its 
previous state-to-state policy.'* The EU effected this policy through the use o f  EU 
ftmds, known variously as European Structural Funds (ESE^ and FEDER (European 
Regional Development Funds). Although the ESF and other funds earmarked for 
regional development were technically negotiated between the EU and state-level 
elites (in Madrid), many o f the Spanish regions had established direct representation 
before the EU with offices in Brussels (Morata 1994,162). The idea behind the policy 
is that gross disparities between the regions o f Europe could lead to instability, which 
would, in turn, threaten the values that were at the very core o f Europe's self-identity: 
democracy and universal human rights. The idea o f “subsidiarity.” similar to the idea 
of “devolution” in the United States, has been widely discussed in Europe in the last 
twenty years (Lodge). Theoretically, the work o f  Marks. Hooge et al. (1996) has 
advanced the idea o f  “multi-level governance” in the European Union.
Taken together, these trends and theories make European regional politics an 
important topic o f study in its own right, and give prima facie  evidence-to be explored 
in this study-that international factors are important in regional politics, and that 
regional elites can benefit from international assistance. The extant literature has not
‘*For example, the European Regional Assembly (ARE) was founded in 1985. which 
united several disparate pre-existing organizations in a permanent organization with 
fifteen founding members, its own bureaucracy, Secretary-General, and six working 
groups. It a  “Final Declaration” from its 1993 Bonn meeting, the ARE made two 
noteworthy resolutions to further a “Europe o f  the regions”: to promote the widespread 
application of the principle o f  “subsidiarity,”  and secondly, the permanent establishment 
o f the “Committee o f the Regions” in the EU system as called for in the Maastrict Treaty 
(Morata 1994,161).
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asked (or answered) what the regional elites are doing with these funds politically 
beyond building infiastructure. More important, what are regional elites doing with 
these additional funds to overcome historical societal problems-such as low social 
capital equilibrium-that have retarded democracy in those regions? There is a dearth 
in the extant literature on these important questions.
Finally, at the most specific level, why study regional elites in Spain? The 
most basic reason is that, given the importance o f the territorial dimension to Spanish 
politics set out above, especially its re-emergence post-Franco, regional elites have 
been grossly understudied. But equally important is that they have been significant, 
autonomous actors in the process o f democratic consolidation in post-Franco Spain. 
Preliminary research had indicated that at least some elites in post-Franco Spain were 
showing the reverse course o f the U.S. pattern of "progressive political ambition” from 
local to state to national politics (Fowler and McClure 1987) by either leaving the 
national stage for regional politics, or by choosing to remain in regional politics, 
despite their clear ability to move into national politics and frequent urging that they 
do so. Two clear examples o f  figures with national renown in Spain: Manuel Fraga 
Iribame, now the President o f theXi/ma o f Galicia, who had been a cabinet minister 
under Franco, and was the founder o f  the post-Franco center-right party AP. the 
forerunner o f the current ruling party, the P.P., and secondly, Jordi Pujol, who had 
been a heroic opposition figure to the Franco regime, suffering several years o f 
imprisonment, and now the venerable president o f the Generalitat o f Catalunya.
Secondly, the democratization literature in general has posited that two o f  the
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most critical factors in the democratization process are inter-elite "concertation” 
(bargaining and pact-making), and the role o f elites in promoting labor organization 
and what Przeworski calls the "democratic class compromise” (O’Donnell et al. 1986: 
I), yet this literature is virtually silent on the role that regional elites can, should, and 
did play in the process. Again, my preliminary research indicated (and I believe my 
fieldwork supports the notion) that regional elites were actively involved in, and. in 
some cases, crucial to, the concertaciôn and pacting process in their regions.
Moreover, my fieldwork also confirmed what Putnam et al. (1987, 1988; 1993) 
observed about Italian politics since the 1970’s: many o f  the political organizations, 
and much o f the political action, has devolved” from the center to the regions in Italy.
The causal hypothesis stated above, which focuses on the role o f regional elites 
in bringing about specific outcomes, will permit a focus on specific actors located 
within specific institutional matrices (Steinmo et al., eds. 1992; Hall 1986). It is very 
important to focus on specific actors, their behaviors and strategic intentions, in order 
to achieve precision and clarity, and to avoid the mistake o f further mystifying such 
institutions as the "state,” or to ascribe causal weight to vague theoretical constructs.
It is also important to examine actors’ intentions and perceptions, both as they 
describe them and others perceive them, in order to gain a fuller understanding that is 
not possible with the observation o f empirical behavior alone. More importantly, one 
cannot ascertain whether leadership actually occurred unless one knows whether the 
change was, as Bums asserts, "broadly intended real change,” and "collectively 
purposeful causation” (1978,434).
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Models
The methodological framework employed here is the "most different” systems
design o f Mills, and the “most similar” research design o f  Lijphart (Przeworski and
Teune 1970). This method seeks to carefully select a tew cases which are as closely
matched on “secondary characteristics” as possible in order to control for common
systemic characteristics which helps to minimize the number o f experimental
variables. Therefore, as Przeworski and Teune explain:
if  some important differences are found among these otherwise similar 
countries, then the number o f  factors attributable to these differences 
will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms o f  those 
differences alone (1970,32).
The advantage o f this method is that the researcher is able to more accurately 
gauge the causation o f  a given phenomenon because the outcome is held constant. To 
be certain, there is a danger o f “overdetermination” if the researcher identifies a large 
number o f independent variables that purport to explain the same dependent variable. 
However, as Huntington (1993,36-37) observers, overdetermination is a problem 
“only for those concerned with evaluating theories. The same does not exist for those 
concerned with explaining events,” as is the goal o f this study.
Putnam et al. (1993) has argued that what makes democracy “work” is 
effective institutional, i.e. policy, performance and a historical tradition o f high “social 
capital” (e.g. trust, political participation and connectivity) at the regional level (what 
they call the “civic community”). This book provides the closest blueprint in the 
existing literature as a model for the proposed study. Pumam's recent approach is
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salutary for the study o f democratic consolidation in at least three ways.” First» it is 
properly located at the level “where the action is” and prevents obscuring important 
regional differences by treating a  national state as only one case. Secondly, it 
represents a more manageable research project than the study o f  an entire state. 
Finally, the variation across several regions in one state can provide valuable insights, 
much as the “most different” system design does by deliberately Juxtaposing different 
cases—usually states—in the comparative method.
There are several differences between Making Democracy Work and the 
proposed study, however. Most fundamentally. Putnam et al.'s dependent variable of 
“institutional performance” is clearly different than of this study, what I have termed 
the “democratic stabilization.” As Tarrow(l996) rightly points out, policy 
“performance is as likely to be positive in nondemocratic as in democratic states” (pp. 
395-396). While an undoubtedly important dependent variable, “institutional 
performance,” as operationalized by Pumam, does not measure or indicate the degree 
o f democratic stability necessary for long-term democratic consolidation.
More recently, Pumam has made the term "social capital” more analytically 
useful by making the distinction between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital 
(2000,22). The analytical distinction is simple: bonding social capital reinforces 
existing social cleavages and. relationships, while bridging social capital cross-cuts
”Methodologically, several reviewers have praised Pumam et al. for their bold, and at 
least partially successful, marriage o f  quantitative techniques and historical-instimtional 
analysis. See Sidney Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time...” 
APSR 90 :2  (June 1996), 389-397.
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these cleavages, creating new social connections.-" According to Putnam, “bridging” 
social capital is far more important to the consolidation and long-term health o f 
democracy than “bonding” social capital is; in certain circumstances, “bonding” social 
capital can even undermine the democratic system.-' However, even in his latest, 
large-scale work devoted to fleshing out the implications o f social trust on American 
politics and society, Pumam never fully explores these provocative assertions, 
especially the critical relationship between types o f social capital and the survivability 
o f the democratic system itself.
Review o f the Literature
The most significant literature on democratization, from a theoretical 
standpoint, is the O'Donnell and Schmitter series. Transitions Jrom Authoritarian Rule 
(1986). Its importance to the field cannot be overstated.— Written at the beginning 
o f the world-wide trend towards democratization, however, it focused on “transition” 
to (versus “consolidation” of) democracy. There is now however, widespread 
acknowledgment that the focus on transition has become dated, and detailed
■"However, in practice, Putnam notes, the two types o f  social capital are often 
intermingled.
-‘In Putnam’s evocative language, bridging social capital is held to be “sociological 
superglue,” while bonding social capital is merely “sociological WD-40,” i.e. it provides 
only superficial lubrication to grease the skids o f everyday life (Pumam 2000,23).
—Barbara Geddes, in a conference paper, notes that the Transitions volume is still 
cited more than six times as much as the next closest citation in democracy scholarship. 
See Geddes (1997,2 fh.3).
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scholarship has emerged in this next area o f  comparative politics at the next stage o f 
the democratization process^ the consolidation o f democracy. The series editors 
(O'DonnelU Schmitter and Whitehead) spin out a smorgasbord o f causal factors 
affecting democratic transitions, with no clear hierarchy o f explanation. For example, 
Schmitter offers the following independent variables that purport to explain the 
process o f  democratic transition; the diminishing o f the military threat and repression, 
the rise o f a "civil society” as a necessary base for democratic attitudes and resistance 
(a major transformation), the discrediting o f  the Soviet-Communist party model ("real 
existing socialism”) and other extreme alternatives, and the proximity and 
attractiveness o f the relative tolerance o f the European parliamentary/proportional 
representation system over the American 'Nvinner take all system.” and vague interna­
tional and cross-national pressures. The real focus o f the Transitions volume, 
however, was on the behavior and strategies o f national elites during the relatively 
brief, choatic and heady transition period; actions and choices that would later chart 
the course o f  the transition's political outcome. This approach has become known as 
the "elite-agency” model (Schmitz and Sells 1999,31), and it has dominated the 
literature on democratization ever since; most post-1987 studies on democracy in 
Spain adapt this framework.^
Based on Spain's long history and the more recent "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian"
^And, o f  course, the chapter on Spain by Maravall and Santamaria within the 
Transitions volume followed the general approach laid out by O'Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead. The focus was on the pacts made by political elites and peak associations 
(such as Labor and Business) during the early transition period following the death o f 
France from 1977-79.
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practices o f  General Francisco Franco (1939-75), and Spain's cultural legacy o f  
corporatism (Wiarda 1982), the apparently successful consolidation o f liberal 
democracy was not anticipated in most o f the literature. As Gunther notes (1986, 13), 
”both o f its previous experiments in democracy, the Restoration... [period of]
1874-1923 and the Second Republic o f 1931-1936, culminated in the establishment o f 
authoritarian regimes.” Despite this lack o f foresight in the professional literature, not 
only has Spain made the 'transition” to democracy, it is well through a period o f 
"consolidation” o f  democratic practices and institutions. It is now widely agreed in the 
literature that democratic consolidation has taken place in Spain, by whatever measure 
is employed (Story and Pollack 1991, 125; Preston 1986,227; Gunther et al. 1988; 
Linz and Stepan 1996). There have been six successful national elections (many more 
regional ones), one major coup attempt thwarted (but none recently), and the hallmark 
o f consolidated democracy; a complete rotation o f parties in power from conservative 
to (relatively) liberal and back again (vir.. the current conservative ruling party 
coalition under Aznar). Schmitter (1990,21) insists on only one election, in which 
power is peacefully transferred to the opposition, as the starting point for democratic 
consolidation. Others stress the acceptance by all major political players o f  certain 
"rules" (Schmitter 1990,21ff; Whitehead 1989; Huntington 1989; Saez 1991).
The bulk o f  the literature on the process o f democratization in post-Franco 
Spain can be grouped into nine 'clusters.* The following clusters are treated in the 
literature as independent causation o f democratization in Spain (the dependent 
variable).
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1. Spain’s cultural history o f corporatism,
2. The role o f  the Church,
3. The role o f the political parties (especially centrist ones).
4. The institutional-constitutional arrangements that were made, especially 
during the transitional phase.
5. The role o f  national elite leadership, both Franco's attempts at modernization, 
and later the key roles they played in the transition.
6. The role o f Labor (including that organized under Franco's initially puppet
labor confederation, the "Vertical Syndicate").
7. The role of the Military,
8. The role o f  the radical left,
9. International pressures by themselves.
Each o f these clusters in the literature will be treated briefly in turn, below.
The methods employed in the relevant literature range from historical analysis to 
political economy. This brief overview gives prima facie  evidence that sub­
national/regional factors are not cited in the literature as having independent causation 
for the process o f democratization in Spain. Each o f  the nine clusters identified above 
will now be treated in more depth.
There are two distinct trends in the general literature on culture in relation to 
the process o f democratization. An older trend looks at national-mass measures of 
culture, and the newer revival o f "political culture” examines national-elite and civil 
society indications o f culture.
The older national-mass cluster in the above list is represented by Howard 
Wiarda, best known for his culture-based corporatist explanations for regime types in 
the "Iberic" world. Wiarda asserts that corporatism explains the current democratic 
regime type in Spain, but one searches his large work (1989) in vain for an explanation 
o f how. Because o f its anti-democratic history, argues Wiarda, democracy in Spain is
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throughout much o f their history by mountains and the sea. I have proposed above
(e.g., in variable AT/) to disaggregate the concept o f “culture,” and to examine the
effects that identifiable facets o f culture have on regional elites’ behavior and
strategies during the consolidation phase o f democracy.
Diamond (1999) concurs with this proposed understanding o f  political culture.
as in the following quotation:
It may even be argued that differences in basic cultural biases are often 
greater within nations than between them. The existence o f these 
political subcultures compels us to disaggregate and to tread with 
caution in speaking o f  the political culture o f  a nation, except as a 
distinctive mixture or balance o f orientations within in a coimtry (p.
164).
The function o f centrist parties is widely acknowledged to have been 
important in the transition phase in Spain, especially in formulating the initial pacts 
between themselves, regional governments and peak business and labor organizations 
(Villa Gil and Sagardoy Bengoechea 1987). These famous tripartite pacts (the Pact of 
Moncloa is the best known) governed the rules o f succession, fiscal matters, power- 
sharing arrangements, and. in general, insured that the early Spanish transition would 
be a relatively smooth one. What is not clear is what role the party system has played 
in the consolidation phase, or the emerging relationship between national and regional 
parties in the context o f democratization. Two outstanding analyses o f  the role o f the 
parties are: Gunther (1989) and Caciagli (1984). Caciagli writes o f the “crisis o f the 
party system” and the widespread ''desencanto'"’ (a combination o f apathy and 
cynicism) that has infected the Spanish public’s view o f  the parties. This is reflected
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ia the PCE’s and UCD’s rapid demise in the eighties, and the rise and fall o f  several 
other parties (Lancaster 1994; Perez-Diaz 1993). The only stable, consistent party in 
state-level politics through the early I990's was the Spanish Socialist Workers Party 
(PSOE), but its platform and tactics have changed so radically for the sake o f survival 
and pragmatism as to be almost unrecognizable. The PSOE itself is now in eclipse 
after losing the national election in 1996 to a newly resurgent center-right coalition 
represented by the Partido Popular (Popular Party—PP). And, over the long term, 
parties and other electoral links are a poor descriptor or predictor o f elite-mass 
linkages (Pumam 1972, 144-160). Clearly, political parties alone cannot serve as 
strong independent variables to explain Spanish democratic consolidation, as one 
cluster in the literature hoped they might (e.g. see Pridham ed. 1990).
Spain is depicted by much o f the literature as a "model" o f institutional- 
constitutional construction during its transition phase (Bermeo 1994; Bresser et al. 
1992; Schmitter 1992, 168; Villa Gil and Sagardoy Bengoechea 1987; Bonime-Blanc 
1987). In other words, "Spain [is] the most "impressive’ example o f the marriage o f 
concertation’'* and democratization, [and is] a near-perfect model for a 'concerted* 
approach to the challenges posed by dual transitions’’^  (Encamacion 1996.484).
’^ ""Concertation” comes from the Spanish word ^^Concertaciôn\ meaning to 
harmonize interests. In practice, it means a  mode o f  policy formulation in which elite 
representatives from ""peak” associations (usually Labor, Capital and the State) attempt to 
reach a mutually beneficial, or satisfactory, ""pact”, or agreement. See Villa Gil and 
Sagardoy Bengeochea 1987, and Encamacion 1996,490 n. 13).
“ Encamacion (1996,477) means by ""dual transition” the ""historic coincidence o f  
[political] democratization and economic liberalization in dozens o f nations...”.
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acknowledge^ however, the initial and continuing relevance o f  Spanish regional 
politics to its democratic consolidation. Other sources provide only a descriptive- 
configurative approach to the study o f regions in Spain (e.g. Heywood 1995; Kern 
1995).
Another cluster in the literature portrays the movement towards democratic 
consolidation in Spain as completely or almost completely the product o f national 
elite direction and leadership. Franco himself knew that he had to begin liberalization 
in his waning years if  his legacy were to survive. By both (1 ) naming Juan Carlos as 
his successor, and (2) allowing increasing labor liberalization, he helped propel Spain 
on a course that became far more open and inclusive (esp. o f the Communists and far 
Left) than he would have liked. In addition, liberal elite elements of Opus Der^ and 
the Military helped the process o f democratization through greater liberality in the 
financial system and legal code, and provided the crucial “opening” in the reforma 
pactada. Indeed, Share and Mainwaring (1984) have gone so far as to claim that 
Spain is purely a case study o f “Democratization from Above” (i.e. directed by 
national political and military elites). Their hasty reasoning does not support this 
broad claim, however. This cluster in the literature tends to exaggerate the importance 
and impact on democratization o f the actions o f a  few national elites during the short 
but intense early transition period, 1977-1979, and by the same token, to ignore the
~^Opus Dei is a  secretive Catholic lay organization, originally founded in Spain in 
1928, that gained increasing prominence in the Franco regime. It ‘'married a  progressive 
belief in technocratic rationalization as the key to Spain^s economic development with a 
highly conservative theological, social and political outlook (Heywood 1995,70). It still 
exercises considerable influence in Spain today, especially in economic and social affairs.
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regional lines, and that most o f today’s regional elites came o f political age in the 
struggle against Franco. Ironically, however. Franco's (state-led) corporatist attempts 
to co-opt and control Labor through the "Vertical Syndicate” (OSE) later evolved into 
a platform for genuine democratic reforms (Encamacion 1996.488-89). Fowerakefs 
work is criticized by Heywood (1991) as having a “romantic vision o f the working 
class struggle against Franco” (p. 136), and for clearly overstating Labor’s role in 
Spain’s overall democratic transition, especially the vineyard workers in the southern 
El Marco de Jerez province o f Andalucta on which Foweraker focuses. Nonetheless, 
Foweraker’s focus on democratization efforts below the state level is a rare and useful 
departure from the bulk o f the literature.
What Foweraker and others (e.g.. Fishman 1990) do not explore is the role that 
provincial and regional labor leaders played in regional democratization efforts, i.e. 
how they devised strategies or responded to pressures from both rank-and-file 
members below or from above, from the European-based international unions (such as 
the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC). For example. Perez-Diaz (1993) 
notes that rank-and-file members o f Catalonian trade unions pressured their more 
radical leaders to pursue more accomodative strategies with regional and national 
political elites, as did international labor leaders. This moderation was key to 
establishing liberal parliamentary democracy, he asserts. Before these compromises, 
regional instability was very high in Catalonia and other industrial regions; the number 
o f strikes by Spanish workers was second only to those o f Italy (Heywood 1995,239). 
Perez-Diaz does not elaborate on the actual strategies and bargains struck, however. In
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addition, the social costs and austerity^ measures imposed by the Spanish national 
government as a  result o f  its commitment to European “convergence” fell 
disproportionately on Labor, especially in the more heavily industrialized region o f 
Catalonia and elsewhere. Regional leaders were left largely to deal with the aftermath 
o f these national policies.
One o f the big surprises in post-Franco Spanish politics is the small and 
declining role played by the Communist Party o f Spain (PCE) and other elements of 
the radical left, who once claimed a large allegiance among Spanish voters, and who 
played such a vital role in the often dangerous and underground struggle against 
Franco. Gunther (1986,148ff; 1989) asserts that internal splits and personality clashes 
lead to the PCE's demise. This same conclusion is arrived at in a book devoted 
exclusively to the subject by Alba (1983), a self-professed insider and political 
Journalist. Alba, however, focuses almost entirely on the PCE's early years, i.e. the 
1920's-60's. A more likely explanation is the deliberate choices o f national and 
regional leaders to refrain from the “Exit” option urged by the radical left, and to 
instead accept the “Loyalty” and “Voice” options within a democratic regime. And the 
recent success o f  the Popular Party and the new Spanish right suggests that the basic 
appeal o f the far leftist ideology has lost its resonance with a majori ty o f the Spanish 
voting public. Whatever attractiveness and force the radical left once held in Spanish 
politics, it clearly has played a very limited role in the process o f democratic 
consolidation, a t either the regional or national level.
Under the general heading o f  international factors, one finds works that
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democracy in the first case (the so-called “bad luck”-^  thesis) and its success in the 
second case. Maravall et al. (1986:1,91) are in complete agreement on this point. In 
general, Tovias makes a good case for the importance o f international factors and the 
integration process o f Spain into Europe for any complete understanding of Spanish 
democratization.
Laurence Whitehead (1986, 1989, 1991) also stresses international factors in
explaining the successful recent cases o f  democratic consolidation, especially in
Southern Europe. Whitehead believes that the EC/EU has done a far better and more
consistent Job than the United States at promoting democracy; the EC has at least
always made membership and the hope o f  membership "non-discretionary.” i.e.
unyieldingly dependent on a democratic form o f government (Powers 1988,28). In
addition, argues Whitehead, the EC offered critical external guarantees to Spain's
business and propertied classes. He calls the approach o f the EC “democracy
promotion” (versus the “imposition” approaches o f the U.S. in Latin America). In his
1991 book, he explains the differences this way:
The broad alternative to democracy promotion by unilateral imposition 
is democracy promotion by mutual accommodation. In this case the 
giver may well recognize the imperfection or vulnerability of the home 
democracy, which may be strengthened by external reinforcement 
(1991,240).
In this quotation, Whitehead echoes Gourevitch's earlier assertion that there is a t\vo~
“’The “bad luck” thesis asserts that a  harsh international climate in the 1930's, 
especially in Europe, was an important reason for the failure o f  so many nascent 
democracies o f that time period. Factors cited include an economic depression, “beggar 
thy neighbor” economic policies, the rise o f  fascism, and retrenchment by the world's 
democracies.
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way interaction between the domestic and international levels (or "images). In this 
instance, democracy appears to be strengthened (or further consolidated) in both the 
supported country and the supporting country(-ies).
More recent work on the international factors on domestic democratization 
(e.g., see Grugel, ed. 1999) have moved away from examining formal and procedural 
links between national and international governmental elites and instead attempted to 
shift the focus to trans-national ("people-to-people”) links between NGO’s and other 
non-govemmental civil society actors. The understanding o f ‘'regionalism” in this 
approach, however, is o f  contiguous groups o f developing countries, not sub-state 
territories, and the approach frankly disdains elites at any level, hoping to “bring the 
masses back in.” There appears to be a large normative element in this proposed 
change o f  focus; in any case, empirical support for the proposed linkages remains very 
limited at this early point in this type o f  international democratization studies.
As valuable as these insights on international factors are, they tend to treat the 
effect o f international factors as uniform across regions in the recipient country, and 
the interaction as occurring solely between national and international actors. It is 
postulated here that the effect o f international factors (finance, technical and other 
assistance) will be different depending on the needs (e.g. basic infrastructure, 
agricultural subsidies or trade links) o f the region, the region's elites and their 
strategies and interactions with international elites.
The only body o f  literature that could be located on the importance o f  regional 
elites and politics in a democratizing country are studies on India. For example, a
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noted scholar o f India, Subrata fC. Mitra, asks this penetrating question, “[I]f India’s 
political process as a whole has remained democratic, then why are the regional and 
local exceptions so frequent and persistent?” (Mitra 2003,638). Mitra does not fully 
answer his own intriguing question, but notes ± a t strong regional variations in 
religion, economic development and class alignments throughout India must be a part 
o f the answer.
Given the foregoing review o f  the literature, this study seeks to make a  
contribution to the literature in the following ways. First, it seeks to treat regional 
elites as ftiily autonomous political actors. Secondly, it seeks to understand the nature 
o f their role in providing democratic stability in their region during the transition and 
early consolidation period.’* Third, it seeks to understand their mediation with 
national and international elites in ensuring democratic stability in their region. This 
third goal o f the study is to be pursued for both theoretical as well as practical reasons. 
Theoretically, it is derived from the Gourevitch’s (1978) ‘‘Second Image Reversed” 
thesis in which he asserted that domestic political outcomes could be increasingly 
understood with reference to international factors. Spain’s proximity to the European 
Union, and the EU’s role in the Spanish democratic transition, at both the state and 
regional levels, make Gourevitch’s theoretical observations o f  great practical value as
■*The literature generally dates the transition phase in Spain from 1975-1982, and the 
consolidation period from 1982 to the present (e.g., see Linz and Stepan 1996,108ff). 
However, I will assert that democracy is not fully consolidated in at least one region o f 
the country, e.g. Galicia in this study, according to my “P-3 indicators o f democratic 
consolidation” set out above, and also according to Linz and Stepan’s measure o f the 
“behavior o f [politically] significant groups” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 109).
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Plan o f the Dissertation
The dissertation is comprised o f six chapters. This chapter has introduced the 
subject matter, working hypotheses, and performed a preliminary review of the 
literature. Chapter two will introduce and Justify the selection o f  cases, and the 
methods to be employed to study them. Chapter three will begin the substantive work 
with a discussion o f the patrimonial, or democratic authoritarian” regional elite 
leadership style found in Galicia, in northwest Spain, during the consolidation o f 
democracy in Spain. Chapter four will continue to discuss the fhiits o f my fieldwork 
with an exploration o f the "communitarian” leadership style QÎAndalucia in southern 
Spain. Chapter five will conclude the substantive fieldwork chapters with a discussion 
o f the ‘"visionary” leadership style observed in Cataluha in northeastern Spain during 
the transition and consolidation period. Chapter six will serve three purposes: first to 
sum up the findings across and among the selected Spanish cases, two, to show the 
findings o f the relationship between regional elite leadership styles and the level and 
quality o f  democratic stability in that region, and three, make heuristic suggestions for 
future research and generalizability o f these cases to other similar cases in the future. 
As a  result o f  the case studies, four patterns were uncovered: (1) structuring o f 
political dissent, (2) regional elite intermediation with national and international elites, 
(3) the use o f  nationalism, and (4) region-specific policymaking.
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Chapter 2: Case Selection and Methods
In this chapter the methods that were actually used in gathering the research for 
this project will be Justified and discussed. It is hoped that such a discussion will not 
only prove to be intellectually sound, but also a usefol guide to other researchers who 
are contemplating using similar methods. First, we will consider the question o f case 
selection, and appropriate methodology, then the elite interviewing technique in 
general, and finally, the actual process o f interviewing Spanish regional elites.
I. The Logic o f Case Selection
While no pretense is made here that the selection of the three regions in Spain 
represents a truly random sample, there is a logic to their selection, viz., it increases the 
'‘leverage” o f the data and the explanations proffered (King et al. 1994,29-31). 
Secondly, these cases are selected for a wide range o f variation on the independent 
variable, regional elite leadership style. As noted earlier, there is some variation on 
the study variable, political stability, and the ultimate dependent variation, the degree 
o f democracy.^ The cases selected increase leverage in two ways:
1. They allow for the collection o f “as much data in as many diverse settings as 
possible” (King et al. 1994,24), and
2. Their selection, along with the multiple levels of analysis in the structure o f  the 
research hypotheses, allows for the collection o f  evidence in “varied contexts.”
^Degrees o f  democracy is held to.be a  continuous, not at dichotomous variable, but no 
attempt to quantify this variable will be made.
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and “different levels o f  aggregation,” which, according to King et al. (1994, 
30), makes the explanation more “powerful,” by increasing the number o f 
observable implications o f theory (p. 218). Ultimately, the result o f  these 
procedures is that, “the more confidence we and others should have in our 
conclusions.”
More specifically, each case selected brings a  set o f  unique elements and 
diversity to the overall study. This diversity applies to each o f the major variables laid 
out above: demographic characteristics, language, history, form o f regional 
government, geography, and political-economic relations (such as that between Labor. 
Capital and the State). Although more detail on each o f  the regions will appear in the 
appropriate chapters, as outlined in the proposed table o f  contents (above), a summary 
chart here will help highlight the diversity o f the regional governments on the selected 
variables.
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that different styles o f leadership are capable o f contributing to political stability and 
democratic consolidation. The case will also help illustrate some variation in the 
dependent variable, showing that differences in the styles o f  regional elite leadership 
also produce variations in the trajectory o f democratic consolidation in a region.
H. Research Design and Methodology
This is a study o f "observable implications” of democratic consolidation in 
selected autonomous regions o f Spain. The use of the term "observable implications” 
here follows the definition o f King et al. (1994.28ff): "an observation that is relevant 
to the implications o f the theory [which] enable us to infer about the correcmess o f the 
theory.”
Eckstein argues persuasively for the importance o f single test cases for theory 
building or modification o f existing theory, and the general advancement o f 
knowledge not possible from a compilation o f single-point observations (1970. 113ff). 
The particulars gained from such case studies can be used inductively to construct 
broad, abstract theories that may be applied across cases and across time. The end­
point o f such theorizing, according to Przeworski and Teune (1970) is a theory that 
makes generalized, causal statements. These kinds o f statements are also referred to as 
"covering laws” by Hempel (1956). and are the cornerstone for the scientific model to 
which political science aspires.
For our purposes. SkocpoL and Somers' (1980) notion o f the "cycle o f research” 
is more modest than the “covering law” model, and probably is more realistic for the 
case-study driven field researcher. It preserves a special place o f importance for
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“macro-causal” case studies, such as this one. Macro-causal case studies both limit 
overly-grand theory (by providing an independent means o f  falsification), and help in 
the construction o f  new theory.
There are very practical reasons for employing the case-study method as well, 
especially from the policy standpoint (Russett 1970,427). Although every case is 
slightly different, policy-makers look to similar cases as guidance for future policy 
action. Since my interest in social capital, democratic consolidation and leadership 
styles is prescriptive and normative as well as explanatory, the ‘how to’ or how not 
to’ components—as revealed in a case study—are very important to me. If a  strong case 
can be made for the validity o f the hypotheses in the Spanish cases, then the 
hypotheses presented here may be worthy o f application to similar cases.
Data Collection Method. The primary qualitative sources o f data for this study is 
the field research from my 1998 trip to Spain, which includes interviews, on-site 
archival research, and some disciplined observation. 1 found to be true Fenno’s 
observation (1990) that, “data collection and data analysis do not proceed in a linear 
progression. They proceed simultaneously” (p. 84).
One way in which I attempted to “triangulate” the research within the 
qualitative format was to obtain as many different types o f elite interviews as possible;
i.e. to ask elites what they thought o f  one another, and to obtain non-political elite 
interviews (or “private sector”) as well as political elite interviews. The aim here was 
to boost reliability o f interview data by asking several different sources similar sets o f 
questions. Furthermore, I believe that one o f  the great strengths o f this study lies in
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this attempt to better understand the context and the broader institutional networks in 
which regional political elites operate. This is particularly true of smaller regional 
elites, because they have both the opportunity and necessity (in order to build the 
necessary political base) o f  dealing with every significant sector of society within their 
relatively narrow geographical boundaries. However, this method o f interviewing and 
"soaking and poking” adds a additional layer o f  complexity to the already severe 
demands, physically and mentally, o f this type o f  research that Fenno notes (1990. 84- 
87).
Elite Interviewing Technique
Perhaps the strongest defense o f using elite interviews in studying modem
politics is offered by Dexter (1970). Dexter makes the following counter-intuitive
statement about the rarity and recent nature o f rigorous, academic interviewing:
|T]nterviewing...goes back a long way-back to Lord Bryce or, for that 
matter, back to the Greeks-but emphasis upon empirical methods o f 
investigation (which in practice generally meant interviewing) as 
symbolizing a new political science, was a characteristic of the early 
1950's(p. 13).
Dexter is given strong support by an earlier practitioner o f  the interview technique. 
Heard (1950):
They [political elites] talked with a generosity and interest which 
suggested that political scientists should tap more and more this great 
source o f information about politics, the politicians themselves (p.
892).
There are at least three reasons why this method is particularly useful to the 
research question under examination in this study:
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1. The exploratory^* nature o f  this research,
2. The need to understand the complex and contextualized framework in which 
regional elites operate, and
3. The need to understand a set o f cases in depth: ”a deliberate decision to 
sacrifice analytical range for analytical depth” (Fenno 1990 [1978], 60). 
Concerning the first point, the literature review in chapter one (above)
demonstrates the lacunae in the existing literature on the role that regional elites play
during a  transition and on what styles o f  leadership they develop towards their newly
democratic constituency. In other words, there is a lack o f the most basic data on this
phenomenon, and the need is clear for qualitative, data-gathering work.
In his earlier work, Dexter (1970) also amplifies point one, as he stresses the
unstructured nature as the sine qua non o f  the elite interview:
...[A]n elite interview [is] an interview with any interviewee...who in 
terms of the current purposes o f the interviewer is given special, non­
standardized treatment. By special, non-standardized treatment, I 
mean:
1. Stressing the interviewee’s definition o f the situation.
2. Encouraging the interviewee to structure the account o f the 
situation,
3. Letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent...his 
notions o f what he regards as relevant, instead o f relying upon 
the investigator’s notions o f relevance (Dexter 1970,5; italics in 
original).
As Dexter points out, the most interesting (i.e. new knowledge) part o f the
^'The role o f regional elites in democratization is not an established research agenda 
like the role o f class analysis is in Comparative Politics, or the effect o f  the incumbency 
advantage on Congress is in American Politics.
Page 54
interview may be the least ‘‘structured,” and that the investigator should always be 
open to learning something genuinely new or unthought of from the experts in the 
freld.
On the second point general point above (the importance o f context), Dexter
notes why the interview technique-in the right hands—is of paramount importance:
[T]he experienced person in any field knows that things happen in a 
subtle, confused, foggy, complex way, which cannot be studied or 
codified simply; the person without practical experience and without 
much contact wants to sharpen and simplify (1970,20).
Dexter (1970, I7ff) issues a coherent framework for when to use interviewing,
when not to, and some useful caveats. The most useful caveat (for this study) is the
observation that one should never rely primarily upon interviews for data if  the
interviewer has no training in the same field as the interviewee, and an ability to
“listen with the third ear,” that is an ability to place one's self into the same framework
as the interviewee.^ I believe that my two trips to Spain, and long study o f Spanish
politics, history, language and culture have given me the ability to “listen with the
third ear.”
Even though I primarily employed the elite interviewing technique, I carefully 
observed the context in which each elite actor operated. In order to understand this 
milieu, I expended considerable time and energy reading and watching all local media 
outlets, attending cultural fairs, observing street life, and even participating in parades
'’“This point was illustrated dramatically for the author when a Spanish citizen was 
unable to understand, or even adequately translate, one o f the interviews for this study 
which was shared with her. Even though she was fluent in her own language, she did not 
have an adequate “vocabulary” o f  understanding to make sense o f  the interview.
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and political demonstrations (as an imobtrusive observer).^^ In one instance, I spent 
several late evenings “hanging out” with political elites in Sevilla as they made the 
rounds o f eateries, bars and other gathering places. I did find such “soaking and 
poking” to be very useful in understanding attitudes and contexts in which regional 
political leaders operate.
It is important to separate academic elite interviewing from typical Journalistic 
interviews. Fenno minces no words as he describes the difference between good elite 
interviewing and political Journalism:
[M]y conclusion is that Journalists will come to conclusions 
about politicians too quickly, too superficially, and too inflexibly to fill 
the political scientists’ need for an understanding o f the politicians.
Their collective rush to Judgment, the incompleteness and lopsidedness 
o f their evidence, and their large swings in attentiveness, give plenty o f 
support for this conclusion. Especially since so much o f  what they [do] 
is explainable by the durable built-in incentives...of their 
profession...(Fenno 1990.54).
This distinction is not lost on politicians themselves, in my experience. One of 
the first questions I was asked before I could begin my interviews with Spanish elites 
was usually, “you’re not a Journalist, are you?” ’^’ In fact, the tendency by the public to
■’^ Participating in street demonstrations does present some tricky moments. In one 
instance, I blended in with a large, chanting crowd roving the streets in Santiago de 
Compostela that was loudly denouncing the United States and using anti-U.S. epithets. 
More than once there were whispered looks thrown my way.
^Another reason that interviewees may ask this question is the legitimate concern 
about not being misquoted, or quoted out o f context. Before L even began the interview, I 
tried to allay any o f  those fears by explaining the nature o f  the project, asking for their 
permission to quote them, and showing that 1 was assiduous about getting what they said 
right through notes and tape recording. See sections on “establishing rapport” and the 
interview instrument.
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view politics as a cynical, scandal-ridden enterprise is probably even more prevalent in 
Spain than it is here; it is a  phenomenon that has been widely identified as desencanto, 
or “disenchantment” in the literature on Spanish democratization (see Chapter I, 
above). The rise of scandal-mongering and scandal-driven media coverage is also the 
subject o f a fairly recent book on Spanish politics by a Spanish author, entitled Behind 
the Political Scandals (Jimenez Sanchez 1995). Accordingly, Spanish politicians o f all 
levels appreciate being treated seriously and with respect.
In Spain, I began at the University o f Salamanca (where 1 have some personal 
experience with the University’s resources), and began a “snowball sample” that 
resulted in a series o f interviews. These interviews were conducted with local and 
regional elites in the selected regions, party officials, and officials o f the regional and 
local governments. All but one o f  these interviews was conducted in Spanish. I 
searched for data on campaign finances, and the financial connections between 
regional and local elites^^, in national and regional ministries, reporting agencies, and 
regional and local libraries. In order to gather more background information about 
Spanish regional elite attitudes and motives pertaining to the democratization process 
in their region., I have researched the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 
covering Europe while in the United States.
Framework for Analysis. The research question and subject matter o f this 
study are best analyzed using the general approach o f  the neo-historical
^^By “local elites,” I mean municipal government officials, and local labor, business 
and party and civic organization leaders.
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institutionalists (Steinmo, et al., eds. 1992). That is, the analyst should investigate 
“the whole range o f state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define 
their interests and structure their relations o f  power to other groups” (p. 2). It is these 
dense networks and matrices that provide ± e  incentives and disincentives that shape 
actor’s strategies and self-perception of interest.
1 do not propose to be a purist in the use o f analytical frameworks, however. 
Insights from other strands o f  theory will be used where appropriate; for example, the 
judicious use o f  game theory to explain the behavior and strategy sets employed by 
regional elites as they affect democratic consolidation at the regional level (see also 
Putnam 1993, 7).
Units of Analysis. The primary unit o f analysis is the individual, but at the 
level o f the regional elite. This concrete unit o f  analysis helps to avoid the problems 
o f imprecision in specifying the object o f study.
Methods of Analysis. The primary method o f  analysis is thorough evaluation 
o f original archival materials and interviews, supplemented by analysis o f  secondary 
data. 1 use simple tabular data where appropriate. This method required that I read 
not only Castillian Spanish, but also Galego and Catalan, which, although related to 
Spanish, are distinct languages. Many o f  the most important documents were only 
available in the regional language.
However, the primary focus o f this study is, and should be, field work. As 
Laitin ( 1996,10) notes, “we should go out into the field, for we cannot go to OECD
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data bases and look for packaged codings” for most new phenomena under study.^ ® 
And, as Fenno notes, most o f  the data to be gleaned from interviews is 
"nonstandardized and, hence, not quantifiable” (1990,89). Any attempt to quantify 
data from interviews inevitably involves choices and judgement, which would involve 
issues o f reliability and replication^^.
The Interview Instrument 
The interview instrument combined three elements: standard questions asked 
to all interviewees, specific questions tailored to the interests/expertise o f the 
particular interviewee, and finally, open-ended questions, [fan interview was going 
particularly well, then I made no attempt to cut it off prematurely, or restrict it into a 
rigid interview format. There are solid methodological reasons for maintaining this 
flexibility in interviewing, as Fenno ( 1990) notes. Fenno goes so far as to say that, 
when he began, 'T had no idea what questions to ask” (p. 57). While I do not entirely
^*Laitin’s observations are also part o f a  more fundamental critique o f  the use of 
"political culture” as an analytical concept in the way that it has been formulated and 
employed by Almond et al. (1963; 1989) to mean that mass public opinion surveys and 
other quantitative data reveal the political culture o f any given political unit, and that 
such attitudes directly translate into public practices (e.g. policy, institutions, etc.). 
Laitin's observations buttress my own (above, in Chapter I) about the inadequacy o f  this 
operationalization o f culture to study democratic consolidation and elite regional 
leadership styles in the context o f democratic consolidation. See also Berezin* s literature 
review (1997) for additional observations on this subject.
^^See also Heard’s decision to use interviews as a primary source o f  data, in full 
knowledge o f the reliability problem (Heard 1950,895).
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The Interview Setting and Format Heard (1950,89Iff.), Fenno (1978; 1990) 
and Babbie (1989,264ff.) write a great deal on the topic o f how and where interviews 
should be conducted. All o f ±ese authors suggest that the better interview will occur 
in “informal” settings, unencumbered by a tape recorder or any other artificial device 
(notebooks, cameras, etc.). Most o f my interviews occurred in formal settings o f the 
interviewees’ choosing, however.
In my experience, Spanish elites were no less likely to talk freely in a "formal” 
rather than in an informal setting. This is probably true for two reasons:
1. The great feeling o f freedom o f the post-Franco era means that they still revel 
in not having to guard against their comments and behavior;
2. Most Spaniards, in general, love to talk in flowery terms, and specifically, 
Spanish elites enjoy talking about matters political, social and economic. 
Regional differences were observed, however. Andalusians were generally the 
most talkative, Galicians the least, although still more than the more reserved 
north Europeans. This phenomenon is useful to an interviewer. The trick was, 
as Fenno suggests, to get interviewees away from stock phrases and glittering 
generalities, and towards an original answer (Fenno 1990,82). This is an area 
in which research in Spain-in general-probably differs from comparative 
research in other settings (e.g. north European countries) the tendency of 
Spanish speakers to embellish, and even obfuscate, the issue under discussion 
with apparently 'hmnecessary” detail.
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The reasons of necessity and practicality for obtaining formal interviews were
as follows:
1. The cultural divide and limitations o f time meant that I would not have many 
opportunities to “tag along” with elites (on any level) in Spain, as Fenno has 
done in his various studies. Some exceptions to this did occur, especially in 
Galicia and Andalusia, but my tagging along there usually occurred with the 
subordinates o f the elites, which was still valuable in its own right to 
understanding context. The point here is that informal access is an expensive 
commodity in both time and money; these costs have to be carefully weighed 
against the “payoff” that one might obtain with greater informal access.
2. Intensifying concerns with terrorism due to a resurgence o f Basque nationalist 
assassinations o f non-Basque politicians and “ordinary” people meant that 
elites were increasingly relying on controlled settings during my stay in Spain.
3. If one adds to that the barriers o f language (including several dialects) and 
culture, then it is especially important to have a record to return to do discover 
nuance, inflection and meaning that simple memory could not capture after 
only one experience o f listening.^^ Often expressions and nuance that do not 
come across in a literal transcription o f an interview communicate important
'’’The importance o f  having the tapes’ recording o f nuance and inflection was 
powerfully demonstrated to the author when he consulted with fluent Spanish teachers on 
difficult passages o f the tapes. Like the author, these native/professional speakers had to 
listen to the difficult passages repeatedly-only possible with a recording—in order to 
decipher the overall meaning o f  the passage.
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non-verbal preferences or tension with the spoken word that can be the most 
valuable part o f an interview.
4. I wanted to leave open the possibility that future "codings” could be taken from 
these interviews by obtaining an "objective” recording o f the interviews, tapes 
which could then be quantified and reviewed by several coders in order to 
obtain inter-coder reliability, 
m. The Logic of Interview Selection
If one accepts the cases selected, and the need for interviews to understand the 
phenomenon Just described, the logic of elite interview selection remains to be 
Justified. My methodological starting point was the widely-discussed phenomenon in 
political science and democratization literature that elites have a disproportionate 
impact on political outcomes, especially during times o f  systemic change (Diamond 
1999; O'Donnell e ta l. 1986; Higley and Burton 1989; Putnam 1977; Purnam 1993). 
Heard (1950) gives two other sound reasons for elite interviewing. First, only elites 
have the experience, the point o f view and the "freedom” to speak their minds. In 
pointing out the type o f  interviews that made up the bulk o f the classic work. Southern 
Politics in State and Nation^ Heard is very explicit: "the most valuable interviews were 
held with practitioners who related their personal experiences.... Their contribution 
was particularly significant because it was unavailable from other sources” (p. 894). 
Secondly, Heard continues that the higher up the politician was, i.e. the "more” elite 
that he was, the better the quali^ o f  information elicited from him: "the more self- 
sufficient the individual, the freer he was to talk....” and "the older and more
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experienced the politician, the more likely he was to speak freely” (p. 895).
One can anticipate the objection, '^vhy no mass, or man in the street,* 
interviews?” As Heard (1950) notes, interviewees are most helpful on subjects that 
directly touch on their personal experience and knowledge, which few persons outside 
o f elite political circles have, viz., '"Interviewees were most helpful when they 
described their own personal activities, things they knew about at first hand” (p. 896). 
Elites can exercise influence in a democratizing setting in a number o f ways:
1. Most importantly, by establishing and/or altering the ‘"meta-rules” o f the 
political game, elites help frame^° the ‘"possible” to be achieved in social and 
political life at any level, regional elites can perform this function at the 
regional level;
2. By establishing or altering procedural or policy decision-rules;
3. By setting agendas, both short and long-term;
4. By establishing infrastructure, communications networks and the physical 
institutions o f  governance.
5. By introducing a s^ le  o f political leadership and bargaining into regional
politics.
Selection o f Interviewees 
Forty-eight interviews were conducted in the three regions o f Spain cited
“^Political sociologists have recently begun to apply ""frame analysis*’ to understand 
how “preset narrative packages” and “networks” helped to simplify the task of collective 
action, especially among new social movements. For a review o f the concept see Berezin 
(1997).
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above, o f  which number thirty-seven proved to be particularly useful (see Appendix 
“B”). Following my definition o f “regional elites” set out in chapter one, they 
included politicians, political observers and other regional decision-makers such as 
leaders in business, the community and the (Catholic) Church, i.e. they were both 
public and private-sector elites. How were they selected?
Well before the I left for Spain, I determined who the formal elites were in 
each region— primarily leaders o f the regional governments, political parties, business 
leaders and a few church leaders. I wrote and mailed a standard letter to each one 
explaining the project, its overall purpose, invoking a connection (if one existed) and 
asking for permission to obtain an interview within a one-month framework that the 
researcher would be in that region. As is often the case in international social-science 
research, few o f these letters were actually mailed back to me; however, this was a 
worthwhile exercise for two reasons: first, it explained the purpose of the interview to 
allow true informed consent, and secondly, when I would later call upon interviewees 
by telephone or in person, they were usually much more amenable to be interviewed 
than if  the call/contact was the first o f any kind.
Upon arriving in Spain, I set about two tasks: to more thoroughly familiarize 
myself with the major political issues in each region, and to establish personal contacts 
that would allow me to actually gain access to the elites in the potential interview list. 
After two weeks o f  intensive study at the National Library, I first made a stop at the 
University o f Salamanca to establish initial contacts that were to prove crucial in 
gaining access to elite interviews later on. As this contact told me, “Spain is a
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Mediterranean country; you have to go through the ‘back door’ [use connections] 
always.”
[ followed a similar pattern in each o f the three regions: first a period o f  study 
(usually at the leading university library) and orientation, followed by the actual 
interviews. I spent about three to five weeks in each region. The first few interviews 
were usually as a result o f  the written letters (above), but after that, interviews came as 
a result o f  references from those interviews and others (often university professors). 
Therefore, like Heard (1950, 888), it was a combination o f a structured and a snowball 
sample. It was not entirely possible to identify all o f the relevant elites before 
beginning field research. After establishing a rapport with the initial interviewees, 
they would then vouch for the author to other elites. On many o f the later interviews, I 
found it best to Just “hang out” where regional elites gather-often at the Parliament 
building, party offices, etc. Because one usually has to have special permission to gain 
access to such locales, the mere fact that 1 was “inside” and had talked to others was 
often introduction enough.
Establishing Rapport 
Unlike Heard (1950), I could not “exploit common bonds” with interviewees, 
or “adapt...to colloquialisms, and even to local habits o f dress,” because 1 am not a 
Spaniard. Instead, however, 1 had three elements working in my favor: (I) my 
knowledge and interest in the individual interviewed and his situation, (2) as a 
knowledgeable outsider with no axe to grind, I presented myself as being impartial 
throughout, and (3) the prestige factor o f  a U.S. researcher coming such a  long way to
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listen to what the interviewee had to say. As a  Spanish graduate student noted, '‘you 
can get into to see people that it would be very hard for me to see.”
Unlike Fenno, 1 found it necessary to have a  prepared list o f  questions (see 
Appendix "A”) so as to standardize questions across regions; then to move to open- 
ended questions tailored for the interviewee as time and the interviewee’s interest 
allowed. Interviewees were usually generous with their time, however. Interviews 
lasted from twenty-five minutes to three hours, with the average interview lasting just 
over one hour. In the intense period o f interviewing in each region the author obtained 
between one and four interviews per day; two per day was the average.
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C hapter 3: Galicia^ Political Stabilization without Social-Capital Building
We begin our analysis o f the three Spanish regions with Galicia, a  beautiful, 
but “peripheral,” region located at the far northwestern comer o f Spain. It has the 
smallest population o f  the three regions that will be examined, with just under three 
million inhabitants today.
In this chapter, we will be concerned primarily with the greatest threat to long­
term democratic stabilization in Galicia, which is the lack o f broad and dense networks 
of social trust, civic participation and citizen mobilization, which together have 
become known as “social capital” (Putnam 1993; 2000). This is in contrast to the 
other two regions o f Spain, where the threat to democratic stabilization is quite 
different. We will first establish the low level o f social capital that exists in Galicia. 
Then we will examine three problems in regional elite leadership that have 
exacerbated the social capital problem, as well as other political problems in post- 
Franco Galicia, viz.,
1. the elite-mass discoimect that has led to intra-elite struggle and party 
fractionation;
2. the “sequencing problem,” or bad timing in the progression o f  post-Franco 
Galicia leaders; and
3. lack o f “fif ’ between the majority o f  the Galician voting public and the 
transitional leaders in Galicia.
I will conclude that only a small “window o f opportunity” for overcoming the
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historic problems o f low-social capital exists in a newly democratizing region, and that 
window is rapidly closing.
As set forth in chapter one above, the broad research question for this study is, 
“can regional elites, through their leadership style and strategies, take steps towards 
democratic consolidation in their region?” More specifically, the technical question is, 
what effect do the strategies o f regional elites have on the level o f democratic 
stabilization (explained in chapter one)? Using Putnam’s ideas about social capital 
as a starting point, 1 theorized that the level and quality o f social capital are highly 
correlated with democratic stabilization, or what 1 have termed ”P-3 indicators o f 
democratic consolidation.” '^ No claim is made in this study, however, that regional 
elites can single-handedly bring about a higher or lower "degree o f  democracy,” but 
rather that they play an important role in the relationship between social capital and 
democratic stabilization.
First, what is the notion o f a " low social-capital equilibrium” and why is it 
important to this case study o f  Galicia? The concept o f social "equilibrium” is one 
borrowed from economics and game theory to describe a social stasis that obtains 
when the social system provides enough "payoffs” to all major players that they will 
stay in the "game,” that is, they will not "defect” (which in turn, includes two options: 
to rebel, or simply to "exif’). In this theory, any system, including social and political
^'However, Pumam’s major concern in both Making Democracy Work {1992^ 8ff.) and 
Bowling Alone (2000,336fiE) is not the direct connection between social capital and a 
democratic system per je , but rather how social capital makes democratic policy more 
efScacious and. responsive, and. makes other contributions to civic life.
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systems, will naturally seek a “balance.” Furthermore, in technical terms,
“equilibrium” is aa “interactive” causal relationship, not a linear causal relationship
(Pumam 1993,181).
Low social capital equilibrium can be characterized as a vertically-organized
society in which a sub-optimal “equilibrium” has been reached that nonetheless
satisfies all the major segments o f  society, and a situation in which it is both irrational
and extremely difficult for the actors to attempt to change the status quo. “Sub-
optimal” means here that the outcome is far below what any objective observer would
want for that society as a whole. A society characterized by “vertical” networks o f
exchange are ones in which “unequal agents” are linked “in asymmetric relations o f
hierarchy and dependence” (Pumam 1993. 173). According to Pumam, a vertical
network, “no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot
sustain social trust and cooperation” (p. 174). Putnam uses the example o f southern
Italy (e.g., the Mezzogiorno) to illustrate a vertically-organized society which has
obtained stasis by operating at a low social capital equilibrium. In both organization
and function, it is strikingly similar to Galicia. Putnam describes it ± is  way:
The strategy o f  “never cooperate” is a stable equilibrium— Once 
trapped in this simation, no matter how exploitative and backward, it is 
irrational for any individual to seek a more collaborative alternative, 
except perhaps within the immediate family. The “amoral familism” 
that Banfield observed in the Mezzogiorno is, in fact, not irrational, but 
the only rational strategy for survival in this social context (Pumam 
1993,177).
Manifestations of Galicia’s Low Social Capital Equilibrium
First, it should be established what level o f  “social capital”-both bridging and
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bonding-has obtained in the region o f  Galicia after the demise o f  the Franco regime. 
Preliminary research had indicated that social capital was likely to be relatively low in 
Galicia. On-site research, however, especially interviews with regional actors, 
confirmed that social capital in the region is low, and has been low since well before 
the transition-indeed far lower than one might suppose from just examining secondary 
sources. Regional elites, despite their position, party or ideology, repeatedly described 
a low social capital equilibrium (in their own words).
Galicia’s low social capital equilibrium is demonstrated in at least three ways, 
each o f which will be evaluated in turn: (I) the relationship o f citizens to authority, (2) 
in the discourse and language o f politics used between elites and masses, and (3) an 
accounting of how political change actually occurs in the region. It is beyond the 
scope o f this work to devise a quantitative measure o f social capital; such a measure 
would be useful in future work. For our purposes here let it be noted that social capital 
is a continuous variable, ranging from "low” to "high.” Each o f these manifestation 
will be treated in a separate sub-section:
CitKEens’ Relationship to Authority 
According to the interviews, several factors account for a  low social capital 
equilibrium. The primary factor is the patriarchical and clan structure o f social 
relations, which has deep historical roots. Put differently, Galicians have a long 
tradition and expectation o f a dependent relationship to authority, much like that o f 
child to parent. As a well-informed Galician professor explained it to me:
Because o f  the structure o f  their families [rural Galicians] do not
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attempt to discuss collective political projects, but rather [they see 
politics as] a  simple market transaction, votes for favors, like buying 
water at the market (Corbacho 1998).
The ‘'Powers” and the Caciques 
One step up from the basic family structure, several regional elites described a 
feudalistic society, also deeply rooted in history, in which isolated individuals are 
“dependent” upon the '‘poderes facticos’’ (powers-that-be) for the basic necessities o f 
life, including all political transactions. One type o f “powers-that-be” are known as 
‘^ caciques ” (no English equivalent), a type o f social-economic hierarchical 
organization found in smaller towns and provinces similar in structure to Italian 
'^mafioso," but usually more benign in practice in Spain.^' The author o f  the book. The 
Agony o f  Galician Municipalities, describes the caciques this way: “organic 
arrangements o f coexistence in the territory, e.g. dirty dealings, protectionism, etc." 
(Corbacho 1998). The physical isolation o f  Galician peasants, as well as a high level 
o f illiteracy and other factors.^^ allows the caciques to flourish. They work by 
providing a basic service, such as providing information in exchange for a percentage 
o f the business, a  vote. Job prospects, or some type o f barter arrangement. They are
■*“Again, Pumam’s description o f  the structure and function o f the mafioso in the 
Mezzogiorno o f southern Italy bears a strong resemblance to the caciques o f Galicia, with 
the exception that the latter have a  more cooperative relationship with the various levels 
o f Spanish government, and less violent tendencies. See Pumam (1993, 145-148).
■*^ B.g., even today, there are only @ 32,000 telephones in the entire region. This is 
about 80 telephones per 1,000 residents, or about eight percent, an extraordinarily low 
level. Note that the number o f  telephones per 1,000 residents was one o f  the basic 
measures used by Lipset (1954) to Judge the level o f socio-economic development in a 
region/state. He has continued this “economics factors” analysis m later works (1983; 
1991).
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seen by many Galician rural inhabitants as a "positive” institution because no other
institution has the capaci^ to oÊfer the kind o f services that the caciques do; in
addition, they can serve as a vital intermediary between citizen and markets, and the
citizen and the daunting official bureaucracy. A Spanish authority on clientelism and
caciques describes the latter this way:
In general, the caciques have been agricultural owners, in all o f  the 
regions that have an abundance of landless workers, in which they 
assume the role o f  political bosses o f  a party in the comarca [county] or 
region, by means o f  controlling the labor market and the utilization of 
diverse forms o f particularism and favoritism towards the small farm 
worker (Cazorla 1992,8).
Although caciques reached their apogee in Spain in general in the period o f 1874-
1923, they remain strong in pockets o f the country, the largest single concentration
being in Galicia, and to a lesser extent, in Andalusia: "it is particularly the case in
Galicia, in which the levels of [electoral] participation have been the lowest in the
country since 1977; this immobilization facilitates the customary maneuvers of
caciquismo'^ (Cazorla 1992,30). Cazorla provides an important clue to the persistence
o f caciquismo in Gallcia-the immobilization” of an important part o f  the
electorate-the rural peasantry which has persisted even after the dual transition from
authoritarianism and economic autarky.
Therefore, in Galicia, the caciques and other patron-client relationship actively
exacerbate the problem o f a low social capital equilibrium. Corbacho continues in his
description o f the weakness o f social capital in Galicia (especially rural) society:
[Galicia] is an agricultural and peasant society, a servile society, 
dependent on the "powers'-political, religious, judicial, etc. (Corbacho
Page 73
[the Socialists] must become a par^  that is able to understand and 
articulate the problems o f  the citizenry, [but] in the first place, we must 
undertake a “general” political project, a project with a strategy for 
making Galicia work, for changing Galicia; [for example] social 
change, economic change, a  change to more pluralism, cultural change, 
better territorial relations... (Tourino 1998).
It is unlikely, however, that social capital can be built, or such a transformational
project could be undertaken, without an intense public dialogue; thus the chasm
between such laudable goals and the means to achieve them is indeed vast for the
Galician Socialists.
The same source (Tourino) bemoans the lack o f a cosmopolitan capital and
other sophisticated urban centers which would allow them to “overcome” the isolation
o f the rural sectors (and presumably win elections). A leftist intellectual and professor
expresses the same frustration very eloquently:
At the heart o f the matter is a drama o f learning “to speak” democracy, 
no?— to buy one’s freedom to think— it is not a game when one sells his 
freedom, but [in rural Galicia] there appears to be no cost as a 
consequence for doing so....one can successfully transfer these 
[democratic] ideas, but one cannot “buy” these ideas o f devotion to 
liberty, free thought, etc.; ideas that the Left is devoted to... (Corbacho 
1998).
O f course, for the Right (e.g. the A.P./P.P.) which has been in power for most 
o f  the post-Franco period in Galicia, the level o f  “discourse” with the citizenry is just 
fine. Indeed, one o f Fraga’s great political strengths is that he “sounds” more Galician 
and authentic than do other regional elites (except Beiras) when he speaks in Galego,^
■“This is probably because he was bom in the relatively rural and isolated village o f  
Vilalba near Lugo on the Atlantic Coast
Page 75
which he usually does on regional television. Not only is his pronunciation more 
authentic, but he taps into highly conservative Galician values like patriarchy, 
hierarchy, self-sufficiency and cultural separateness (e.g. the slogan, '"we're different, 
but we’re equal”). However, even rightist elites admit that the conversation is largely 
one-way:
Political power dominates society and relations with others; relations 
with the civil powers are not collaborative; their powers are weak 
(Barreiro 1998).
Such an observation begs the question, however, o f why the elites could not use this 
power to effect significant change in social capital. Below the question is examined 
empirically; that is what efforts did regional elites actually attempt or refuse to 
undertake to affect the level and quality of social capital in Galicia? As postulated in 
chapter one regional elite leadership style could at least theoretically affect levels o f 
social capital.
The second area o f  elite concern in the impoverished discourse o f  politics as 
manifestations o f  a  low social capital equilibrium is what I have here termed the 
"federalism” question: at what level can/should citizens attempt to foster political 
discourse? Critics charge that the Xunta thwarts genuine citizen discourse by retarding 
and/or circumventing local government in the administration o f public programs 
which, in turn, prevents them from developing the kind o f long-term competence that 
would enable them to "bring democracy closer to the people” and to build social 
capital at the grassroots:
[A]s the government closest to the citizenry, shouldn’t they [be able] to
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apprehend how collective questions should be settled, what is necessary 
in this community and who should pay for it? How is it [public budget] 
to be distributed? These are basic values in a  democracy that are built 
and fortified in the political parties, the schools, but also in the political 
institutions closest to the society. But we [in Galicia] are able to invert 
this activity in which a remote government makes decisions more 
abstracted from the citizens (Corbacho 1998).
Explanation of Political Change in Galicia
Surprisingly, elites from across the political spectrum and in private
organizations concurred that fundamental political change is very slow and difricult to
effect through normal electoral politics:
[I]n the peasant’s world it is different because, in the manner o f "local” 
politics, change is brought about [through] a coup (Corbacho 1998).
From the head of the Socialists comes this gloomy assessment o f Galician society:
“[it] is an immature, invertebrate society which relies upon local power bases; e.g. in
Coruna, Vigo, Santiago..^'’ (Tourino 1998). In order to bring about real change in this
setting, he continues, "it would take a great deal o f skill to overcome the traditional
dominance o f the Right; [and they] completely control the autonomous community’s
budget o f almost eighty billion pesetas [@ $533 million].” He went on to note that
this budget gives the P.P. complete control o f  public financing, public works and
public media, which they use in a very partisan manner, essentially for credit claiming,
and discrediting political opponents. He is backed up in this statement by Llagares
(1996) and Jimenez Sanchez (1998) who notes that the P.P. created and maintains
several mass media outlets (televison, radio and newspapers) and uses them to
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disseminate highly flattering stories o f  party leadership in “action.”^^  In fact, almost 
all newspapers in Galicia are not economically viable and therefore depend upon 
“public” funds (i.e.) from the regional government, the Xunta, for survival.
An example o f the partisan press in Galicia is the “leading” newspaper (in 
terms o f number o f copies printed), O Correa Gallego, which is “one-hundred percent 
supported by the Xunta,’"' according to professor Jimenez (1998). An example o f this 
kind o f “credit-claiming” by Fraga and his cabinet in the Xunta was observed in the 
front-page banner headline o f  O Correo Gallego: “The Xunta will invest 278,470 
million pesetas [@ $1.8 billion] in order to create employment; the creation o f70,000 
work-posts every year until the year 2001 is foreseen” (£7 Correo Gallego 4-6-88, p.
1 ff.). The article fails to note that a large portion o f these funds came from sources 
outside of Galicia, largely the European Union; instead, it seeks to claim credit almost 
entirely for the amount and the work o f  many o±er levels o f government. This article 
also specifically denigrates the head o f the Galician Socialists. Emilio Tourino by 
name, calling his concerns and objections to the plan “ridiculous.” Since the Xunta 
under Fraga and the Popular Party controls most o f  the media outlets in Galicia, not 
just this newspaper, it is likely that this kind o f assessment will be the dominant one. 
and conversely, it will be very diffrcult for fresh voices and those advocating
^^See also Parente (1997). Parente notes that \Ha& Xunta directly controls the following 
media, public works and “mercantile societies”: Radio Galicia and TV Galicia, IGAPE, 
Verin Hospital Foundation, Galician Ports and Port Authority, TURGALICIA (Tourism 
Promotion Board), SODIGA (Industrial Development), Galician Energy Development, 
Provincial Business Agencies, SOGAMA, Center for Supercomputing, GALIOIL. 
FOSTER, Galician Quality Council, MEDTEC Institute, XACGBEG
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fundamental change to be heard.
The description o f  the difficulty o f  significant political-social change is given 
credence by a prominent political figure firom the opposite end o f the political 
spectrum:
In terms o f  our national picture [within Spain]» It is a society that is 
only a  little developed» or only has a  little "backbone” (yertebrada). Its 
powers are weak; the action o f citizens Is very dependent on the power 
[holders]» this is noticeable also In the Institutions» the private 
organizations, business owners» financial and the Church-these are the 
great weaknesses o f our society (Barrelro 1998).
Finally, the leader o f the rising "nationalist” party In Galicia» Xosé Manuel 
Belras, said flatly that "Galicia Is not developed socially.” and has a need to 
"[increase] the very low levels o f basic social capltal-the structures» the groups, 
sanitation and health» etc.” (Belras 1998). However, his prescription for overcoming 
this problem varied dramatically from other regional elites, as we will see below.
Paradox o f Galician Social Capital 
Galician society presents an apparent paradox In social capital. The paradox is 
this: how can there be so much rich assoclatlonal life at the local/community level, and 
yet simultaneously, how can the levels o f  region-wide social capital-such as trust, 
mutual toleration, trans-reglonal associations, and large-scale reclproclty-be so low? 
This paradox Is neatly addressed by the distinction between bonding and bridging 
social capital (Pumam 2000» 21 ff). In Galician cities there are many clubs, and I have 
personally observed families and friends milling about and talking animatedly In the 
plazas and other public spaces, often late Into the evening. The author has witnessed
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public fairs and other community spectacles in abundance, even in some o f  the 
smallest communities in Galicia. This associational activity appears to match the 
requirements o f social capital described by Putnam (1993) o f connectivity and 
participation in civic organizations; in fact, such activity would appear to be a  model 
for the precisely the kind o f  civil society he would wish for the United States.
However, based upon my personal observation, Galicia is rich in bonding social 
capital and yet poor in bridging social capital. The associational activity in 
Galicia-especially in the predominately rural sectors-tends to reinforce already strong 
ties to family and a small circle o f friends, often to the exclusion o f fresh connections 
across familial clan and vocational activity. According to one Galician authority, the 
system o f "foral” land rents and other feudalistic practices still obtains in much o f rural 
Galicia, and, along with high rates o f illiteracy, poor secondary roads and physical 
isolation, help explain why bridging social capital is so low (Viejo-Vinas 1998).
O f the two types o f social capital, bridging social capital would be the greatest 
threat to the power bases o f the caciques and other powers-that-bc because if  diverse 
citizens from around the region were able to effectively communicate and associate, 
they simply would not need the caciques, because the caciques ' services (e.g. 
providing information, job services, etc.) depend upon isolation and immobilization of 
the rural masses. Bridging social capital would give them the organizational 
confidence and capacity for effective interest articulation and aggregation. The 
caciques are well aware o f this threat, according to several interviewees, and have 
actively worked to retard it. How have they done so? They insist on power-sharing
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arrangements to coopt would-be reformers (Corbacho 1998; Barrelro 1998), or they 
simply ignore attempts to build bridging social capital.
An attempt at region-wide building o f  social capital was undertaken by the 
Catholic Church in the late 1970's eager to shed its former association with Franco ism. 
According to a prominent Galician priest and academic, however, relations between 
the Church and the caciques deteriorated rapidly in the post-Franco period, partly 
because the Church refused to enter into the traditional regional power-sharing 
agreements with the caciques and other power-holders. Partly as a result o f its 
conflicts with the caciques, and partly because o f long-range demographic trends, the 
Church has lost a great deal o f influence in the region, and has now "retreated” from 
grand social-capital building projects to its traditional strength in secondary education 
(Torres 1998).
The caciques have found that a "divide and conquer strategy”-the antithesis of
bridging social capital— helps maintain their power in Galicia. As the former Vice-
President explains in some detail:
the difference between the modem state and the Galician revolution is 
that in the modem state, power is unified and creates state 
leadership...but here [in Galicia] there are a multitude o f  powers, each 
o f whom live together by making pacts which are useful in serving 
themselves, but which none o f them control or dominate in this 
sense...the territorial powers, who mle over the provinces and 
diputaciones and city governments and the political parties-they have 
intemal agreements, an intemal accord o f  power (Barreiro 1998).
These "intemal accords o f  power,” or secretive pacts, subvert the notion o f democratic
concertacion discussed earlier; viz., harmonizing the interests o f several discrete
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classes for the benefit o f  society as a whole. They also vividly illustrate the problem 
o f late reverse incorporation, i.e. when, as Barreiro perceptively noted, the state is 
created after the local leadership and power relationships have already solidified, the 
question o f whose interests should prevail (traditional power brokers or the people 
acting through the state) becomes difficult to resolve. For the power-holders, the 
answer is obvious-their interests should continue to be served. It would take an 
extraordinary and courageous act o f  leadership at either the level o f  the Spanish state 
or the Xunta to break these ossified bonds, but since the system '‘works” (like in the 
classic low-social-capital equilibrium) there is little incentive for these actors to do so.
The key element in bridging social capital is that o f ‘trust.” or ''confianzd' 
(“confidence”). If  the citizen does not trust anyone outside o f his immediate family or 
clan, then they will not associate with them on a regular basis, cleavages will be 
reinforced rather than cross-cut, and bridging social capital will remain low. In a 
series o f interviews conducted with regional elites o f all types, when asked to identify 
the “greatest problem facing Galicia” most placed the problem o f low confidence/trust 
at the top o f their list; surprisingly, above high unemployment and other economic and 
social problems. There is an awareness, therefore, among regional elites o f the 
importance o f social capital (although few actually use that term), and its impact on 
regional politics and economics. For example, the head o f the PSG (Socialist Party of 
Galicia) said that “the greatest problem is Galician values, which is behind the lack of 
trust” (Tourino 1998). Given their awareness o f the phenomenon among regional 
elites, the motivation for addressing the problem should have been present in the
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transitional period among this group, but it remains to be seen if  they possessed the 
other two necessary ingredients to bring about change through ‘'collectively purposeful 
causation” (Bums 1978): the intention to bring about real change, and specific policy 
proposals to do so.
The New Historical Institutional paradigm discussed in chapter one (above) 
helps understand how actors formed their political preferences, and understood their 
role and function in the political system, including how they could or could not go 
about facilitating needed political change. It sheds light on why. despite almost 
universal agreement among “foundational” elites (in the late I970's and throughout the 
I980's) that change was desperately needed, there was a near-universal perception 
among these elites o f the difficulty, indeed, the futility of attempts, o f  bringing about 
the change in low social capital equilibrium. In short, the way that institutions shape 
their perceptions, they cannot see '‘what's in it (change) for me?” Only extraordinary 
leadership (Bums 1978), gifted with transformational vision and ability, would have 
been able to rise above the powerful limiting force of this kind o f  institutional inertia.
Having established the low level o f bridging social capital in Galicia in the 
post-Franco period, let us now trace what steps the regional leadership took during the 
transition period to democracy that affected the low social capital equilibrium 
positively or negatively. Recalling variables X , 2 j  above, we can examine their 
behavior and strategies in terms o f the study variables E(s,b)i_^, which are repeated 
below:
E(s,b) I = The basic “exit” or “voice” option (Hîrschman 1970) o f  regional elites;
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i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a  democratic 
system.
E(s, b)2 = Strategy and behavior o f  regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents;
e.g., a populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperation strategy.^* 
E(s,b)j = Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites.
E(s,b)^ = Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites;
e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the 
center/national elites).
As indicated above, E(s,b), is the most fundamental political decision that 
regional elites can make, with profound implications for the consolidation-even 
survival-of democracy within not only each region, but the larger state. The question 
of which strategy-exit, voice or loyalty-to pursue at the beginning o f the post-Franco 
period in Spain was very much on the minds o f regional elites for several reasons. 
Nationalists and extreme leftist forces were seriously urging the "exit" option-that is 
secession from the state o f  Spain. Along with Basque, some Catalans and other 
"peripheral” nationalisms, these forces argued that the region would be far better off in 
terms o f social and economic development, recognition and an "authentic” political 
system if they formally separated from the Spanish heartland. Secondly, for those
^®The d i^ rence  between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise 
some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular 
unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, 
regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived "payofts” (usually 
electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).
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Galician elites who did not want to completely sever ties with Spain, there was the
fundamental choice to make o f  whether to remain quiescent (“loyal”) and accept
whatever constitutional arrangements were proposed by the national elites meeting in
Moncloa in Madrid, or whether to try to actively shape the relationship o f Galicia to
the center (the “voice” option).
That the exit option was ever seriously considered would, prima facie, appear
to be unlikely, considering the basic conservatism o f the majority o f  Galicians, as
noted above. However, the majority o f the outspoken regional elites in the immediate
post-Franco era were on the Left o f the political spectrum because they were clustered
in the more liberal cities, where their “transaction costs” o f organizing were lower than
the rural-based rightist forces. The chart below, summarizing the evolution o f the
Spanish party system shows the numerical dominance o f  the Left in Galicia in the late
1970's and early 1980's. To be sure, in the very first legislative elections, the Spanish
state party, the aptly-named Union o f the Democratic Center (UCD) was a powerful
actor (because there was very little organized opposition to it), but it completely
disappeared by the second elections held in the late 1970's.
Even today, one hears echoes o f the powerful calls by the radical Left to take
the exit option from Spain, as in this assertion o f  the strength o f Galician nationalism
from the head o f  the Nationalist Block o f Galicia (BNG):
The social basis o f  the Left are radical nationalists-not just 
“regionalists” but Galicians-a nation without a  state, with a distinct 
culture and language. This is a radical nationalism in the context o f the 
Spanish state. This social base is much greater than in either the 
Basque or Catalan cases... (Beiras 1998).
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Although Beiras’ assertioa that the “social base” (i.e. language, historical symbols and 
cultural “distinctiveness”) for Galician nationalism is theoretically greater in Galicia 
than in the better known Basque and Catalan cases, it is probably wishful thinking that 
the Galician citizenry would become as mobilized as the in the other two cases in the 
cause o f Galician nationalism.
[CHART I ABOUT HERE-EVOLUTION OF THE GALICIAN PARTY SYSTEM]
[See Appendix “C”]
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and nationalist (possibly separatist)-‘*orthodox” Marxist-Leninist
The First Elections and the Leadership Problem
The first three regional elections were marked by great confusion and lack of 
an absolute majority by any party in the regional parliament. The first two elections, in 
1977 and 1979, were known as “pre-autonomic,” while 1981 was the first 
"autonomous” election. One observer (Barreiro 1998) blames the political confusion 
o f the time on the underlying "social disorganization,” but this begs the question of 
why the regional political elites themselves could not organize internally and get ahead 
o f the voters.
The party fractionation, frequent defections between parties, and frequent name
changes o f the parties attest to the confusion and political disorganization of most of
the democratic transition period (see party chart above). A regional political analyst
sums up the state o f the parties o f  that time as follows:
The weakness o f the system o f parties is, in general terms, evidence of 
a pre-political system in large sectors o f the citizenry in virtue o f which 
the parties are seen as factions and not as instruments absolutely 
necessary for the functioning o f a free and open society (Blanco et al.
1982, 168).
Unlike the other two regions in this study, no "transformational” political 
leader emerged at this critical moment in Galicia’s transitional period. The 
governments o f  the Xunta in the I980’s suffered from a lack o f decisive leadership 
with a clear vision for the future o f  Galicia, and most especially, how to ameliorate the 
critical problem o f a  low social capital equilibrium. See the general conclusions and
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region by region comparison in chapter 6 for an explanation of the sorts o f steps that 
could have been taken to improve both democratic stability and social capital in the 
region. Note also the strong contrast between regional elite leadership style during the 
transition period in Galicia, as compared to those in Andalusia and Catalonia. The 
story o f how the leader o f  the first autonomous government for Galicia was chosen 
illustrates the haphazard nature o f  the selection process amid the euphoria and 
confusion o f  those heady days.
None o f the Galician parties was prepared to govern when called upon to do so 
in the first autonomous election o f 1981, and with some good reason. As can be seen 
in the table below, the Union o f the Democratic Center (UCD). a state-level center- 
right party led by the very popular Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, was 
crushingly superior to all the other parties in Galicia in the early post-Franco period 
(the late 1970's). Electoral data from those first three region-wide Galician elections 
gives credence to the wariness o f  the other Galician parties about their chances for 
electoral success in the early post-Franco elections. The 1981 electoral returns must 
have come as a genuine surprise to the leadership o f the Popular Alliance (A.P.).
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CHART: Party^  Percentages of Vote Totals in Early Post-Franco Galician 
Elections
Party/Coalition 1977 (in 1979 (in 1981 (in
percentages) percentages) percentages)
UCD 52.5 47.5 27.6
AP 12.8 13.7 30.1
PSOE/PSdeG 15.1 17 19.6
BNG/PSG/BN 1.9 5.9 6.2
In a critical miscalculation, the Popular Alliance (A.P.), forerunner to today’s
ruling Popular Party (P.P.)- both in Spain and in Galicia, so distrusted its own chances
for electoral success, that it threw together a fragmented, inexperienced leadership
team. This team included the eventual President o f the Xunta, Fernando Albor. An
active participant in the process now admits that he was chosen as a titu la r
figurehead.” In this selection, the AP showed its unwillingness to prepare to be a
"government in waiting” which is a fundamental requirement o f the "responsible”
loyal opposition in a parliamentary system (Sartori 1997):
The forecasts predicted that UCD [Union o f  the Democratic Center] 
should win. We were, in reality, just looking for a  head o f  our group in 
[the Galician] Parliament when we named Albor; we were not counting 
on forming a government; we were not sure about these things... [but] 
we succeeded beyond our hopes and won the election; we had to head a 
government (Barreiro 1998).
Although Albor was a well-respected medical doctor, all regional elites who 
were interviewed agreed that he was not an optimal choice to head the Xunta during
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who already had a  proven competence in specific areas o f  governance.
However, the fxtÿt Xunta did have some successes, especially from the 
viewpoint o f Labor. According to the head o f the largest labor confederation in 
Galicia in the late 1990's, the fSxst Xunta did help the cause of organized Labor and 
“social production.” An institutional firamework was created and pacts (accords) were 
signed. Here Galicia was clearly following the model set by larger “successful” cases 
o f democratic transition in Europe and elsewhere in Spain, such as Cataluna.
The Emergence of Popular Government Under Fraga 
Given the foregoing disarray in successive Galician governments, an 
unexpected development occurred-the emergence o f  clear, popular leadership under a 
former Franco government official-Manuel Iribame Fraga. It was unexpected in 
Galicia for two reasons: first, Fraga a man o f immense ambition, was expected to 
remain in national politics where he had been for most o f his long political career, and 
secondly, he had openly derided the regional movement in the early 1980's when he 
still harbored hopes o f becoming the Prime Minister o f Spain. Now, he did an about 
face and had competed in the 1990 elections. As the former Vice-President of the 
Xunta noted, “it’s like Clinton going back to be the governor o f  Arkansas; it Just 
doesn’t  happen” (Barreiro 1998).
Whatever Fraga’s motivation, after his election in 1990, for the first time, the 
regional government had a truly popular leader, who could justifiably claim a 
“mandate” to govern. The relationship between the population and Fraga was 
described this way:
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When Fraga arrived, it was almost like hand in glove, or a second skin.
In reality, Galicia got what it wanted, and it wanted what Fraga offered.
It is a  symbiosis that gave an exceptional political result (Barreiro
1998).
Attempts bv Regional Elites to Confront L.S.C.E.
From the foregoing narrative, it becomes clear that regional elites in Galicia 
have been painfully aware o f what we have termed here “low social capital 
equilibrium,” or L.S.C.E. Given that awareness, however, what did they actually try to 
do about the perceived problem? And if  they acted or failed to act, what reason did 
they do so? As already noted, the clearest manifestation of a low social capital 
equilibrium in Galicia is the lack o f mutual trust and generalized reciprocity (cf. 
Putnam 1993, 168, 172). Generalized reciprocity means that one undertakes actions 
that will contribute to building civil society and civil trust without expecting a specific 
and immediate return favor; rather there is the hope and trust that such a favor will be 
repaid “down the line.” As Putnam notes, “an effective norm o f generalized 
reciprocity is likely to be associated with dense networks o f social exchange” (1993. 
172).
Generalized reciprocity is, however, very difficult to create. At the most basic 
level, it is not “rational.” in the strict sense, for one to give up something o f  value to 
one's self in hopes that someone, sometime in the unspecified future, would do the 
same for you. Generalized reciprocity logically requires that someone, at some 
specific place and time, break the cycle of “specific” reciprocity (a simultaneous 
exchange). In order to have a  “demonstration effect” for the larger society, such an
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organization and social capital provide crucial insights; in his formulation, civics 
drives economics and not vice-versa (Pumam 1993, 157). As noted above, the primary 
method o f organizing labor in Galicia until relatively recently was ''caciquir meaning 
that agricultural/political bosses dominated labor in a patron-client relationship not 
based upon mutual trust, but rather upon asymmetric need by largely landless, illiterate 
peasants, and the ability o f the bosses to provide for their needs in exchange for 
political and economic loyalty (Cazorla 1996). For example, the primary sector 
(agriculture) continued to constitute 52 per cent o f the Galician work force as late as 
1973, and what industrialization that did exist before the 1970's was o f the “colonial” 
or “dependent” kind: semi-finished goods were brought in from outside to take 
advantage o f cheap labor, and then they were taken out for final finishing and sale 
elsewhere, adding little long-term value to either the Galician economy or to worker 
security. Thus the massive emigration that had characterized earlier loss o f Galicia's 
most productive workers continued, with a loss o f 500,000 workers between 1951 and 
1970. The one exception was the relative industrialization in a few cities on Galicia's 
Atlantic coast, primarily in ship-building (Maiz 1994. 193). Nothing demonstrates the 
lack o f  Employer-Worker social capital better than massive emigration o f  the next 
generation o f  workers as has occurred in periodic waves in Galician history. The low 
social-capital equilibrium is maintained by the “defection” or “exit” o f the very people 
who might disrupt the equilibrium.
Unless one accepts a completely deterministic view o f history, however, such a 
bleak past does not mean utter failure in the future in rebuilding Labor-Employer
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social capital. Specific alliances and political decisions during and after the 
democratic transition have been equally to blame for the lack o f  social capital among 
Labor sectors and between Labor and Capital. For example, the history o f  labor 
organization o f the five largest organized unions is tied to the radical struggle against 
Franco. Using the chart (“Evolution o f the Galician Party System”) in the Appendix, 
note the close association between the U.P.G. and the union, the LN.G. (National 
Intersyndicale o f Galicia), which was founded with U.P.G. support in the late 1960's 
(it later becomes the 1 Jsi.T.G.). U.P.G. was also instrumental in the organization and 
recruitment o f  the C.L. (Peasant’s Commissions), one o f the few attempts to organize 
rural workers (Maiz 1994). A similar relationship existed between the Galician 
Communist Party (P.C.G.) and the CC.OO. (Workers’ Commissions). The Galician 
Socialist Party (P.S.G., not to be confused with the P.S.de G.), another radical leftist 
party, is strongly influential in the C.l.G. (Galician Intersyndical Convergence). 
Because o f  this very close association between Labor and the radical political Left in 
Galicia, there is little social trust between most o f  the Right and Labor.
Since the Right, under the A.P. and the P.P., has been the dominant ruling 
party in Galilcia since the mid-1980's, not surprisingly, it has repeatedly tried, to 
perform “end nms” around organized labor. Thus, successive rightist 
governments have dealt with organized labor at arms-length, conducting largely 
symbolic pacts only as absolutely necessary. Typical is the document: “Ai/nra-Unions 
Accords” conducted in 1992, It was concluded between only three o f  the nine 
organized labor unions in Galicia, Conspicuously absent is the largest, the CC.OO.
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At only 40 pages, it is one o f the shortest o f  the regional corporatist accords that the 
author has seen, and it is written in vague, innocuous terms lacking specific goals or 
targets. It largely catalogues existing organizations under the Xunta's control and prior 
efforts at attracting Jobs to the region.
In 1998, organized labor was pushing hard to conduct a far more specific set o f 
accords with the Xunta o f Manuel Fraga over thirty-five major areas o f concern. 
According to the leader o f the LT.G.T./UJC.T., those negotiations were "going 
nowhere,” and the biggest impediment was, quite simply, the "lack o f conjianza" or 
trust, and a feeling o f  generalized reciprocity (Carro Garrote 1998).
The same lack of confianza was manifested on the Xunta's side in an article in 
its mouthpiece, O Correo Gallego: "The government o f Galicia today concluded its 
retreat...with a plan over closed labor and with a proposition to immediately open up 
negotiations for a pact with localities, it is said, [in order to] transfer autonomous 
competencies to the municipalities” (4-5-98, 13; italics added). This quotation also 
reveals the government’s plan to utilize local-level governments (among other 
mechanisms) as a conduit to distribute fimds directly to workers, bypassing organized 
labor unions. The unions were completely excluded in the plan’s formulation. This 
conservative government obviously does not share the neo-liberal orthodoxy o f other 
rightist administrations (e.g. Reagan or Thatcher) about the “magic o f the 
marketplace” or government non-interference in economics; clearly it sought to both 
“create” Jobs and claim credit fordoing so through a relatively massive expenditure o f 
public funds, 278 billion pesetas, or about 1.8 billion dollars, over a four to six year
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period. There were great doubts about the permanence o f many o f these jobs, and the 
simple economic reality that funds from the E.LT., and other external sources that this 
massive program was based upon, would be rapidly coming to an end in the early 
twenty-first century. Whether or not the plan was actually implemented as envisioned, 
the point is that the damage to social capital with Labor bad already been done in the 
plan’s formation and initial announcement.
According to labor elites, most organized labor groups have been biding their 
time, hoping for a change o f government in the regional election o f2002; however 
Fraga decided to run again at age 78, and won another term.
Corbacho sums up the prevailing elite stance: "the political elites here like to 
play [the role of] fathers, o f benefactors, in which [the people] must necessarily 
depend on them” (1998).
Building Social Capital ' From the Bottom Up”
The literature on social capital and civil society, stresses that, in order to be 
effective, social capital is best promoted through voluntary associations and programs, 
or "bottom up” approaches, and not from forced, third party, “top down” approaches 
(Pumam 1993, 163-167).'** Game theorists, rational actor analysts and the new 
institutionalists have likewise stressed “cooperative communities” in overcoming the 
classic “collective action dilemma” o f  Olson and the problem o f‘*third-party
■’* Alexis de Tocqueville (1961 [1830]) was one o f the first to stress the voluntary 
nature o f an effective civil society. “Bottom up” approaches are understood here to mean 
political action that originates from ordinary citizens and non-governmental 
organizations, and not as the direct result o f regime action.
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(1998). An expert on political scandals in Spain notes that \h& Xunta is further 
Justified in its stance because “Galicia has had lots o f scandals at the level o f the city 
and provincial governments, but Xunta appears clean” (Jimenez Sanchez 1998).
The Xunta has refused to disperse desperately-needed local funds and develop 
local competencies despite the clear Spanish state “model”o f financing that is 
supposed to be followed. Under this model, approximately 40 percent o f all public 
fimds is supposed to be used by localities. However, localities in Galicia expend only 
about 30 to 40 percent o f the average o f the expenditmes of all other localities in 
Spain, despite the fact that Galician localities have more fimds available to them-in 
theory-than do other Spanish localities. In all, “over 90 percent of the income that is 
supposed to be for cities and local governments [in Galicia] is taken to the regional 
government” (Corbacho 1998). Given this level o f expenditure, and the reduced 
capacity that it represents, it is clear that local and provincial government in Galicia 
would not be able to build social capital from the bottom up.
Furthermore, Galician elites tend to promote the status quo instead of trying to 
change it because they largely benefit from it. Recall the former Vice-President’s 
observation that:
The territorial powers—that rule over the provinces and diputaciones 
and city governments and the political parties— have intemal 
agreements, an intemal accord o f  power (Barreiro 1998).
Clearly, then any attempt to construct bridging social capital across the
territorial and functional boundaries that are enforced by the caciques and other
“territorial powers” would be doomed to failure unless a strong regional leader or
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leaders was able to dismantle this system, which would be a revolutionary change. 
However, the leaders o f Xunta during the I980's were too weak, and the regional 
parliament was too internally divided to take on these traditional powers.
In the I990’s, Manuel Fraga had the personal stature, the political capital and 
the links with the ruling national party that might have enabled him to effect this kind 
o f  revolutionary change. He choose not to. A series o f  interviews helps understand 
why. In short, Fraga sought maximum visibility and minimum risk. He was seeking a 
post that would cap an extraordinary and lengthy political career (now almost 50 
years): up firom modest means in rural Galicia, into the Franco regime, serving as both 
as Minister o f  Industry and Tourism, and later, as ambassador to the Court o f St. 
James (England). He then was the founder o f the state-level Popular Alliance 
(forerunner of today’s ruling party, the P.P.) and a member o f  the Spanish Parliament. 
As one observer notes, his strength-his authoritarian manner in both speaking and 
organization—was also his weakness in Spanish state-level politics when memories of 
Francoism were still fresh. When it became clear to him, despite heroic struggles on 
his part, that he would never become the Prime Minister o f  Spain, he decided to stand 
for election to the Galician Parliament, where he was a shoo-in as President o f  the 
Xunta.
Given the reality o f low social capital equilibrium as detailed above, Fraga
simply choose to strike a bargain with the existing powers:
Fraga does not do anything to resolve it [the problem o f low social 
capital and societal “dependency”!; completely on the contrary, he is 
happy with this situation; he provokes it, and the potential for more
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power (Barreiro 1998).
The projects he has undertaken are clearly to build upon his legacy, to secure 
more recognition for himself and the region o f  Galicia internationally (e.g. his risky 
international trips to Cuba and Libya).
The Complicating Factor o f Regional Nationalism 
In this section, the relationship between nationalism and regional elites’ 
attempts to improve social capital will be addressed. As a starting point, the simplified 
relationship might be specified as follows:
R.E.L. -  (nationalism) — social capital 
Recent books on the importance o f social capital to democracy, most notably 
Putnam, (both 1993 and 2000) simply ignore nationalism or give it cursory treatment. 
This is understandable; nationalism is an extraordinarily complex topic, and to treat 
the topic as it relates to social capital would dilute the clarity of the core arguments. 
Where, for example, should one place "nationality” in the causal chain? Is there any 
relationship between high and low levels o f nationality and low social capital 
equilibrium? How does one clarify the deeply interactive nature (or "multi- 
collinearity”) o f social phenomenon like nationalism and social capital? In European 
cases such as the ones under consideration, however, the problem o f nationalism is 
inescapable, especially since much o f  the core reason for seeking regional autonomy 
has to do with an historic tradition o f  "national” separateness. As noted above, in 
Chapter One, Spain is cited by several scholars as the European country with the 
existence o f strongest sub-state "peripheral” nationalism (Rokkan and Urwin 1982).
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Clearly, today^s Galician nationalists do not represent the first attempt to use 
nationalism to address Galicia’s social problems and lack o f development. Although 
this is not the place to give a detailed accounting o f the history o f nationalism in the 
Spanish and Galician contexts, nationalism has been advocated, primarily by Galician 
intellectuals (especially by Manuel M. Murguia), several times during the past 150 
years as the” solution to Galicia’s social and political problems (Maiz Suarez 1998: 
1997; 1996; 1994; Vilas Nogueira et. al 1994). Attempts were made in the late 19'*’ 
and early 20“’ centuries, and in the short-lived Second Republic o f the 1930's '^’, to 
create a genuine mass-based nationalist movement. These attempts largely failed due 
to factional divisions within the movement. There were two primary elite factions that 
championed Galician nationalism, the Catholic-traditional and the Liberal-regionalists 
(Maiz Suarez 1994, 182 ff). These factions often worked at cross-purposes, and mass- 
based nationalist movements in Galicia were always crushed by events at the very 
moment they were beginning to take root. The historical processes can be neatly 
summed up in the following cycle: after years o f struggle between elite factions in 
Galicia over the proper message and tactics for Galician nationalism, one faction 
would emerge stronger or absorb the other one, and just as this new united front would 
begin to gain a larger following, some external event would swallow up the whole 
movement, and. it would have to start again firom scratch later on.
One historical episode will demonstrate this cycle. First, in I880’s the
^^o r elaboration o f the particular political movements associated with the attempted 
promulgation o f Galician nationalism, see Maiz Suarez 1994,181-191.
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Catholic-tradîtîoa faction o f  elites headed by Alfiredo Brafias began to gain a  relatively 
large following in Galicia due bis writings and the influence o f the most traditional 
sectors o f the Catholic Church. Essentially, Brahas et al. argued that Galicia was 
diffèrent, that its true values were best reflected in conservative church teachings, and 
that the contemporary state-level regime in Madrid had strayed from those cherished 
values and teachings. In addition, this variant o f  “Galicianism” was specifically anti­
modem, anti-industrial, and anti-urban, identifying these traits as a menace to 
authentic Galician interests. The opposition to the Catholic-traditional faction was that 
o f the liberal-regionalists, led by Aureliano Pereira, who proposed a radically 
progressive mixture o f democratization and federalism. Their program was composed 
o f calls for thorough democratization and economic modernization, including the 
abolition of the feudalistic system o f  "land rents” (sisremaforal) which retarded both 
the economy and the peasantry. However, intemal squabbles and intellectual 
differences among this group resulted in the lack o f stable organization and self- 
destmction from 1880-1900. For its part, the Catholic-traditional group became co­
opted and absorbed by the centralizing tendencies o f the larger Spanish monarchical 
project o f  the Carlists (Maiz Suarez 182-183). A similar pattem or dialectic was 
repeated up until the Franco era, when all such attempts had to be moved underground. 
It was not until late in the Franco regime that Galician nationalist organizations 
hesitantly began to re-group; the first was the U.P.G. (see acronym list above and the 
chart in the Appendix) in 1964.
ft is clear this historical nationalist stmggle continues to be played out today.
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The current leader o f the regional government, Manuel Fraga, and his rightist party, 
the P J*., have attempted to coopt the legacy o f Branas^°, while that o f Pereira lives on. 
albeit in a more radical guise, in the leftist version o f  the Nationalist Block o f  Galicia 
(BNG), discussed below.
In the standard formulation, there are two types o f nationalism in terms o f its 
affect on democracy, or any political order, one mostly salutary, the other destructive. 
The salutary type is known as "civic” nationalism, and the destructive type is known as 
"ethnic” or "exclusionary” nationalism.^' The difference centers around the basis o f 
citizenship in the state. In civic nationalism, everyone who is bom or naturalized 
within the border o f a state is granted citizenship; in ethnic nationalism, only those 
who are identified as being a part o f  the ethnic or folkish community are called 
citizens. This latter type is also known as nationality "o f the blood” because there is 
supposed to be something in the blood o f these self-identified groups that separates 
them from the (supposedly inferior) blood o f the "other.” The fact that this is a  mythic 
construction and no such "gene” exists does not dilute the power o f this appeal to 
followers. The destructive potential o f ethnic nationalism is obvious-it requires an 
"other” or out-group in order to obtain collective identity-it is only a short step to 
scape-goating and pogroms if the logic o f exclusion is followed through. History 
shows many examples o f virulent exclusionary nationalism, especially in nineteenth
^"Fraga's attempt to coopt Brana s legacy is seen most explicitly in his monograph "O 
Rexionalismo de Onte a Hoxe” ("The Regionalism of Yesterday and Today”) (1992).
^'See for example, the formulation in Hockenos (1993), Free to Hate. Another variant 
o f this standard dichotomous depiction o f  nationalism is that o f fus soli and Jus sanguinis.
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and twentieth-century Europe.
However, this traditional formulation o f  nationalism does not capture a  third 
“type” or use o f regional nationalism-that is the use, or potential, o f  nationalism as 
both a state-building (Irvine 1993) and developmental exercise (Bendix 1977,408ff). 
The potential o f this third type o f nationalism is clearly evident in the case in Galicia.
It also becomes clear that this is leftist nationalism, not the rightist nationalism o f 
Franco and so many other nationalist movements o f  the 20'** century. In the discussion 
above o f the problem o f low social capital equilibrium in Galicia it became clear that, 
while elites in the leftist-nationalist National Block o f Galicia (BNG) describe the 
problems o f Galicia in almost identical terms as other elites on the right and in other 
sectors o f  Galician society, their diagnosis and prognosis o f  the problem are 
completely different. Combining variants o f Marxism, such as dependency theory, 
with their own hybrid nationalism, the leader o f the BNG. the fastest growing political 
force in Galicia, passionately argued for nationalism as the solution to Galicia's 
problems o f low social capital, low physical capital, and other economic and 
developmental challenges. At least hypothetically. Beiras believes that self-sufficiency 
and self-development is the key to overcoming these problems.
One o f the great advantages o f the interview method is that allows the 
interviewer to gauge the intensity o f  the words that are spoken, which simply cannot 
be divined by the same words printed on the page. The interview with Beiras was 
perhaps the most intense o f any o f  the ones conducted in Spain, especially in the key 
points in which, he stressed nationalism, autonomy and separateness as the solution to
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Galicia’s problems, including, specifically, “lack o f social capital” (his words). It was
clear to me that if  he were elected to head theXwnta, Beiras would be committed to
effecting his “nationalist” program, both because o f  his deeply-held ideological
beliefs, and the expectations o f his core supporters.
The analysis o f  the left-of-center nationalists, like the ENG, begins with a
historical-geographical argument similar to the “dependency school” in international
relations theory. It asserts that Galicia has been “for years” treated as a “colony” for
the heart o f Spain (Castille) and the rest o f Europe because o f its rich resources, cheap
labor and physical isolation. In his own words:
Galicia is on the socio-economic periphery o f both Spain and the 
European Union. Political expression is poor because Galicia has 
functioned, economically, politically and culturally, like internal 
colonies for a long time. We have a weak, under-developed economy 
because we have few internal motors o f development (Beiras 1998).
The Nationalist Block’s argument is that as long as Galicia continues to depend on
outsiders for development funds and technical expertise, then the fundamental
problems o f Galician politics and society will never be resolved. Beiras continues.
[W]e didn’t have the industrial revolution that occurred in the 
nineteenth century in the rest o f  Europe, and we don’t have [today] the 
kind o f  strategy and hi-tech industry for integration [into the larger 
economy] (Beiras 1998).
The only way to obtain the kind o f internal capital, knowledge and expertise to 
overcome this dependency trap is draw off from the rest o f Spain and use the powerful 
galvanizing force o f Galician nationalism to develop the kind o f cohesion, pride and 
skills necessary to become truly self-sufficient and less vulnerable to fluctuations in
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the Galfcian population. W hetherornot his prognosis to the problem is realistic or not 
is another matter. The one element that has not changed in his long political career, 
from the fringes o f the left to closer to the center-left is his advocacy o f  thorough­
going Galician nationalism. From my interview with him, it is clear that he sees 
electoral politics and his personal leadership "style” as mere tactics to achieve his 
more ftmdamental goal, or strategy, o f improvement for Galicia through nationalism. 
The style that he currently prefers is one o f populism; he eschews the intra-elite 
bargaining strategy o f the PP and other rivals. However, this master strategy, if  
implemented, would very likely bring him to brink o f E(y,6),, that is the basic "exit” 
versus "voice” or "loyalty” strategy.^* As suggested earlier, even the consideration of 
the "exit” opposition violates the democratic norm o f either "voice” or "loyalty,” 
whether one is in government (power) or in the opposition, and it would threaten the 
democratic stability that is necessary for democratic consolidation to occur.
Regional Elites and Economic Development
The second greatest problem confronting Galicia as a region, according to a 
majority o f my interviews is the lack o f economic development, and, more
^As noted in chapter one, the basic options o f "exit,” "voice” or "loyalty^” follow the 
tripartite scheme o f Hirschman 1970, which he derived from economics theory. 
Hirschman suggests that individuals, firms and states are all confronted with one o f these 
three basic choices. The first option ("exit”) is to simply completely leave the political 
system to which they have been connected, often by violent and revolutionary means. 
The second option is to remain within the system, but to actively articulate one’s views 
(“voice”), and the third and final option (“loyalty”) is to remain in the system and to go 
along meekly with decisions that are made by others in that system.
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specifically, the highly uneven economic development in the various provinces that 
comprise the region. Two charts below indicate the gaps between Galician economic 
development and in Spain as a whole, and secondly, the unevenness o f development 
within Galicia. Such economic underdevelopment matters politically because o f  the 
threat it poses to long-term democratic stability. This is also part o f  the reason that the 
European Union has been so generous in providing economic and other assistance to 
the region.
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CHART: Comparison of GNP Per Capita Between Galicia and Spain to the
Average in the E U (15 members) inconstant 1996 terms [EU-15 = 
100]
Year Spanish GNP/per capita 
avg. cf. EU (100 %)
Galician GNP/per capita
cf. EU (100 %)
I960 57.2% 39.7 %
1975 77.8 % 58.3 %
1985 69.8 % 57.2 %
1996 76.2% 63.4%
Source: Fimdacion BBV(1997,60) and Eurostat
However, such averages tend to conceal wide disparities not only between 
regions in Galicia, but also between sectors and age groups. The chart below gives 
some indication o f the disparity between the four provinces that comprise Galicia. 
Obviously, the provinces of Lugo and Orense lagged far behind Coruna and 
Pontevedra, largely because o f the concentration o f  ship-building and a few other 
heavy industries in the key cities in the latter two provinces.
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CHART: Comparison Between the Economic Output in the 4 provinces of
Galicia Spain = 100
Year Coruna Lugo Orense Pontevedra
1975 78.93 % 57.30 % 58.95 % 77.30 %
1995 89.35 % 73.57 % 75.01 % 84.35 %
Source: Fundacion B B V 61)
European Union aid and direct links-help or hindrance?
Intuitively, the massive amount o f European Union aid to Galicia-administered 
directly, or through the Spanish state, sometimes with “matching” funds from 
Madrid—would appear to be extraordinarily efficacious in addressing the problem o f 
low social capital equilibrium, i f  properly administered. Such funds could be used to. 
as Putnam says, not only pave roads, but to build institutions capable o f maintaining 
the roads. The more immediate and practical concern o f the E.U. in dispersing such 
funds is to insure democratic stability in a  member-state, which is the sine qua non o f 
a healthy Europe. As postulated above, these kinds o f “international factors” clearly 
have some causal weight as an intervening variable.
Recognizing the extraordinary potential importance of the EU to help spur 
regional development and cross-state regional trade and ties, Galicia was one o f  eight 
autonomous communities (regions) in Spain that established a direct “official” EU 
representational office in Brussels (Morata 1994,160). This representation, along 
with statistics that indicated that Galicia lagged far behind not only the EU average 
(see chart above), but also the Spanish average, has resulted in an very high level o f
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EU funds being channeled to the region for various infrastructure and developmental
projects. These funds are known variously as “structural,” “cohesion,” or “solidarity”
funds. An economist gives an idea o f the scope o f this funding:
Galicia is receiving today [1998] 80,000 million pesetas [@ $533 
million] from European Community "solidarity” funds, and is [was] the 
number one region receiving these funds because it was so far below 
the EC and Spanish average of PCI and GNP... In total, the funds from 
the Spanish state and the EC are extraordinarily important...the re­
distribution [within Spain] o f the public income in total is 
approximately 400 to 500,000 million pesetas [@ $2.64 to $3.3 
billion]. This massive re-distribution pays for the basic services and 
physical infrastructure [in Galicia]: roadways, pensions, health, welfare, 
education, etc. (Corbacho 1998).
However, the sheer volume o f funds alone does not guarantee its efficacy. The 
way that the post-Franco Spanish Constitution designed regional autonomies meant 
that, even though the Spanish state alone can negotiate directly with the EU for funds, 
the vast majority o f these funds would be sent directly to the regional governments, in 
this case the Xunta. at least until the local and provincial governments developed 
sufficient “capacity” to administer the funds competently and impartially on their own.
Regional elites, especially the Xunta, who were granted this volume of funds 
were presented with two basic choices in their use: first, construct physical and social 
institutions (practices, norms and procedures) that would have a lasting impact and 
which would, in theory, be self-regenerating, or secondly, to commission and execute 
projects directly, and make payments directly to individuals, bypassing local 
governments, which would both temporarily alleviate a need, and allow the regional
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employment in Galician primary sectors (such as agriculture) in order to help lower the 
problems for Europe as a  whole associated with a surplus o f agricultural products in 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP/PAC), then the funds have partially succeeded. 
In the space o f  Just over 10 years, employment in the primary sectors in Galicia has 
declined from over 40 percent to just over 20 percent (Corbacho 1998). However, 
unemployment remains very high among secondary sectors and the younger generation 
(18-34), which does not bode well in the long term.
Galicia faces a difficult reckoning, however, in the not-too-distant future as 
significant declines in EU funds begin to take effect. At least some Galician elites are 
well aware of this reality, viz., “it is inevitable that the external funds, especially 
European structural funds will be ended in the next few years, especially as the EU 
expands eastwards” (Corbacho 1998). The actions that Galician elites failed to take 
mean that it will become increasingly difficult to overcome the fundamental problem 
o f a low social capital equilibrium in the future.
Conclusion: EfRcacv o f Regional Elite Leadership to Overcome a L.S.C.E.
Barreiro’s conclusion about the efficacy o f leadership to overcome Galicia’s
fundamental problems is unintentionally revealing. Probably because o f his personal
disapprobation o f  Fraga, he is unable to see that Fraga had exceptional political
“capital” with which to bring about fundamental change. He makes the point in a
backhanded way:
Ult is an exceptional situation with an exceptional leader [Fraga] that 
will be seen as a  parentheses; we cannot be preoccupied with the 
situation that produced it because the same PP [Popular Party] with
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diâërent candidates in other situations [facing] other parties; things 
would have been very different (Barreiro 1998),
What Barreiro means is that other candidates would not have given the “exceptional
result,” viz., the very high levels o f  popularity Fraga garnered for himself and the P.P.
However, his conclusion about Fraga’s efficacy in bringing about change appear to be
right on the mark; viz:, Fraga was more concerned with burnishing his personal legacy
and continued re-election to a fairly high-profile post than he was about tackling the
fundamental problem o f Galicia-the low social capital equilibrium. Barreiro makes
this point abundantly clear:
Fraga has a  very personalistic [leadership] style; he operates in the 
manner that he is more important than his party, than his programs, 
than his government; his government is him. He doesn’t need great 
collaborators, he doesn’t need a great party, he only needs, likewise, 
himself. It is a leadership style marked by the idea that there is one 
grand leader around which [rotate] the others. He is the center o f all 
activities. He is the power, he is always ready, he is the worker, he is 
the orator; this is exacerbated by weak parties— [T]he result is a 
situation o f very personalistic leadership... (Barreiro 1998).
Whether from the Right or Left, regional elites in Galicia tend to be quite
pessimistic about the ability o f elites (both their own ability and that o f their
colleagues) to overcome the problem o f low social capital equilibrium. Most share an
implicit traditional model o f modernization and development—only improved
standards o f living can bring about fundamental social change, after a  certain tak eo ff’
stage is reached (cf. Gershekron). If Pumam (1993; 2000) is correct, however, the
causal flow is just the opposite-it is social change {viz., reaching and maintaining a
high social capital equilibrium) that produces sustained, higher standards o f living
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over the long run.
That Fraga is more concerned about his own legacy than the fixture o f Galicia 
(without him) is made abundantly clear by the succession crises that has been brewing 
for some time inside his Popular Party (Llagares 1997). He temporarily averted this 
crisis by standing, one more time, for re-election in 2002 as he approached his 
eightieth year. However, even today, Corbacho notes, leadership selection in all the 
parties, including the P.P., "is still very bad; it is not a process that produces 
excellence, the most able person. It has other characteristics that benefit the institution 
[party], but it does not select well” (Corbacho 1998). Another observer fears the 
return o f the inchoate coalition governments o f the I980's if  talented and experienced 
leaders are not groomed now to take over after the inevitable departure o f Fraga 
(Garrote 1998).
Overall, the Galician case gives credibility to Pumam’s observations that a 
region with pre-existing social capital will tend to get the effective governance that it 
deserves because society has the strength-the independent power-to demand and 
articulate such policy, and the interest and ability to hold the government accountable. 
It may be true, as Putnam (1993, 176) points out, that a strong society produces both a 
strong economy and a "strong”^^  state, but in the case o f  Galicia, a  weak society 
produces an over-bearing state. How does one create such a "strong society” in a
^ I believe that ‘‘effective” state is a  better word choice, because the phrase “strong” 
state conjures up the weak society-strong state dichotomy o f Migdial et al., i.e. an 
authoritarian state that keeps a fiagmented society together, often by military or police 
coercion.
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relative short period o f time (e.g. 25-50 years)? Such practical questions are of 
paramount concern to policy-makers confronting the reality o f several o f the world’s 
states that want or need to become democratic without any historical repertoire o f 
social capital at all.
This case study has pointed a way forward on the question o f overcoming low 
social capital equilibrium without providing any definitive answers. The Galician case 
demonstrates two critical needs for leadership to build social capital ia a transitional 
setting: the proper sequencing o f leaders, and the proper Tit” between society and its 
leadership. On the first point, that a  society’s best leadership should be brought 
forward during the critical early democratic consolidation phase, and secondly, that 
such leadership should "fit like a glove” with the mass public. The Galician case 
illustrates the point that neither condition is sufficient by itself to overcome the 
fundamental problem of low social capital equilibrium.
In parliamentary-style democracies, leaders must necessarily arise through the 
ranks o f the parliamentary system, which is dominated by parties. However, the 
parties remain underdeveloped and fragmented in Galicia even today, and, as 
Corbacho pointed out, such parties do a poor job o f elite recruitment and training. The 
Galician case has illustrated another problem that is common to societies undergoing a 
dual transition: it did not have a strong party structure, and little knowledge o f  how to 
create one, at precisely the moment that such knowledge and structure is most needed: 
the early transition. Despite the nationalists’ council to turn inward in search o f 
leadership and developmental capacity, it would be at exactly at this early stage that
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external expertise would be the most helpful. International assistance Is most needed 
at the foundation-laying stage, not later on. Unfortunately for Galicia. Spain did not 
join the EC/EU until 1986. well beyond this critical stage In the sequence. After that 
point, the massive amounts o f  EU "cohesion” and "structural” funds, despite the best 
Intentions, have not been efficacious In the larger mission o f consolidating democracy 
internally In the Galician region o f Spain.
Political stability does unquestionably obtain In Galicia today. At least by that 
most basic measure, the political elites In Galicia have succeeded In providing a stable 
order In which democracy has a chance to become consolidated In the region at some 
point in the future. But It Is political stability that comes at a high price: without 
building social capital and my "P-3 Indicators.” democratic consolidation will be 
undermined In the long run.
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Chapter 4: Communitarian Democratic Leadership: The Case o f Andaiucfan Elites
Andalucia^ or Andalusia in its Anglicized version, is the region o f Spain 
located all along the entire southern border o f Spain from Portugal in the west, and 
bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on both the south and east. It is the largest of 
today’s seventeen “autonomous communities” that make up Spain. It is the region o f 
Don Ouijote and the plains o f La Mancha. However, it is topographically quite varied, 
from the wetlands o f La Dona in the west to the mountains and narrow valleys around 
Granada. It has long been a region o f sharp political contrasts-e.g. wealthy sea 
merchants and impoverished campesinos.
In this chapter, we will explore the roots o f a distinctive “communitarian” 
leadership style that has developed among regional elites in Andalucid since the 1977 
transition from authoritarian rule. This chapter will also seek to provide a link 
between the theory o f regional leadership in a newly-democratizing context that was 
suggested in chapter one, and that o f practice, as revealed through interviews and on­
site archival research. Andalucfa provides the researcher with fertile ground to 'Test” 
theory against practice, which should be the goal o f political science research. The 
chapter will also seek to understand the concrete mechanisms by which the needs of 
the citizenry are met by regional leaders in a  democratizing context, 
n . The Research Design
To recapitulate from chapter one, the research hypothesis is as follows:
The variation in behavior and strategies o f  regional elites in Spain, 
conditioned by regional factors defined below, resulted in variable
democratic consolidation in each region, and in Spain as a  whole.
The overall goal o f this study is to understand the neglected role o f regional 
elite leadership style in a democratizing context by using the methodologies o f the 
interview, participant-observation, and on-site archival research. "Style” is defined as 
the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by regional elites in pursuit o f 
electoral gain and "higher” vaules like democracy and regional political and economic 
advancement.
Recall the key variables from chapter one:
{Int. Factors}
X
X/+X2+X}+X^ - *  E(Srb) 
where are the independent variables affecting E(s,b), the intermediate
dependent variable, which is the behavior and strategies of regional elites; and DC 
outcome, the ultimate dependent variable, is the variation in the process o f the 
consolidation o f democracy in a given region. Because o f more direct links with the 
international community, international factors are postulated to be more strongly 
causative in one o f the cases (Catalonia) than the others.
In addition, here are the key variables:
E(s,b) I = The basic "exit” or "voice” option (Hirschman 1970) o f regional elites;
i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a democratic 
system.
E(Srb) 2  = Strategy and behavior o f  regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents;
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e.g.» a populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperatioa strategy/** 
E(s,b) j  — Strategy and behavior o f regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites. 
E(s,b)^ =  Strategy and behavior o f  regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites; 
e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the 
center/national elites), or pursuit o f  an export strategy.
Following Bums (1978), leadership is asserted to be collectively purposeful 
causation in the direction o f “higher” values by a  self-identified group. Recall that the 
difficulties o f proving leadership is a  cause, and o f  avoiding infinite regress in 
leadership styles/types is addressed in this study through; (I) a standardized set o f 
variables (above) across regions, (2) the concept o f “elite culture,” and (3) focus on a 
limited number o f institutional contexts (or “regimes”) in which elites operate.
The case of the Andalusian region stands in sharp contrast to the rest o f Spain 
in many ways, although for many outsiders, it is the “real Spain.” *^ Most relevant for 
this study is its political contrast with the rest o f Spain during the post-Franco period, 
and especially the other two regions under consideration, both in its consistent post-
■^*The difference between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise 
some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular 
unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, 
regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived “payoffe” (usually 
electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).
^^This region seems most typically Spanish to foreigners for two primary reasons: (I) 
its colorful and vibrant fbklore (songs, dance, pageants and costumes) have widespread 
appeal, and (2) the region has seen the largest immigration o f any region of Spain over the 
last few centuries, thus spreading the customs o f  the region around the world. Much of 
the Andalusian popular culture is, in turn, due to the intersection o f the culture o f long­
term occupiers the Moors firom the south (i.e. AMca) and the Spaniards hom the north.
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transitional preference for the Spanish Socialist Workers ParQr (PSOE and PSA) and 
its underlying, supporting social structure. The post-transitional trajectory o f  
democratization has taken a  very clear, distinct path from the rest o f  Spain, thus 
providing strong prima facie support for this study’s thesis. It remains to be 
demonstrated, however, the mechanisms that translate mass preferences into 
leadership styles, and how regional elites make conscious choices to maximize their 
support among their “mass clients” within this milieu. Secondly, this chapter will 
elucidate the operational strategies that regional elites employ in the federalist struggle 
with the center (national elites in Madrid) over resources, ideology and party 
affiliation. Finally, the chapter will build inductively towards a generalizable regional 
elite leadership style that shall be termed “communitarian.”
First, why should the regional case o f Andalucia be included in this study?
Five clear reasons are elucidated below.
1. It is the largest region in Spain, both geographically and in population, and it is 
the fastest growing economically {ABC 6/98); to ignore it would be to ignore 
the heart o f  Spain and to miss perhaps the single-most important region in 
Spain, which would make any attempt at generalization less powerful or 
credible (see the discussion on generalization in chapter 2, above).
2. It is one o f the three “historic” regions in Spain, recognized as such under the 
1978 post-transition Spanish national constitution, which entitles it to special 
considerations and material benefits.
3. Its “nationalist’ identity, which fr)rms the basis o f its claim to historic status, is
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o f a completely different character than that o f the other two regions in this 
study, but is still nonetheless effective in bringing unity to a very diverse 
region.
4. It should bring more variation to the study, in terms o f regional elite leadership 
style and the lack o f a historical nationalist identity.
5. Its politics show a  sharp center versus periphery cleavage that throws the 
underlying federalist question o f  this region’s relation to the central 
government in this overall study into sharp relief.
I will suggest in this chapter that elite regional leadership explains most o f  the 
anomalies identified in this numbered list, especially the last one.
It is generally well-known ihat Andalucia, in particular the areas around 
Sevilla, the regional capital, and Cordoba, have long been the home to leftist 
politicians and intellectuals, even well before the death o f Franco in 1975. For 
example, the long-time tic mayor o f Cordoba, Julio Angulta, was an orthodox member 
o f  the Spanish Communist Party (PC£), but he is now the leader o f the new national 
party, the [U  (the United Left), an alliance o f the reformed Communist party and the 
Green party. The poverty o f  the region, combined with an alienation firom Madrid and 
Barcelona, gave the leftist parties a stronghold here. Combined with the unique 
political-economy o f the south of Spain, the conditions have been ripe for a very 
distinctive style o f  elite leadership and interaction with the Andalusian public. 
Although often pictured as the most typically "Spanish” o f all the regions by outsiders, 
it has historically been looked down upon by the rest o f  Spain as being relatively poor
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and backwards. An artifact o f  the grinding poverty o f  the region before and shortly 
after the transition were the huge waves o f immigration from the region to other 
regions o f Spain, Latin America and Europe, composed primarily o f workers seeking 
opportunities abroad.
The post-transition political-economic development of Andalucia has been 
remarkable regardless o f the measure used. According to the President o f  the 
Andalusian Parliament (a position similar to Speaker o f the House), Torres Vela, 
Andalucia is the fastest growing region of Spain, its growth rate eclipsing even the 
more prosperous region o f Cataluna. In addition, Andalucia has reversed the 
historical pattern o f exporting its labor to other regions o f Spain and Europe; it now 
“imports” labor, especially from north Africa and the Middle East. Recent racial 
incidents have occurred in the port cities o f the region (e.g. Malaga) because o f  the 
demand for inexpensive foreign labor to fulfill growing shortfalls (much like the 
southwestern United States) has pulled in a large number o f immigrants, which has 
caused a backlash among long-time Spanish residents. As the table below 
demonstrates industrial production va Andalucia has outpaced that o f Spain as a whole 
during the decade o f the I990's.
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TABLE ONE: Comparison of Industrial Production in Spain Andalucfa
(Measured m growth in aggregate production rates, including energy, metals, 
construction and manufacturing)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
And. 114 78 97 109 105 121
Spain 98 91 97 105 101 113
Source: Junta de Andalucia^ Consejena de Economfay Hacienda, Covuntura 
Economica de Andalucia. No. 30, March 1998, p. 28.
Clearly, Andalucia has come a long way economically in a short period of 
time. The challenge o f this chapter is to ascertain the unique "path" that 
democratization has taken in Andalucia that is in keeping with its history and social 
base, which, in turn, may suggest a ideal-typical leadership style that may be replicated 
elsewhere in similar cases in terms o f its “communitarian” structure and lack o f strong 
capitalist economy before the transition to democracy. O f course, the leadership styles 
that Andalusian elites actually employ has to be ascertained through empirical 
research.
in. Pre-transition Background in Andalucia: Constructing an Identity Whole 
Cloth
A brief history of attempts to create a nationalist identity for this region 
demonstrates that, despite heroic efibrts, there was no significant mass-based 
nationalist movement or identity. This fact makes the recognition of Andalusia in the 
post-Franco Spanish constitution even more remarkable.
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'^Epistolarîo Bético, ” written by José Vazquez in 1917, has been cited by regional 
writers as the perhaps the greatest journalistic statement o f Andalucian identity. In this 
piece, the author disagrees with then commonly-heard "solutions” for southern Spain’s 
problems: viz., chiefly, agricultural reform or radical revolution. Instead, he identifies 
the problem as one o f a lack o f‘‘civic consciousness” and opines that:
Andalucia will become a force, it will not be like some stopped-up 
avalanche that, under the influence o f a fiery and deceitful 
revolutionary, sweeps and surges forth, but rather by means of 
fortifying itself with the thought and the affirmation o f  a collective 
consciousness, and then all o f  its problems can be resolved with a 
surprising facility (Vazquez 1982 [1917], 30).
In essence, Vasquez was calling for a social revolution based on thorough-going
educational reform (he refers to Rosseau’s Emile), not some technical “solution” like
improved agriculture or revolution imposed from above. In calling for a social, or
civil society, reform, Vazquez was surprisingly modem, anticipating the main thrust of
Putnam’s (1993) conclusions 66 years later.
Unfortunately, the history o f Andalucia over the next fifty years was not to
follow the pattern that Vasquez laid out. Historians and political analysts have
speculated on various reasons for the historical “backwardness” o f the region, even in
relationship with the rest o f Spain: e.g., poor soil and climate, dominance o f the
church, a  work-adverse culture, an anti-capitalist culture, high illiteracy and even
social radicalism (Carr 1989). In addition, the “dependency” theorists have cited
Andalucia as a case o f a “periphery” being consistently “underdeveloped” through its
interaction with the “core,” Madrid in this case (Barzelay and O’Keanl990,56) .
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Regardless o f  the preferred explanation, the surprising fact is that Andalucia has made 
a dramatic and almost wholly unpredicted, even counter-predicted "dual transition” in 
both politics and economics in the last quarter o f  the twentieth century/^ It is here 
asserted that there were four critical factors ixi Andalucia's unexpected turnaround: 
primarily the socialist-led transition to democracy, strong regional elite leadership who 
helped direct social as well as political change, massive aid and support from the EU 
and other European IGO’s, and finally (yes) technical advances in agriculture and air- 
conditioning. The collective consciousness that Bias Infante, Vazquez and other 
Andalusian elites hoped for so fervently seems to have been the product of, and not the 
cause of, these other four factors, i.e. they had the causal chain exactly backwards. In 
one way, however, at least the illusion o f a collective Andalusian consciousness was 
important for securing special rights for the region during the transitional period, and 
that is the story that we turn to below.
IV. Regional Elites in Andalucia Since the Transition
Despite that lack o f historical nationalism at the mass level in the region. 
Andalucia was one o f only four regions that was able to gamer recognition o f its 
"historic” status in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. This status is important for the 
region, because, as previously noted, it allows regional elites to apply for and receive 
additional funding, special exemptions from laws o f  the central state, and a much
^®Note that the ‘'dual transition” that Andalucia has had to make in the post-Franco era 
is in contrast to much o f  the rest o f Spain, particular the regions around Madrid and 
Barcelona, which had already undertaken a  successful economic transition under Franco, 
and had the lesser, but still daunting, challenge o f making a single transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.
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(out o f  a total population o f  only about seven million at the timel). This move robbed
Andalucia o f its vital economic base; one could justifiably conclude that the problems
o f underdevelopment in Andalucia during the Franco regime were “not a consequence
of natural characteristics, but (rather) the result o f political decisions that were taken”
(Torres Vela 1998).
The sea change that occurred in the strategy o f Andalusian elites was the
diminution o f  the Marxian dialectic in favor o f American-inspired emphasis on the
state, institutions, the market, and proper sequencing (process) in bringing about
political and economic development. According to Torres Vela, who was intimately
involved in this sea-change in strategy,
[Wjhen the modem political science, like that o f  the United States.
Easton and others, was embraced at the University o f Granada, and 
finally introduced into Spain, it produced a new analysis that explains 
political development in terms o f our own lack o f political process. 
Under-development is linked to the lack of political power itself 
(Torres Vela 1998).
Because academics like Torres Vela (both a professor o f economics and the President 
o f  the Andalusian Parliament) are also in positions o f political power in Andalucia and 
elsewhere in Spain, the link between theory and practice is plausible. It may be that 
this group o f professors (aroimd the University o f Granada) is claiming too much 
credit for such a  momentous social and political change. However, one concrete 
manifestation o f the stress on state “capacity” and “planning” is clearly illustrated in 
the case o f  the Andalusian Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPIA) discussed below. 
Two o f  the key figures for Andalucfa during the transition phase in Andalucia
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were Rafael Escuredo and Fernandez Viagas.”  In the Spanish Constitution, the 
Andalusian foundational Pacto de Antequeria and. elsewhere, they were able to 
recognize the importance o f “historic” status for the region, and concomitantly, they 
consciously sought to foster and promote Andalucian nationalism and integrate it with 
early elements o f what is identified in this study as the “communitarian” leadership 
style (see Table 2, below). Escurerdo, in particular, understood the needs o f the 
moment, and rose to the occasion, with a style that has been described by local 
political observers as “tic” (Montabes 1997a, 4).^ ® Escuredo was also president o f  the 
regional government o ïAndalucia (the Junta) during the critical period of 1979-1984, 
when, according to Montabes et al. (1997a, 1997b), the elections and regional elite 
leadership played the dual role o f normal mediation with the public, and the 
extraordinary role o f consolidating or normalizing democratic practice as a meta­
system (1997a, 4; Portas 1987).
According to professor Pérez Royo (1998) o f  the University o f  Granada. 
Escuredo was instrumental in helping to create an “historic” identity îo t Andalucia. 
The idea o f  “creating” an historic identity is, o f  course, an oxymoron (how can one 
create the past?), but it comports with other counter-intuitive findings o f the
”  Moreover, in the Spanish transition in general, it was a native o f  Seville, Felipe 
Gonzales, who was to prove to be one the pivotal figures in the consolidation phase of 
democratization in Spain in the I980's.
^^Escurerdo has lived in hermetic isolation since his term as President o f Andalucia', 
even former close associates have lost touch. Several associates believe that he lives in 
Madrid. Attempts to contact him for an interview for this study were unsuccessful.
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democratization Uterature^^, It also comports with the idea o f the charismatic leader as 
the “law-giver” or creator or new orders and new identities (Conger and Kanungo 
1998,140fif; W ildavslqr 1989, 101), In addition, empirical research has concluded 
that, “leaders who are entrepreneurial founders, the probability is higher that they are 
principal assemblers o f  the vision” (Conger and Kanungo 1998.142), that is truly 
charismatic, and not manufactured by political handlers to appear that way (c f 
Weber’s “routinized charisma”).
Escuredo worked hard for, and achieved, a referendum on October 28, 1981 on 
both the historic status on Andalucia, and its relationship with the rest o f Spain. This 
public referendum gave him the ammunition needed to change the national 
constitution o f Spain. He also was instrumental in changing the wording o f the 
Spanish Constitution in “Title VUI” in order to sWovf Andalucia to seek the same level 
o f autonomy granted to only two other “historical-national” communities-the Basque 
Country and Cataluna (Barzelay and O’Kean 1989, 57).
In order to create or “reinforce” this “historic” nationalistic identity, and as an 
electoral strategy, Escuredo and his fellow elites in the Socialist Party undertook a 
two-prong strategy: first, argue Oasit Andalucia's “underdevelopmenf’ was as a result 
o f cultural repression from the center o f Spain (picking up on the leftist “dependency”
^^or example, one o f the strongest and most surprising “counter-intuitive” findings of 
the democratization literature is that elites have been able to create (but not necessarily 
sustain) a  democratic predilection among the mass o f people, although the mass-national 
political culture had been “anti-democratic” just a short time befisre (O’Donnell et al. 
1986). However, Diamond (1999, 173) reminds us that elites alone cannot sustain a 
democratic culture.
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argument), and secondly, separate the Andalusian Socialists from the state-level 
Socialist Party (PSOE). The first strategy was carried out in political speeches, and in 
a  magazine (since disbanded) ± a t was founded at the time, [Andalucia Libret (Free 
Andalusial). The second strategy was enacted in a deliberate electoral plan that 
sought to capture the traditional left o f  Andalusian politics and the far left o f  the 
former Communist party supporters. It was, in contrast to the “rightist” nationalism of 
Cataluna, explicitly a “nationalism o f the left.” As part o f its electoral platform, the 
PSA argued that it was ‘ih e  major [party] that represents the identity and interests of 
Andalucia” (Barzelay and O’Kean 1989,57). Even before Analucia was recognized as 
a “historic” region under Title VIII. Escuredo was able to become the “pre- 
autonomous” President o f  the Andalusian government (the Junta) by winning the 
votes of the Commimist delegates in the Andalusian Parliament in 1979. Also in this 
election, the decision to separate the PSA from the PSOE paid off-the vote for the 
PSA increased by seven percentage points, and that for the PSOE declined by six 
points, and this in the PSOE s “home” region (Barzelay and O’Kean 1989, 58)1
As a direct result o f  this two-part strategy, Escuredo and the PSA sought to 
create a positive component (instead o f just a negative, anti-Madrid, position) which 
could simultaneously:
1. Help consolidate democracy in the region,
2. Bring about desperately needed social change and economic development, and
3. Serve an important and historically neglected “mass clienf ’ in Andalucia: the 
small-to-medium sized entrepreneur/farmer/business-owner.
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4. Demonstrate the institutional capacity o f  the new Junta to bring about these 
comprehensive political and economic changes (Barzelay and O’Kean 1989. 
59).
IPIA as an example o f  Leadership Style 
The Andalusian Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPIA) was created as part of 
a specific political strategy by Andalusian regional elites to address all four points that 
were critical in Andalusia during the transitional and early democratic consolidation 
period, and are still relevant today
According to a well-respected case study o f IPIA, the ambitious goals included 
"actively animating socioeconomic change processes in several particular contexts.” 
IPIA, under President Escuredo. and the particular guidance o f Ricardo Moreno, went 
far beyond the usual business-promotion role o f such government bodies and 
attempted to simultaneously consolidate democracy and promote social change in the 
region. Their relative success in achieving these goals has lead to the “case of IPIA” 
being included in the famous Harvard case-study series (Barzelay 1990a; 1990b).
What makes IPIA so unique in Spain-and indeed in systems o f  corporatist 
intermediation-was that it was not a “peak association” o f  either labor or business- 
owners that one would typically find in European tripartite corporatist arrangements, 
but rather a  full-fledged development agency whose purpose it was not to merely 
represent interests at bargaining sessions with other interlocutors, but rather to
®°When asked what the greatest problems facing Andalucia today were, the President 
o f the Parliament, Torres Vela answered, “lack o f  region-wide modernization and 
unemploymenf’ (Torres Vela 1998; translated by the author).
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simultaneously help consolidate democracy and develop infant industries and &agile 
small business located in the region.
The uniqueness o f DPIA, and Escuredo’s strategy attached to it, is not an 
historical accident, but is rather the product o f specific strategies and behaviors of 
Andalusian elites in the early 1980's vis-à-vis other regional, national and international 
elites, as hypothesized by variables E(s,b)i2 j^  ^ Escuredo was attempting to build his 
power base, not only for himself, but also for the Andalusian Socialists in the long­
term. Because o f the sum total o f his strategy in relation to other elites, he eschewed 
traditional tripartite corporatist arrangements that have been so celebrated in the 
political science literature (di Palma; O’Donnell et al. 1986); viz., one is which the 
state plays merely a coordinating role between already existing and powerful "peak” 
associations representing employer and labor interests. In addition, this form of 
tripartite corporatism did not fit into his model o f "democratic planning” 
(^'planificacion democratica). In particular, he found ± e  CEA (Andalusian 
Confederation o f Employers) to an unreliable partner and overly-ambitious (Barzelay 
and O’Kean 1989,62-63). He may have also found their frank identification with the 
right to be at cross-purposes with his own electoral strategies and preferences.*'
The IPIA sought not only to bring about economic change, but also "social 
learning,” through action plans. Developmental specialists, like Ricardo Sanchez, had 
long been foustrated by the lack o f innovation and fatal resignation among the
®'During the 1982 election campaign, the CEA did not help relations with Escuredo 
and the Socialists by supporting an advertisement that depicted the Socialists as a  red 
apple (suggesting Communist links) with a worm coming out it (rotten to the core?).
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Andalusian populace. Therefore, they sought to truncate that process, described by 
Putnam (1993) as taking many hundreds of years, o f  social development that must 
precede successfol economic development. The specific mechanisms were: social 
animation, institution-building, strategic planning and networking (Barzelay 1990b, I). 
The director o f IPIA, Ricardo Sanchez believed that social learning would free up the 
minds o f those involved in regional production from traditional social structures that 
retarded political and economic development, such as isolationism in communities, 
weak entrepreneurship, and very weak coordination among employers (Capital) 
(Barzelay 1990b, 3-4). The link between improved social capital and economic 
production is clear and explicit in Sanchez’s plans.
For the IP LA, Escuredo’s support, built upon his communitarian leadership 
style, was a much more powerful source of legitimation than any other alternative, e.g.. 
an alliance with a party, or the CEA, His public "discourse” both legitimated and 
brought new sources o f  income and "suppliers” to the IPIA so that it could better serve 
its client: the small and medium-sized private enterprise who would be both the 
political and economic base o f a resurgent post-Franco Andalucia,
There were political costs, however, to Escuredo’s strategies for improving 
democratic stability and social capital in the region. The most potent one, that 
eventually forced his departure from office, was E(s,b)j (strategy and behavior vis-à- 
vis national elites). Although the norm in most European democracies is to have 
tightly disciplined parties at all levels o f government, Escuredo’s strategy called for 
him to "run against the center,” i.e. blame the national government in Madrid for
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However, the tension between Sevilla and Madrid continued, as well as the 
underlying regional institutional structure, or mass client. After the departure o f 
Escuredo, other elites rushed in to fill the void.
Upon closer examination on site, and interviews with elites in Andaluda, it 
becomes clear that historical animosities, even cleavages, remain from the past. For 
example, there still exists an east-west rivalry, centered around Sevilla and Granada, 
and extremes o f right versus left over the question o f whether the region is historically, 
or should be, nationalistic or socialistic.
However, the transition in Andaluda was not bloody or extreme. Why? An 
extraordinary circumstance, unlikely to be widely repeated in other democratizing 
contexts, obtained in Andaluda in the late I970's and early I980's. Direct Andalusian- 
European links between regional, socialist-party and labor elites were formed that 
largely bypassed the central government and provided both material and technical 
support that was badly needed in the region in order to insure a  peaceful transition to 
democracy (Jerez 1998; Van Doom 1994; Barzelay and 0 ‘Kean 1989). The 
Andalusian economy is further helped by the rapid development, for the purposes of 
attracting tourist revenues, o f its natural resources-its coasts, mountains, picturesque 
villages and historical sites. Some Andalusians are proud of% and some resent, its new 
appellation— the “Florida o f Europe”— but this new status undeniably brings a huge 
inflow o f foreign capital into the region, and helps its democracy through a 
“demonstration effect,” i.e. successful economic performance boosts the legitimacy o f  
democracy with the populace. Even today, the regionalist Partido Andaltidsta
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(“Andalusian Party”):
manifests its adherence to European federalism, based upon the 
solidaristic interdependence o f  all peoples, and with the knowledge o f 
the historic continuity and institutions o f the Spanish state, as a result o f 
a  pacted process o f federal association between free and equal peoples 
(Partido Andalucista 1997, 6).
Towards a Model o f  “Regional Communitarian Leadership”
Based on the foregoing analysis, a model o f the regional communitarian 
leadership style in a democratizing context will be explicated below. Because 
relatively little has been written about this leadership model, it is not possible to 
compare the proposed model with many existing models.
A uthor Model Social Elite Elite Application
Features Setting Strategies Behaviors
Wildavsky Potentially Radical Appear to be Persuasion Societies
unlimited egalitarianism an “anti­ (low marked by
terms o f and “social politician” in coercion). low coercion.
office: democracy”; order not to facilitation voluntary
“discontinuou heavily threaten and self- consent and
s” i.e. long regulated followers or effacement: in little
gaps without markets: appear to be crisis a inequality.
strong charismatic “lording it” bringer o f a
leadership. leaders arise over others: in “new law”
alternating in times of time o f  crisis. that is
with trouble however. unlimited in
charismatic leaders should scope
leaders show supreme 
virtue and 
unlimited 
authoriqr
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Van Doom Diffiised, Homogenous; (I) Use (1) use o f Appropriate
non- strong sense “loyalty” pacting as a in developing
hefrarchical o f shared. option to device to regions where
leadership albeit non­ avoid rocking insure loyalty center
style; isolated national the boat; (2) and as (capital) is
instances o f values; Electoral; development weak, marked
charismatic equality often intra-elite tool; (2) by non-
leadership based upon cooperation; Electoral: hierarchical
dispossession (3) Seek welfare and social
or shared hard benefits from benefits relationships
times the center; populism; (3) and relative
(4) seek Forge deprivation
benefits from alliances with that creates
international center elites “equality”;
sources in order to conversely
secure also
benefits; applicable in
publicly advanced
blame center social
as necessary democracies
for bad times based upon
(4) promote radical
external egalitarian­
tourism and ism
seek
representation
in IGO’s
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What are the implications o f this new model for both understanding regional 
leadership styles, and the role that regional leadership can/should play in a 
democratizing setting? First, it helps understand what sort of leader will be needed 
(and tolerated) at diffèrent phases o f democratization in a communitarian setting: the 
charismatic during the transition phase, and the "ordinary,” or even "anti,” leader 
during the consolidation phase, at least at the regional level. Secondly, the model 
helps solve a persistent puzzle about the types of leaders who do well in a 
communitarian political-institutional context: both charismatic leaders and "anti” 
leaders, but not usually at the same time at the same level. Thirdly, my communitarian 
model predicts, contrary to what communist or social democratic versions do, that 
communitarian leadership style may be found in lesser-developed countries or regions 
of countries. The social-democratic version o f Wildavsky, for example, presupposes 
that the communitarian sense o f "radical egalitarianism” occurs only after a high level 
o f political and economic development has taken place, much as orthodox Marxism 
would predict. On the contrary, I have found that this sense o f radical egalitarianism 
can be authentically found in communities whose relative deprivation gives them a 
shared sense o f  solidarity, and an anti-capitalistic, or extra-systemic, outlook in 
economic matters. Recall, for example, the lament by the head of the peak Capital 
(business owner) association, Sehor Moya, that almost a  third o f  the employment in 
Andalucia was still today in the black economy, and it was very difficult to change this
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mentality because it was based upon deep-seated institutions/^ This is the main 
reason that IPIA, under the guidance o f President Escuredo and Morena was such a 
success-it was tailored to regional institutional realities (or ‘‘culture”), and not a 
cookie-cutter model from other democratizing experiences.
To elaborate from the Andalusian experience, two charismatic leaders were 
clearly needed and appreciated during the transitional phase when Andalucia was 
fighting for its identity and its place within the new democratic Spanish state. They 
helped build a  different kind o f social capital-one that bridges from community to 
community (where bonding social capital tends to be ve/y strong), and overcome 
historical distrust between small rural and larger urban business owners, and between 
the eastern and western parts o f the region. However, once that “critical” phase was 
over, the region has been led by what appears to be a  series o f lackluster elites who 
succeed precisely because o f their very ordinariness, because they do not threaten the 
community’s sense o f self. They can build upon their predecessors’ foundational work 
in creating bridging social capital. The current president o f the Junta, Chaves, has 
been an “utilitarian” political leader in this regard. Yet, even today in some 
communities in Andalucia, and in their representatives to the Andalusian Parliament, 
are leaders who fit the charismatic leader ideal-type; one is even Jokingly called the
“ Moya’s analysis was given even more credence at an academic conference held at the 
University o f  Malaga in Andalusia on July 3,2002. Even though the share o f the 
“irregular” or black market economy was said to have declined slightly to about 25 
percent o f  the total economic output, it still is one o f the most difficult social-economic 
problems to solve In Andalusia today. See El Pais (Spanish newspaper), July 4,2002.
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“Messiah” and “Moses” by his colleagues for his fiery oratory and his ability to 
connect with the people in his community.
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Chapter 5: Visionary Leadership Style: The Case o f Cataluna
Section One: Introduction and Research Questions
Cataluha, or Catalonia in its Anglicized version, is the region o f Spain located 
at its extreme northeast comer where Spain Joins with France, not too distant from 
Italy and Monaco, It is also the area where the Pyrenees slope down into the 
Mediterranean, allowing relatively easy access from the Mediterranean to both the 
mainland o f the European continent, via France, and to the rest of Spain, Because o f 
its geo-strategic location, this region has been important since antiquity, for travel, 
trading and military purposes. It is also a naturally beautiful region of mountains, 
ancient villages with Roman ruins, valleys and scenic coastlines.
This is a study o f regional leadership styles during the transition and 
consolidation phases o f democratization in Spain, as explicated in chapter one. To 
briefly recapitulate from that chapter, the research hypothesis was as follows:
The variation in behavior and strategies o f regional elites in Spain, 
conditioned by regional factors defined below, resulted in variable 
levels o f  democratic stability and democratic consolidation in each 
region.
The theoretical relationship between variables was forecast to be as follows:
{Int. Factors} 
t
Efs.b) — level of democratic stability — degree of democracy
cases that are “most likely” to confirm the hypothesis, and do so after testing^. It is 
much more common in the literature to find the “most likely'^ case-study approach 
because such an approach is often perceived to be “safer” on the part o f the 
researcher-he or she wants to prove what they set out to prove, ignoring the value that 
disconflrmed hypotheses add to the general body of knowledge. See chapter one, 
above, for a  more complete explanation o f the methodology and logic involved in 
Eckstein’s case-study approach.
Why is Cataluna a  “least-likely” case to confirm the hypotheses in this study? 
Catalufia boasts a long history of political independence from the rest o f Spain, well- 
developed traditions o f representative government, public policy apparatus, and long 
periods o f much higher economic prosperity than the rest o f Spain. In terms o f 
advanced political-economy, it is similar to some o f the regions o f the north o f Italy, 
cited by Putnam (1993) that enjoy high “social capital” among the populace. 
Therefore, Cataluna would appear, superficially, to be a “most likely” case to confirm 
Putnam’s thesis that democratic development explains both economic and policy 
performance (and not vice-versa, as was previously believed). Conversely, Cataluna 
would appear to be a  “least likely” case to support the thesis here that regional 
leadership matters in democratic consolidation. Why? If Pumam is correct, regional 
leadership does not matter much, because it is the enduring (1000-year long?)
®^ In fact, according to Eckstein’s criteria, if  a  “most likely” case fails to convincingly 
confirm the hypothesis, this has the same vitiating effect on the hypothesis that a 
disconfirming case would have.
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and a  discussion o f  this style.
Cataluna presents a set o f  intriguing challenges for the researcher. The primary 
problématique for this case in this study is, how did a region that was actively 
repressed for over 40 years by the Franco regime®* re-emerge with a high level o f 
economic development, more united internally, and more democratic than ever before? 
A related question is why has Cataluna not experienced the same violent separatist 
struggles (and terrorism) that the Basque region has, despite more widespread 
nationalist identity among the people o f Cataluna than the Basque country®^ and more 
active suppression by the Spanish state under Franco? The secondary problem-area 
will be an understanding o f the role that the leadership style o f Jordi Pujol and his 
fellow elites played in the path that democratic consolidation took in Cataluna. 
Specifically, what was the elite-mass client interaction during this phase o f democratic 
consolidation? Finally, we shall examine the problem o f sequencing; i.e. does it 
matter what type o f leader comes along during the different phases in the 
democratization process, or do different types o f  leaders become more or less crucial 
during the early vs. later stages o f  democratization? Any work o f this type on the
®® And actively repressed for even longer periods of time under the monarchs, dictators 
and other '‘central” Spanish authorities.
®’The levels of nationalist identity among the public in each o f the regions o f  Spain 
have been thoroughly measured by annual surveys conducted by the respected Spanish 
research institute, CIRES. See, for example CIRES (1991). One measure (among many 
used by CIRES) is the use o f the “national” language. A scientifically-conducted poll 
fbimd that only 10 percent o f respondents in the Basque country even understood 
Euskedai, and an even smaller percentage used it regularly. In contrast, over 80 percent 
o f  Catalonians understood Catalan, and 60 percent said that they used it regularly.
Page 149
democratic transition in Spain should include the region o f  Catalufia, for the following
reasons, among others:
5. It has one o f the strongest levels o f nationalist identity (measured by both 
voting strength o f  nationalist parties and in repeated public opinion polls), o f 
the new "autonomous communities” o f Spain, a status that enabled it to be the 
first to claim "historical status” under the 1978 constitution.
6. It has the clearest and most widespread nationalist identity o f any region o f 
Spain (much more so than the well-known Basque region).
7. Catalufia has proven to be an extraordinary breeding ground for political 
leaders in post-Franco Spain. To cite a few examples: the Vice-President of 
the dominant post-Franco Socialist government (1983-1997), Narcis Serra, the 
recent mayor o f Barcelona, Maragall, (who is widely considered to be a leading 
candidate for Prime Minister o f Spain, or president o f  the regional 
government), and, Jordi Pujol, the president o f the Generalitat (Catalan 
regional government) almost since its re-emergence in the late 1970's. As we 
will see below, Pujol embodies a  "visionary” leadership style o f an "authentic” 
leader.
8. Finally, it appears to be the most "successful” o f  all the 17 autonomous regions 
o f Spain by most conventional measures: aggregate standards o f  living, 
infirastructure, levels o f literacy, public health, public policy performance and 
effectiveness, etc. What explains this success vis-à-vis the rest o f Spain in 
many o f  the measures thought to be indispensable for democratic
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consolidation? What role does regional political leadership, if  any, play in this
success? Or can political success be explained solely ia terms o f  economic
success (a version o f Lipset’s $8500 PCI '‘threshold” for democracy, cited in
chapter one).
Section Two: The Research Design
Logic and terminology
This study seeks to understand the neglected role of leadership style through the
methodologies o f the elite interview, and on-site archival research. Because these
methods and the research questions (above. Section One) involve subjective and
qualitative analysis, it is asserted that quantitative analysis o f leadership style would be
inappropriate. It would be useful here to recall the independent variables identified in
this study, as well as a quotation from James MacGregor Bums classic. Leadership
(1978). First, the conceptual definition o f  political leadership from Bums:
Political leadership is those processes and effects o f political power in 
which a  number o f actors, varying in their composition and roles from 
situation to situation, spurred by aspirations, goals, and other 
motivations, appeal to and respond to the needs and other motives of 
would-be followers with acts for reciprocal betterment, or, in the case 
o f transforming leaders, the achievement o f real change in the direction 
o f “higher” values. Political leadership is tested by the extent o f  real 
and intended change achieved by leaders' interactions with followers 
through the use o f their power bases. Political leadership is broadly 
intended “real change, ” It is collectively pitrposefid cotisation (italics 
in original; Bums 1978,434).
Style is defined as the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by 
regional elites in pursuit o f  electoral gain and “higher” values like democracy and
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regional political and economic advancement.
Leadership style is operationalized in this study as being composed o f the 
following four variables, E(s,b),_^ (see chapter one).
Section Three: Relevant Historv
Cataluna has a  long history o f  political and economic development separate 
from, and somewhat in competition with, the rest o f Spain. As early as 1150. it was a 
self-identified region under the control o f it own royalty, (an Archduchy), which were 
newly separated from the Frankish kings (Pages i Rejsek 1996,21). Its distinctive 
language, Catalan, emerged slightly earlier (around the 10'** century A.D.). The Middle 
Ages and European Renaissance period were occupied with securing ever-expanding 
regional power and trading routes (primarily maritime) through intermarriage and 
outright conquest. The western end o f the Mediterranean Sea was increasingly under 
Catalan dominance by the end o f the Medieval period. Catalan language, culture and 
influence had spread down the eastern coast o f Spain as far south as Murcia, and 
eastward to the Baleric Islands (Majorca). The 14* century also witnesses the zenith 
o f Catalan territory and influence, in which the most o f north Mediterranean coastal 
states, west o f Turkey, were under direct or indirect Catalan control. (Pages i Rejsek 
1996,23). By the late I400's, Cataluna had united with Aragon, and then with the rest 
o f central and northern Spain, primarily in order to expel the Moors from southern 
Spain. It is not without some historical justification that today’s Catalans boast that 
they have “rescued” Spain several times from serious challenges, both domestic and
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foreign. What many modem Catalan nationalists conveniently overlook, however, are 
the many benefits Catalufia has gained from its association with the rest o f  Spain.
Relatively representative government also claims a  long lineage in Catalonia, 
longer than in any other region o f Spain; interrupted, however, from time to time, 
especially by conflict with the central Spanish state. The predecessor for today’s 
regional government, the Generalitat^ was the Corts-General, (much like the later 
French Estates-Generai) which met for the first time in the Federation o f the Aragon 
Crown in the 14*'’ century A.D (Pages i Rejsek 1996,21). It, in turn, appointed an 
executive committee, the Diputacio del General, which carried out the practical, daily 
functions o f government, and is usually considered the "embryo” o f the self-governing 
Generalitat (Pages i Rej'sek 1996,29).®* The Generalitat first broke free o f  absolutist, 
royal control in 1413 when Ferdinand I o f  Spain recognized its powers and legal 
standing. The subsequent history o f  the Generalitat (1413-1977) is too lengthy to be 
recounted in any detail here. Suffice it to say that, over the centuries since its 
establishment, its power waxed and waned, and it was often a corrupted, coopted and 
non-representative body. It ceased to exist for long periods o f time. In fact, a 
(Castillian) Spanish textbook describes political control imder the combined Aragon 
crown this way:
Aragon had the most repressive system o f nobility in the [Iberian]
®*In fact, the facade o f the same building that housed the old Diputacio in 1365 still 
serves as the eastern facade o f today’s Generalitat in Barcelona. The Generalitat claims 
that this Gothic palace is the only one that has continually housed a government in 
Europe, and the oldest government building that still houses the same Qrpe o f government 
for which it was originially built (Pages i Rej'sek, 29).
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which was admired throughout Europe” (Pages i Rejsek 1996,38). The second 
incident was similar treatment under General Franco from 1940-1977. Franco further 
inflamed Catalan resentment by cooperating with German agents in the capture o f the 
elected President o f the Generalitat, Lluis Companys (who was in exile in France), 
and then his execution in 1940 by court-martial. Clearly, Franco’s vision for a 
“unified” Spain was far different than that o f the Catalan nationalists, but it is one that 
still enjoys some currency today in the democratization literature-the need for a "one 
size fits all” model o f  governance (political-social-economic affairs). O f course, the 
insults suffered under Franco are much fresher in the memories o f Catalan nationalists 
and ordinary citizens than those suffered under Philip V. but a vague impression of 
long-term and systematic oppression o f Cataluna by the central Spanish state is widely 
shared in the region.
Section 3: Regional Elites in Cataluna Since the Transition
Cataluna is alone among the regions in having just one significant head of 
regional government since the transition from authoritarianism on the death o f Franco, 
Jordi Pujol.®’ Pujol was a militant at an early age under Franco, in both Christian and 
nationalist causes. He was imprisoned by the Franco regime for his oppositional 
activities. Ironically, however, this imprisonment gave him far more credibility as an 
“authentic” leader than he would have otherwise enjoyed. Soon after his release from 
prison, in 1974, he founded the Catalan Democratic Convergence party (CDC), and
’^Technically, there was a “trustee” President o f  the Generalitat from 1977 to 1980, 
Joseph Tarradellas, who had been President o f  the same body during the 38 years o f its 
“exile” under Franco (Pages i Rejsek 1996,50).
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was elected to the Spanish national parliament (the Cortes) in 1977 under his party's 
banner. In 1980, the CDC entered into coalition with the Democratic Union of 
Catalunya (UDC) and won the status o f  the majority in the first elections for the 
Generalitat, and according to parliamentary practice, the membership o f this majority 
coalition in the Generalitat elected him as President o f the Generalitat on April 10, 
1980.’° Pujol is now in his fifth term o f office after winning re-election by absolute 
majority in 1984,1988 and 1992, and by simple majority in 1995 (Pages i Rejsek 1996, 
70). He has announced his decision to step down in 2003 (Company 2002), and has 
already named his desired "successor.”
Catalan regional elites in the early transition 
In the years before the death o f Franco, many of today's Catalan political elites 
were heavily involved in anti-Franco struggles throughout Spain wherever the 
opportunity best presented itself. One such turning point and time were the "Burgos 
trials” held in the early seventies against suspected members o f  the Basque liberation 
front, the ETA. Although most o f  the Catalan elites who participated in the struggle in 
1971 now believe that ETA has become a terrorist organization, at that time it was a 
rare outlet to channel anti-Franco "anti-fascist” resistence that might (and did) receive 
international attention. One such Catalan elite with whom 1 conducted a  personal 
interview was Rafael Ribo, head o f both the ERC party (Left Republican Party o f 
Catalunya) and the Catalan Initiative (IC). I shall quote it at some length because it
’“The two parties later formally merged into the Convergence and Unity party of 
Catalunya, or the CiU.
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captures both the times and provides an “insider’s view” o f  it:
I became involved in the so-called “intellectual assembly o f Cataluna”
[in 1971] which was founded against the trial in Burgos o f the ETA 
members. Remember that in Franco’s time, ETA was another thing 
[than it is now], and we were backing the ETA, asking that there not be 
a death penalty sentence in Burgos. [T]here were 6,000 people involved 
in the international movement there... (Ribo 1998).
After the Burgos trials were over, however, the movement that it had started
lived on because the leaders who were there went back to their regions and created
organizations and fora for resistance. The anti-Franco movement became
institutionalized at the regional level, as Ribo explains:
This [movement] became the Assembly o f Cataluna, which I was 
involved in for four years [underground]— we were gathering in 
churches... because the [Catholic] Church was offering us protection, in 
the monasteries as well as the churches, and 1 was nominated by the 
Assembly to be the Secretary of the so-called “Relations Committee” 
which was formed by the already important leaders and personalities of 
the clandestine community, leaders like Josep Bennet, that was in 
charge o f  relations with the other democratic platforms [throughout]
Spain. These were not legal platforms, like the one presided over by 
Felipe Gonzales in Madrid, the plaza Junta (?) or General Caban; this 
meant that we were traveling a lot to Spain to meet with all o f  these 
anti-Franco platforms... (Ribo 1998).
Regional elites in Catalonia then focused on formalizing their opposition to
Franco through (usually leftist) political parties so as to broaden the appeal o f  the
message throughout Catalan society. Again, we follow the tale through the personal
story o f Professor Ribo:
After 1974,1 decided to enter into the SUC [United Socialists o f 
Catalunya], the Catalan branch o f the Socialist Party allied with the 
Communist Party  [recounts history o f  the SUC since its creation in 
1936]... but in the 70's it regained its character as being a unified party 
rather than as a  [ideologically] communist party because o f  the fight
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against Franco. You can see this if  you look at its [diverstfied] 
membership, like Alberto Frei, famous architect, or Josep Pique, 
current Minister o f Industry [now Foreign Minister in 2002] in the 
Aznar government; very different people were in the SUC then... So in 
synthesis, you see that it was not any special talents on my part, but the 
unusual times in which I was involved (Ribo 1998).
After the death o f Franco, the political focus of most regional elites lay in
obtaining legal recognition for the region (especially its political and economic
systems) enshrined in any post-transitional pacts or the proposed new constitution.
The first democratic elections for legislative seats to be held in Spain after the death o f
Franco were held on July 15. 1977. Every Catalan party that won legislative seats in
the Spanish national parliament promised (in their party’s electoral platform) to obtain
legal recognition for Cataluna, the return o f the Generalitat as its primary governing
institution, and the return and recognition o f the Catalan President elected in exile.
Josep Tarradellas. There were mass demonstrations in Barcelona on September 11.
1977, the "national” holiday o f Cataluna, for the same goals, a demonstration that was
estimated at over one million, one o f the largest ever in European history (Pages i
Rejsek 1996,48-51).
The story o f how Catalan elites managed to obtain all of these goals vis-à-vis
the central Spanish state has been told elsewhere, especially in the intense negotiations
known as the “Pacts o f  Moncloa” (for the Prime Minister’s residence in Madrid where
they took place) and the negotiations surrounding the writing o f the new constitution
(see especially Heywood 1995; Maravall and Santamana 1986:1). Their basic goals
were achieved in fairly rapid succession: drafting o f the autonomy statute (Statute de
Page 158
Sau) in 1977, recognition o f  Cataiunfia’s “historic status” in the Spanish Constitution, 
which was sanctioned by the King in December 1978, and finally, sanction o f the 
autonomy statute by the Cortes, the Catalan people and the King by December 1979/'
Even with the higher level o f  economic development that the region of 
Cataluna has enjoyed vis-à-vis the rest o f Spain, the early post-transitional period was 
marked by severe economic crisis in the region, and labor-management clashes (Pujol 
1998). Part o f the reason was the general economic problems facing Spain and much 
o f Europe during the time period, but an alternative explanation is the lingering labor 
radicalism that typified the region from a previous generation that could now resurface 
after the death o f Franco.
Much has been written in the democratization literature about the importance 
o f “pacting” and “concertation,” much o f it based upon the successful Spanish state- 
level pacting in Madrid after the death o f Franco, as noted above in chapter one (see 
also Bermeo 1994 and di Palma 1990). However, "pacting” in Catalufia under Pujol 
took on a difterent character. There pacting was used not as an incomes policy, or as a 
grand social design in itself, but rather as a narrow fi-amework to buy social peace and 
allow him maximum latitude in which to pursue his larger vision o f a unified Cataluna 
within Spain. Without social peace, all o f his other goals would be in jeopardy, 
including the survival o f  democracy itself in the region. Seen from this perspective.
^'The Statute de Sau states in its preamble that it is “the expression o f the collective 
identity o f Catalonia and defines its institutions and relations with the State within a 
fiamework o f  fi-ee solidarity with the other nationalities and regions....” and that, the 
Generalitat is “the institution around which the self-government o f  Catalunya is 
politically organized” (Pages i Rejsek 1996,51).
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Pujol’s pacting in the early I980’s in Cataluna was a success.
In the early I980's, Pujol and his party faced the difficult problem o f a  "dual”
transition: economic, as well as political reform, as this noted by the head o f the
"peak” business association, Joan Pujol (no relation to President Jordi Pujol):
The early I980's, the period o f the political transition, were a difficult, 
complicated period economically [in the region]. It was a hard change.
I think that it was a problem due to the difficulty o f the adjustment here 
[in Cataluna]. Many o f the labor unions were strongly linked to the old 
Communist Party o f Spain-especially the CC.00.~and the far left.
The UGT was strongly socialistic. On the other hand, the old regime 
had absolute control o f both the political and economic systems. It was 
a time o f both very high inflation and unemployment which lead to 
more conflict. It was a very bad climate, no? In those years, the early 
80 s, the government produced two social accords between the two 
[main] labor unions and the business-owners. They really lessened the 
social tension. This was a very successful process ftom the point o f 
view o f reducing conflicts for that time period (Joan Pujol 1998).
Other political observers, from the left o f  the spectrum, concur that Pujol had
"firm control” o f the political process by the early I980's, but one in which voices
from the left were effectively stifled, breeding some long-term resentment. One
veteran politician and professor observed that the Socialists actually had the most seats
in Cataluna (a plurality), so that Pujol had to cobble together an electoral coalition in
order to govern. He is described as having "as little interchange as possible” with other
Catalan elites during this time period (Molas 1998). In addition, leftists criticize the
pacts for being too narrowly focused and lacking a  grand political design, but it
appears that Pujol preferred this type o f pact in order to maximize his room for
maneuver.
According to the leader o f the business "peak” association (FMT), the most
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important o f  all o f the tri-partite accords in Cataluna was the 1993 accord. It created,
among other things, the Catalan Labor Tribunal {Tribunal Laboral de Cataluna) to
arbitrate and resolve all Labor-Capital disputes that might arise in the region. It was
important to institutionalize an impartial arbitration body, because the labor unions
often felt persecuted or at a disadvantage vis-à-vis business owners; it has met "with
great success” (Joan Pujol 1998).
Pujol was fortunate that the left had fragmented in the early I980's, thus
reducing their ability to stonewall in the pacting process. The far left, represented by
the PSUC (United Socialist Party o f Catalonia) had experiencing the most precipitous
fall, from 18 percent to 4 percent in the 1982 elections, just above the minimum
threshold for the right to hold legislative seats (Ribo 1998). In the 1986 election, the
far splintered even further, causing it to go below the minimum threshold, and thus
losing all seats. Part of the collapse o f the left in the region can be blamed upon the
general crisis o f  orthodox "Euro” communism during this time period, but Pujol’s
ability to capture both the left and right with his cross-cutting, nationalist/moderate
electoral strategy contributed further to the collapse. For example, Pujol’s major
initiative o f the late I990’s, the "ley de Catalan,” or Catalan Law, appeals to both the
Old Right and the New Left, as my elite interviewees o f various ideological/party
identification indicated. As one interviewee said,
[W]e are not for the old nationalism that just helped to hide social 
inequalities, but we [Catalans] are quite ftir from equality [with the 
Castillians]; that’s why we [the United Left Party] are backing any 
democratic measures [like the "Catalan Law”] that would help Catalan 
[language, media and culture] exist at the same level as Spanish
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[language, media and culture] (Ribo 1998).
The essence o f any democratic process is the willingness to compromise on all
both the most fundamental rules of the game itself; those towards the extremes on both
sides o f  the spectrum are likely to be disappointed with the results of compromise.
By the mid to late 1980's, however, the pacting process had served its purpose
o f solving the “social crisis” by helping to buy social peace, and generally promoting
moderation. By this time, both the right and left in Cataluna had grown disenchanted
with the process. Despite the success o f Pujol’s pacting for social peace, the leader of
the largest business alliance in Catalufia found the process to be increasingly
inefficient from his perspective:
The ET>fT [Catalan National Work Creation Chamber] has participated 
in the pacts. They were important in the eighties. But the FNT does 
not have much confidence in these kinds o f agreements. Because, in 
reality, they are conducted now solely for the benefit o f the government.
We preferred bipartite, direct relations between business and labor.
The government tried to control the whole process for political goals, 
not for the good o f business and labor. It is not a good mechanism. It’s 
a holdover from corporatism (Joan Pujol 1998).
The Catholic Church has been another important actor in Spanish politics, and 
especially during the early transition period, when most Roman Catholic clergy 
reversed the historic support that the Church had given from roughly the Civil War 
until the late 1960's (after Vatican H) to Franco’s vision o f “organic” church-state 
unity. Instead, the newer clergy played a  fomenting role similar to that played by the 
church in Eastern Europe during the fall o f  Communism there-providing safe havens, 
encouragement and organizational expertise to anti-Franco elements. Because o f this
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experience during the transition, many Catholic clergy became leftist in their political 
outlook, and they had a  strained relationship with Pujol, whom they perceived as being 
rightist. However, even a critic o f Pujol, like the well-known Catholic priest, José 
Ignacio Faus, stated that, during the transition phase, Catalufia has had good "luck" in 
its leadership because Pujol is “very pragmatic,” and his nationalist program “has been 
a blessing” for increasing a sense o f collectivity, or “agglutinization.” On the other 
hand, however. Father Ignacio states that Pujol’s “time is passing because he has a 
very poor social sense...there is another Catalufia o f  the poor, and immigrants, but 
Pujol ignores them” (Ignacio Faus 1998; translated by the author).
Catalan Regional Elites in the Consolidation Period
Pujol has been a tireless champion of his vision o f a  ftee, semi-autonomous 
and democratic Catalufia that, while anchored in Spain, has its own "presence in the 
world” outside of, and apart from, the rest ofSpain.^ Typical o f his overall vision 
was a  speech that he delivered at the London School o f Economics on May 8,1996 
entitled, “Two Nations, One State.” In this speech, he continually stresses that 
Catalan history is equal to, and, in some ways, superior to that o f “Castille,” or central 
Spain:
In reality, in southern Europe before the 20'** century, the names of
^In fact, his many speeches have been collected and published by Generalitat in a  
thick, 30-volume series, that correspond with his 32 years as head o f the Catalan 
government. In addition, every year the Generalitat publishes a  slick, 500 pp.-f- 
compendium o f Catalan contacts and resources around the world entitled Presència 
catalana en el mon [Catalonian Presence in the World].
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[only] two countries [can be] mentioned as having undergone the 
Industrial Revolution: Catalunya and Lombardy. All o f  the rest o f 
southern Europe did not achieve this until much later. And when one 
speaks o f southern Europe, it is in reference to south o f  a line between 
Paris, Lio and the southern Alps. Probably, [this] is caused by the fact 
that Llombardy and Catalunya have two different personalities with 
respect to Italy and Spain, respectively. Lombardy, because it 
belonged to the Austrian Empire, and. therefore, is a  country very 
connected both to the mentality, the manner o f thinking, and the 
political, social and economic tendencies o f  central Europe. And, we 
[in Cataluna], as a result o f  the totality o f our history that 1 have already 
briefly explained, we have had a different personality, and, therefore, a 
different social and economic structure than the rest o f Spain.... [W]e 
have a strong civil society, different from the rest o f  Spain (Pujol 1997,
85-86).
Pujol, however, is not content to merely set the historical record straight and to
foster recognition o f  Cataluha’s impressive past achievements. He was always future-
oriented, or, in a word, visionary. Later, in this same speech, Pujol, in very strong
language, lays out his vision o f the connection between Catalan national
symbols-culture, language, institutions-and Cataluha's future in terms o f continued
political and economic progress:
This economic and demographic recuperation o f Catalunya is going to 
be followed by a recuperation o f  the language. Our language has been 
in an extremely difficult situation. There is going to be also an 
authentic recuperation o f the culture, and, later, a  political revindication 
o f  our identity, and a recuperation o f  the idea that Spain is not strictly a 
unity &om the point o f view o f the language, the culture, the history the 
manner o f thinking, the mentality, etc., but [rather] a union o f these 
parts, one o f which is going to be Catalunya (Pujol 1997,87; emphasis 
added).
Section 4: The Relationship Between Political Elites and Sub-Administration
Page 164
Since Cataluiia is one of the most economically-developed o f  all the regions o f  
Spain, it has the greatest need for complex public administration. Accordingly, 
Cataluha has one o f the largest public sectors o f all the regions, employing about 
35,000 civil servants, and has an annual budget o f Pt 1,500,000,000 (@ $10,000,000) 
to serve a population o f slightly over 6,000,000 (Matas 1995, 3). Compare this with 
the much larger population of Andalucia in chapter 4, a  region with a smaller overall 
budget. However, it is surprising that Cataluiia has one o f  the most “politicized” 
regional governments o f all the regions (Matas 1995). Explanations for this counter­
intuitive finding are explored below.
Formally, the Catalan system o f public administration is patterned after the 
British “Whitehall” model, with the top posts being political appointees, and sub-ranks 
being staffed by nominally professional (career) administrators. The top ministers are 
designated as Ministers and their role is to oversee a vast bureaucracy of specialists. 
They are nominally in charge o f fifteen “departments.” However, the top 
administrators (i.e. those in charge o f day-to-day administration of the departments) 
are the Secretaries-General (Pages i Rejek 1996.13Off). Unlike other regional 
administrations, the Catalan system adds another layer o f  managers, the “Directors- 
General,” who are also appointed by the government at the request o f a  Minister 
(Matas 1995,18). The thinking behind this additional layer is that public 
administration can be made more efficient by allowing specialized managers to be in 
direct control o f  their area o f expertise. However, in practice it has proven to be 
another political tool for the President and other top regional executives to exercise
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more effective political control by allowing an "‘end run” around other public 
administrators directly into the desired area o f  the bureaucracy.
Section Five: Analysis o f Elite Behavior and Strategy in Cataluna
Building a power base. Even visionary political leaders must first get elected, 
and then re-elected, if they wish to see their overarching ideas put into action, into 
specific policy. In order to get elected, they must appeal to more than a narrow 
constituency, and once elected, they must, especially in a parliamentary system, be 
able to operate with the assistance o f supportive legislators, administrators and fellow 
elites. In short, they must construct power bases both inside and outside o f the 
government. Even in regions with strong social capital will not automatically support 
a visionary leader.
Electoral strategies.
To appreciate the electoral success o f Pujol and his CiU party, one should 
recall two salient facts about the recent history o f Cataluha: first, that it was the hotbed 
o f far leftist (anarcho-syndicalist) extremism in Spain during much o f the twentieth 
century (muted, o f course, under Franco), and secondly, that separatist pressures (from 
the rest o f Spain) were very strong in the immediate post-Franco era. In this section, 
we shall consider E(s,b) mentioned above; i.e. how did Pujol build his power base(s)? 
In order to win significant elective office in the region, he had to appeal to two widely 
divergent mass constituencies simultaneously, the far left and right. In the late I970's, 
the Catalan electorate was anything but the classic Downsian (1959) “normal”
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distribution; rather it was strongly bi-modal. Pujors blend o f  Catalan nationalism
working within the Spanish state^, Europeanism, globalism and pro-business stands
artfully crossed this seemingly impossible electoral chasm. This is how one veteran
Catalan politician and political analyst described it:
Pujol never proposed a Catalan state, but rather a Christian-Democratic, 
Catholic version... he doesn’t want to raise a front against Spain, but 
rather, he wants to elaborate on his own model o f  development as a 
modem, progressive state; he accepts the reality o f Spain. True Catalan 
nationalists are very few in Pujol’s government; his is not really a 
nationalist government. Pujol has put together a  government of the 
center that distinguishes between a “Catalinist” and a nationalist (Molas 
1998).
In the immediate post-Franco era, Pujol had the crucial advantage o f being seen 
as an transformational” leader (Bums 1973; 1978) in Cataluha (but not, o f course, in 
the rest o f  Spain). Pujol obtained the status of an “transformational” Catalan leader 
due to his championing Catalan causes during the Franco regime, and going to jail for 
his political beliefs. However, such status did not guarantee that his tenure as 
President would long continue, especially as a new generation o f post-Franco voters 
came o f age. As he notes in his speeches, the “demographics” o f Cataluha were 
constantly changing, meaning that many immigrants had flooded the region looking 
for jobs and economic opportunity. Electorally, this presented a formidable challenge 
because many o f the immigrants tended to bring their old political affiliations with 
them; Socialists from the South, Conservatives from other parts o f  Spain.
One o f the strategies that Pujol and the CiU successfully employed was to
^Please see Pujol’s artful constmction in the “One State, Two Nations” speech cited 
above.
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break up the large voting blocs o f  immigrants by re-vitalizing the old comarque (i.e.
“county”) system that, while they followed natural geographical boundaries, tended to
cross-cut and dilute opponents’ voting strength. The official Justification in
documents produced by the Office o f the Presidency was that the comarques would be
“facilitate the principles o f efficiency, decentralization and participation in the
provision o f public services” (Pages i Rejsek 1996, 148).
As we saw in the case o f Galicia, nationalism is a useful electoral strategy as
well, because it cross-cuts the typical left-right political spectrum, incorporating and
appealing to elements o f both the right and the left. The nationalist electoral strategy
appeals to the traditional Catalan’s desire to "return” to the glory days o f Cataluna’s
past, to recapture lost symbols o f the nation, but it also appeals to the left’s desire for
change, to follow one’s own destiny, for autonomy from the central state. Business
interests, while usually allied with conservative interests in the United States, tend to
be slightly left o f center in most European political systems because o f the history of
statism in most European countries. The head of the largest “peak” confederation o f
business owners in Cataluna, FTN (Catalan National Labor Promotion), had this to say
about Jordi Pujol’s personal and political ideology:
The government o f Pujol is very broad-based; it is really a  coalition o f 
parties. Pujol is very long-lived. We have a collaboration with Pujol 
because his personal philosophy is very close to business, although he 
has a  popular global vision (Joan Pujol 1998).
As this quotation points out, Pujol’s “global vision” and turn towards Europe 
were also popular electoral strategies, for at least two reasons. First, following classic
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Machiavellian advice in the Prince, a  leader who is experiencing domestic dissension
can promote unity at home by seeking wealth and new benefits for his citizenry
abroad. In this case^ the EU seemed to offer that hopeful future. Secondly, given
Catalan history, such concrete links with Europe were seen as legitimate and desirable
by a majority o f the population. Europe was seen as a reliable lifeline for Cataluna, in
case something were to happen again in the rest o f Spain, tight economic and political
ties with the rest o f the Continent would help keep the region secure and prosperous.
O f all the regions, Cataluna had the longest history o f extra-Spanish links with other
European nations; therefore, such renewed economic and political ties only seem
natural today. One well-known democratic opposition leader explained the attraction
and utility of European links this way:
Europe is important to us because it is a reality...not only in economic 
links, but also social, political and cultural ones as well. Europe is kind 
o f  a democratic goal for us. For democratic Cataluna. within Europe, it 
is an easier framework to get the recognition o f our personality and 
collective political unity; call it a  “nation,” or a “special autonomous 
community”- !  do not care about the name (Ribo 1998).
Creating Bridging Social Capital 
In a  transitional setting, how does one (re)-create flourishing, vibrant 
associational life? Can civil society be “created” at all, or does it have to gradually 
evolve out o f hundreds o f years o f preparatory, incremental growth? According to the 
now-dominant understanding o f Putnam et al., the latter understanding is the correct 
one, and there has been little attempt to look at “prime movers” o f  civil society; 
instead it has been thought to be sufficient to count or document the epi-phenomena o f
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civil society-e.g. the number o f  cooperatives, voter turnout, mutual aid societies, mass 
party membership, etc. (Pumam 1993, 149). I f  a  region (or country) was so fortunate 
to have a  large number o f these civic (technically non-political) associations in a 
critical period (about 75-130 years ago), then it will most likely have not only a vibrant 
civil society today, but also a thriving economy as well.
Although the same kind o f comprehensive statistical work that has been done 
for Italy does not yet exist for regions o f Spain, Cataluha is clearly the case that comes 
closest to the Putnam ideal type for civil/civic society both then ( 1860-1920) and now. 
That is why it was stated at the outset that it is a “most likely” case to confirm his 
hypotheses. Cataluha has a  very large number o f civic associations, many o f them 
centered around sports, labor, management and culture. The official Catalan guide.
The Catalan Presence in the World, lists 107 recognized "non-govemmental” 
associations/groups in a recent issue (Generalitat 1998); and these are just the Catalan 
NGO’s that have some international component as well.
Therefore, the question remains, how did Cataluha move from the immediate 
post-Franco period, when suspicion ran rife and associational life was in shambles, to 
today’s thriving civil society, in the space o f  a short 20 years? Did Franco merely 
represent a “ d^eep freeze” for Catalan civil society that would be naturally restored 
once he had passed from the scene?
The electoral breakdown in the 1977 elections provides a critical clue: 
Catalans were badly divided, and unsure about the future o f their region; i.e. the 
distribution o f  the Catalan electorate was strongly bi-modal. Part o f this schism is
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explained by 20‘**-centuty Catalan history in which “anarcho-syndicalism” was so 
prevalent.
It is at this critical Juncture that Pujol emerges. Through the articulation o f a 
democratic, capitalistic, semi-autonomous region that will continue to improve itself 
through direct links with Europe and the world, use o f pacts, and increasing stress on 
national symbols, he was able to bridge the social cleavages that threatened not only 
stability within the region, but the viability o f a fragile democratic regime itself within 
Cataluha, and perhaps in Spain as a whole.
Section Six: Towards the “Regional Visionarv Political Leadership” Model
Below, I shall construct a new typology o f  the “visionary” political leadership 
style that may be generalizable, and useful in similar cases. It should be useful to 
compare and contrast this new model with existing ones in the literature.
Model title Character­
istic
Social
setting
Elite
Strategies
Elite
behaviors
Bum s Transforming Achieves a 
higher level 
of
performance 
in a  socieQf
conflictual, 
but some lines 
o f mutual 
communica­
tion exist 
between 
leaders and 
followers
Seek out the 
motives and 
“higher 
needs” o f  
followers; 
Use power 
base as 
mutually 
enforcing
Engage the 
“full person” 
o f the 
follower
D ror VPL
(Visionary
Political
Leadership)
Leads society 
past crises
conflictual Lifetime 
training in 
political arts
Participate in 
structured, 
ritualistic 
settings
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WîldavsiQr Meteoric Limited terms Free market; Use o f Constantly
o f  office individualism coalitions to shift alliances
based on and equiQf achieve as necessary;
-contract; immediate nimbleness;
the right goals avoid
person at the imbalances of
right place at power
the right time (threatens
for the right "contract")
purpose
Van Doom Regional Bridges Transitional. (I) Uses the (I)
Visionary societal and "voice” consistently
Leadership cleavages conflictual. option to articulates a
through but not provide vision o f  a
articulation o f revolutionary; stability for stable, united
broad, yet strong vision; (2) society; use o f
moderate. traditional o f Electoral: short-term
vision o f representa­ populism devices like
future tive and/or "pacts” to
political institutions nationalism; create
order; leaves and symbols (3) Run stability (2)
daily to draw upon against and appeals to
administra­ bypass the potent, but
tion to others “center”;
(4) use 
international 
links to foster 
vision and 
bypass center
generic 
common 
symbols; (3) 
castigate the 
"other,”  but in 
a controlled 
fashion; (4) 
create/ exploit 
direct
international 
links with 
states and 
[GO’S
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Implications and Limits o f  the Model
In regions with a long history o f  high social capital and representative 
institutions, charismatic or authoritarian leadership styles simply will not work with 
the imderlying political-institutional matrix during a transition back to democracy. 
However, evidence from the Catalan case does not support Wildavsky’s contention 
that leadership in “market” regimes will be necessarily “meteoric”-i.e. intense and 
short-lived.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
Section I; Key Factual Findings
This study has undertaken to perform a historical evaluation o f the role o f 
regional elites-both public and private sector— played in facilitating democratization in 
their region during the transitional period in Spain, 1975-early I990's. The evidence 
gleaned from three cases gives some factual support to the general proposition that the 
strategies and behaviors o f regional elites do affect levels o f democratic stability, 
social capital, and ultimately democratic consolidation in their region.
CHART ONE: Overview of Regional Democratic Stability and Democratic 
Consolidation
Democratic Stability Democ. Consolidation
Andalusia Medium High
Catalonia High High
Galicia High Low
The regional variations in the chart above need explanation. Democratic 
stability was slightly lower in Andalusia than the other two regions because of the 
more fîrequent recourse to strikes. However, as noted below, conflict itself does not 
lead to lack o f a  consolidated regime; indeed it may be an important indicator o f a 
more robust democratic system (cf. Pumam 1993). In Galicia, the difference between 
democratic stability and democratic consolidation is highlighted; democratic stability
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nationalism to help increase democratic stability, bridging social capital and a sense o f 
local autonomy. In all three cases, nationalism was used by regional elites to argue for 
a special "historic” status in the post-Franco Spanish Constitution, which, in turn, 
granted an extraordinary degree o f autonomy to regional government during the early 
transition stage when political practices were being first established. In addition, 
appeals to regional nationalism are an explicit part o f  the electoral program of each o f 
the three ruling parties, or. in the case o f  Galicia, has been coopted somewhat into the 
P.P. platform.
The fourth pattern that emerged was in policymaking; tailoring policy to 
address region-specific problems which would serve two purposes: add to the 
legitimacy o f the regional government, and solve specific problems associated with the 
democratic transition in that region. This pattern is seen most strongly in Andalusia, 
less so in Catalonia and Galicia. In the next section, the specific behaviors and 
strategies o f the three sets o f regional elites will be compared and contrasted.
Section II: Comparison and Contrast of R.E.L. Across 3 cases
Building upon the key factual findings listed above, it is now possible to 
undertake a systematic comparison o f regional elite leadership across the three regions 
included in this study. Each o f the three patterns identified in the previous section can 
be characterized as a  simple ordinal level o f activity, v£r.. low, medium or high. A 
fairly high degree o f  regional variation on this ordinal scale is observed for each 
pattern o f  activity, as detailed in the chart below. Taken together, variations in the
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patterns identified help explain relative success and failure in each region at promoting 
democratic stability, social capital and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.
CHART: Comparison of patterns of regional elite leadership styles
Andalusia Catalonia Galicia
Pattern 1 
(structuring 
political dissent)
Medium, use of 
mobilization o f 
labor base in party 
(P.S.A.) to 
“channel” protest 
into mass 
demonstrations
High, through use 
o f already existing 
“peak”
organizations and 
pacting for social 
peace
Low; elites 
continue “divided 
and conquer” 
strategy by making 
pacts with already 
existing power- 
brokers
Pattern 2 
(Intermediation)
High during period 
1980-1997 due to 
connections with 
ruling national 
party; medium. 
1997-present
High, due to 
personal prestige 
o f Pujol and the 
power in his 
regional party, the 
CiU in the national 
legislature; e.g. 
secured approval 
o f the “Catalan 
Law”
Low during period 
1977-1990; high in 
Fraga era, 1990- 
present due to 
connections with 
ruling national 
party
Pattern 3
(moderate
nationalism)
Medium, 1977- 
1980; low and 
muted since
High and explicit Initially high; now 
coopted and 
moderate
Pattern 4 (region-
specific
policymaking)
High; e.g. IPIA High, but left to 
large cadre of 
professional 
bureaucrats
Moderate; mostly 
in form o f direct 
aid from EU and 
others.
Next, pattern three (the use o f nationalism as a  strategy for developing regional 
autonomy) will be examined in more detail. Electoral data showing the relative voting 
strength o f  regional parties in each o f the three regions, plus the Basque Country and 
Castilla~La Mancha, is a useful baseline for comparison.
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consolidation phase; e.g. in gaining recognition in the Spanish constitution, to wrest 
more concessions and benefits from the central state than "normal" regions enjoy.
Despite being strongly implanted in Catalonia, a  center-right version of 
nationalism under Pujol managed to diffuse center-periphery tensions between the 
region and Madrid, and to build bridging social capital between radicalized labor and 
conservative business elites.
Nationalism in Galicia plays a more ambivalent role. There it has been a 
radical leftist version, seeking outright independence from Spain (the “exit” option), 
and to use nationalism as a separatist development strategy. At least logically, this 
political program could conceivably help build social capital in the region, but at a 
terrible cost-making the overall Spanish state weaker, and in all likelihood, making 
the region o f Galicia economically unviable as an independent political unit. This 
version o f nationalism, however, has been firmly rejected by the voters, forcing the 
leading nationalist party, the BNG to moderate into a more electorally viable “catch­
all" center-left nationalist party, where it is the fastest-growing political force in the 
region today. Nationalism in Galicia may yet play an important role in building social 
capital there.
Section QI. Limitations
In light o f the strong evidence o f  patterns that emerge from the case studies, 
limitations, nonetheless exist. The primary limitation o f the study is the classic 
“small-n" problem (a small number o f  cases from which to draw conclusions) that, in a 
strict interpretation o f  “the logic o f  social inquiry” would limit the generalizability of
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them to boost their own legitimacy and regional pride. In fact, the President o f the 
Junta, Manuel Chaves, marched at the head o f  one o f the larger demonstrations that 
day, and used his participation to pointedly note his disagreement with the Spanish 
central state. This finding is in accord with Pumam’s (1993) theoretical finding that 
there is ' no correlation between conflict and the civic community” (p. 117).
Recall that social capital is defined as those dense networks o f  voluntary civic 
associations which help build mutual trust and tolerance among citizens. A high level 
o f  social capital is desirable, according to Putnam (1993,2000) because it is positively 
correlated with better indicators o f  public health, and even the democratic regime 
itself.
The case studies demonstrated three concrete strategies that resulted in greater 
democratic stability, and social capital, although the latter concept is more difficult to 
measure:
1. Through the construction o f  formal, region-specific institutions (e.g. the 
Andalusian Institute for Promotion o f Industry),
2. A series o f regional pacts between “peak” representatives o f labor and business 
elites, coordinated by the Catalan regional government that resulted in social 
peace during an especially tense time between radicalized labor union members 
and business elites,
3. Use o f moderate nationalism, that specifically eschews the “exit” option, in 
both Catalonia and Andalucia to build bridging social capital across the region.
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Section Four: Thematic Summary
Region Sequencing Leader-follower "fit”
Andalusia High First high, then medium 
Optimal type: charismatic 
communitarian
Catalonia High High
Optimal type: pragmatic 
visionary
Galicia Low; out o f  sequence First low, then high 
Optimal type: 
authoritarian 
transformational
As Linz and Stepan (1996) found in their thorough re-examination o f Spanish 
democratization, timing, or "sequencing,’* proved to be critical in explaining the 
relative success in achieving democratic consolidation in each case. A second theme 
that emerged was the importance o f a good "tit” between regional elites and followers 
(the voting public).
Each region needed a different type o f sequencing and a different type o f elite- 
mass fit. During the transition, the first phase o f democratization, Andalusia 
needed-and had-a "charismatic communitarian” leader in the person of Rafael 
Escuredo. In other words, they needed a leader during the transition who would:
1. Help bridge historic gaps between communities, the basis o f political life in 
Andalusia.
2. Articulate a moderate Andalusian "nationalist” ^identity that could overcome 
sharp cleavages between east and west Andalusia, highlands and lowlands.
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3. Argue in national fora that such an conunon Andalusian identic did exist and 
warranted special recognition in the new post-Franco constitution, which he 
did achieve. He then pushed for, and achieved, a referendum in Andalusia 
ratifying this decision.
4. Help build regional state capacity. Not only Escuredo, but also President o f  the 
Parliament, Torres Vela, and the majority Andalusian Socialist Party in 
Parliament, recognized that a  key to democratic stability was to increase the 
capacity o f  the state to administer programs that would be necessary for 
political and economic development o f  the region. Here, these leaders 
specifically learned from American Political Science and economics. They 
reversed a trend among leftist oppositional elites in the late Franco period who 
believed, for ideological reasons, that the state was the problem because it was 
a tool o f the ruling classes.
5. Most importantly, a  leader who understood that creating institutions that would 
help achieve democratic stability. Escuredo called this his planificacion 
democratica (‘‘democratic plan”), and the goal was not only to increase 
economic output dramatically (which it did), but also to build bridging social 
capital by increasing cross-regional communication between communities and 
large and small businesses in a way that had never been done before. The 
Andalusian Institute for the Promotion o f  Industry (IPIA) was the most visible 
manifestation o f this plan. He understood that the key to economic success in 
Andalusia was political restructuring. However, he undertook such bold
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initiatives at some personal political risk; he alienated traditional power 
holders, such as the Confederation o f  Andalusian Employers (CEA) who 
claimed to have the sole right as a  "'peak” organization, to represent the 
interests o f all business owners, large and small. Escuredo^s political 
initiatives may have played a part in his premature departure from Andalusian 
politics.
By the time that President Escuredo departed Andalusian politics in the early 
1980's, the fundamental needs o f  the transition in Andalusia had been met, and he had 
paved the way for more "‘normal” democratic leaders, like the current President. 
Manuel Chaves. The importance o f sequencing in the case o f  Andalusia gives support 
to other theories o f leadership, such as Skrownek's ideas about "political time” in 
American Presidential succession. Escuredo was a colorful character, personally 
appealing and charismatic, who proved to be a good fit with the Andalusian public.
In Catalonia, much o f the necessary institutional structure for a successful 
democratic transition was already in place due to its long prior history with 
representative government, as detailed in chapter five. However, radicalism among 
labor elites and lingering bitter anti-Castillian sentiments among the Catalan populace 
threatening democratic stabili^ in that region. What was needed was a leader o f 
authenticity and vision who could:
1 - Articulate a new, pragmatic vision o f  the role o f  Catalonia in the world, not 
Just as a subordinate part o f Spain, so as to quench credible talk o f the ""exif ’ 
option (i.e. secession feom Spain), and to pull together a  socie^ cleaved around
Page 184
ideology (left vs. right), and workplace ownership issues.
2. Use existing social institutions, like the pacting process, to help achieve the 
social peace necessary for democratic stability in the early transitional phase.
3. Address the powerful force o f Catalan nationalism (see chart on nationalist 
voting patterns) in a way that would satisfy the need for celebration o f  Catalan 
culture, language and symbols without coming into direct conflict with the 
central Spanish state. Even more so than the Andalusian case, Catalan elites 
were the first to recognize the importance o f "historic status” in the 1978 
Spanish-state constitution. Despite his unceasing advocacy o f the "Catalan 
Law, Pujol was a moderate nationalist (to the frustration o f his more radical 
peers) who always prized democratic stability even above Catalan nationalism.
4. Be a tireless promoter o f Catalan business and political interests in the 
European Union and in the world at large.
5. Serve as a power broker in Spanish national politics behind the scenes, 
securing additional benefits and recognition o f  Catalonia’s special status 
without directly becoming involved in political conflict at the Spanish state 
level.
The government o f Jordi Pujol has been able to bring about the goals in each of 
these areas; his extraordinarily long tenure has provided Catalonia the stability that 
was its greatest need. In contrast to Andalusia, however, Pujol was not very involved 
in institution-building, or in the daily management o f government affairs. He has been 
criticized by other Catalan elites as being too aloof. Clearly his mandate has now
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expired, and his is voluntarily stepping aside to make room for another‘‘ordinary” 
leader in 2003, Arturo Mas. Again, the sequencing was optimal. The fit was also very 
good. Catalans perceive themselves to be the most hard-working, no-nonsense 
business-oriented region in Spain. Therefore, they want leaders who are pragmatic, 
and not flamboyant. Pujol also answered the need for a head o f  state figure who 
appeared above day-to-day politics, although they admired his tenacity and principled 
stands on key issues.
Galicia is the exceptional case that helps demonstrate the importance of 
sequencing and leadership fit in regional leadership, if only in their absence. During 
the transition, the need for authoritarian transformational leadership was great, but did 
not exist. Such leadership would use its authenticity with the public to bring about 
much needed changes in order to achieve long-term democratic stability, overcome a 
classic low social capital equilibrium and consolidate democracy. Among other 
problems, regional elites during the transition:
1. Showed a disconnection with the Galician public, which lead to intra-elite 
struggle, party fractionation, and the lowest rates o f voter turnout in Spain.
2. Had a sequencing problem. The least experienced and least able leaders were 
nominated by poorly organized parties.
3. They failed to create institutions that would bridge historical cleavages and 
break up the customary dominance o f the caciques. In short, they achieved a 
kind o f undesirable short-term democratic stability that short-circuited the 
potential for building bridging social capital. Today, the problem o f a low
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social capital equilibrium remains.
4- Showed a lack o f fit between the Galician electorate and leadership style in the
early 1980's, but a very good fit in the 1990's.
5. Despite the goodness o f  fit, the government o f Fraga has largely failed to use
its authenticity with the public to achieve a long-term democratic stability 
based upon heightened participation. Instead, he has made the customary intra­
elite pacts that keep the old poderes facticos and caciques dominate in local 
and provincial politics in exchange for his unchallenged pre-eminence in 
regional politics. In addition, he has used windfall ftmds from the EU to 
heighten his popularity through direct payments to Galician individuals and 
firms, again failing to build long-term institutions that would better serve 
democratic stability.
Section V: Heuristic Suggestions for Further Research
Applications for future research could focus much more on efibrts to build 
bridging social capital at the regional level. Social capital could be treated in future 
studies as a  dependent variable, and not just an independent or intervening variable.
Regions and regional elite politics could be treated as less o f a "problem” (Linz 
and Stepan 1996) in the literature than as an appropriate level and unit o f analysis to 
understand the building blocks o f democratic consolidation and the trend towards 
devolution in many democratic states.
The overall conclusions are basic: that regions o f Spain could serve as a model
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for democratization for other societies and countries that are fragmented by 
pronounced cleavages, such as regional, ethnic, economic, linguistic and “national” 
divisions. One cannot help but think o f the many “failed states” in the Global South 
today, beset by “warlordism” and not attempt to apply some o f  the lessons and 
observations from these Spanish cases. The cases supports the observation that 
regional elite leadership style can affect the level o f  democratic stability within 
different parts o f a  divided country, such as in this examples. Therefore, U.S. 
policymakers should not ignore regional politics as they consider “nation-building” 
plans. As I frankly acknowledged above in the “limitations” section, many caveats 
would apply, but if  the analyst ignores important regional differences and the needs of 
the mass “clients” in each area o f  the country, one’s prescriptions for democracy are 
likely doomed to failure. That Just such an overdue assessment is now underway is 
evidenced by the article, “In Failed States, Can Democracy Come Too Soon?” 
(Massing 2002). Looked at far more closely than the early democratization literature 
did, it becomes obvious that merely conducting and concluding national pacts and 
holding national elections is not enough to consolidate democracy. On the other hand, 
we should not be completely pessimistic about the further spread o f  democracy beyond 
areas that already have a “thousand-year” experience with it (Pumam 1993), or whose 
“culture” is supposedly anti-democratic (Wiarda 1989). A return to authoritarianism is 
now unthinkable in all o f  the regions o f Spain, although politics in Galicia is clearly 
more authoritarian than in other regions, primarily because that is what the mass public 
appears to want, and regional elites there failed, to take foundational steps towards
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overcoming its low social capital equilibrium.
The variation in the three cases in the efficacy o f  regional leadership in 
affecting the level and quality o f  social capital shows much more clearly the 
importance o f sequencing than the study o f any single case could have on its own.
Two out o f the three cases demonstrated an efficacious sequence; one demonstrated 
the results o f an inefficacious sequence. In both Andalusia and Catalonia, the 
leadership selection process produced excellent leadership at the beginning o f  the 
democratization process when it is so critically needed. Despite a great deal of 
ambivalence in the literature o f the importance o f political parties in early 
democratization detailed above in chapter one, well-defined, experienced 
"parliamentary-fit” parties are critical in selecting their best leadership to actually 
govern from the moment that the new government is installed in power. This, of 
course, is difficult, in transitional settings. In both Andalusia and Catalonia, however, 
the parties had long organized before the death o f Franco, often in secret at some 
personal danger to themselves. Both Escurerdo and Pujol emerge from the shadow of 
the Franco regime fully prepared to govern, with pragmatic strategies to overcome the 
social capital problems in those regions. The disarray in the Galician parties, 
illustrated vividly in chapter three by personalistic factions, frequent name changes, 
splinters and mergers, and an admittedly haphazard leadership selection process, 
produced inexperienced leaders and a  badly divided government that lacked the power 
and focus to combat the problem o f low social capital equilibrium in that region. By 
the time that Manuel Fraga comes to Galician politics, he is "out o f  sequence” both
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personally and in for the needs o f  Galicia. By that time, traditional powers (e.g. the
caciques) had made additional power-sharing agreements and settled into a new modus
vivendi that intentionally retarded the development o f  bridging social capital because it
would threaten their power basis. Indeed, it appears that his government has made the
problem o f  a low social capital equilibrium worse and even harder to overcome than
before. A Spanish critic is especially harsh in this regard:
It is not a  coincidence that Fraga Iribame-who is well known in this 
context for his Galician origin-has dedicated all o f  his energy to create, 
wherever is was possible, a  structure o f party-clientelism, that is helped 
at times by persons who have had political roles in the old regime...it is 
particularly the case in Galicia, in which the levels o f participation have 
been the lowest in the country since 1977; this immobility has 
facilitated the usual maneuvers o f  caciquismo (Cazorla 1997, 30).
Only the passing o f time will allow that judgement to be fairly made, however.
For the future, more research needs to be done on specific mechanisms that 
regional elites can use to overcome the weight o f history, to overcome low social 
capital equilibria. In addition, the aAect o f other political processes and institutions on 
social capital needs to be explored. Social capital is a  useful, but multi-dimensional 
term; no doubt future research will help “disaggregate” it into more precise sub­
components that can be isolated and more rigorously tested. The distinction between 
“bridging” and “bonding” social capital recently elaborated by Putnam (2000) proved 
to be analytically useful in the Spanish cases, but still not flexible enough to account 
for wide variation in the concept across the cases. Each o f the regions had a  problem 
with low social capital, but in very different ways.
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Especially in highly varied states, regions should be studied as cases in 
themselves, and not just administrative units o f a  larger country. They are the units in 
which the people’s primary education and political values are formed, they are often 
the sites of revolution and terrorism. More positively, they can be the laboratories o f 
democracy that are close enough to the people to invite their active participation and 
overcome the problems coincident with radical isolation.
It is hoped that this study of the effect o f regional elite leadership styles on 
democratic stability will become part o f  a larger body o f research devoted to 
understanding this neglected role o f  an important set o f political actors. They have 
emerged as powerful actors in their own right in the process o f democratic 
consolidation who deserve far more attention in the literature than they receive.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
The Interview Instrument 
A sample set of questions
Asked to all interviewees:
1. (If political elite): how did you get your political start? (If non-political elite): 
how do you view the characteristic leadership style o f president o f the region?
2. How would you describe (the president’s) characteristic method o f interaction 
with (a) other political elites? (b) other powerful regional actors {poderes 
facticos], (c) the national government o f  in Madrid?
3. How would you compare or rate this president o f the region with his 
predecessors (list one by one).
4. If you have knowledge o f other regional president(s), how would you compare
president with them in terms of leadership style and
effectiveness?
5. Would you say that there are good relations between the regional government
o f president__________ and (a) business owners, (b) labor leaders, (c) the
Church, (d) the media, (e) other major political interests? Why or why not?
6. What is the greatest social-political problem in _________ (region) today and
in the recent past (during the transition period)?
7. (After problem(s) identified) How well has the government o f__________
dealt with the problems you just identified?
8. Over the last 25 years, how well-and in what specific ways-has the overall 
political development necessary for democracy been undertaken in your region
(CCj IAJ) and in Spain in general? In what ways d o  social structure(s)
limit and guide the possibilities o f democratic leadership in your region?
9. [At conclusion o f the interview] With whom else should I speak about these 
matters? Specifically, In (a) the regional government, (b) labor unions, (c) 
business leaders/owners, (d) the media, (e) university professors, (f) in the 
Church.
10. What books/periodicals would you recommend?
Specific questions, depending on the interviewee, might include the following:
1. [To political elites] How did you develop your political style o f  leadership? 
Which social, political and economic factors in the context o f your region have 
affected this style? What was your first electoral victory?
2. [To labor and/or political leaders] What helps explain the lack o f confidence 
between labor leaders and business owners in this region?
3. [Example o f  a  specific regional question] How well is the regional government 
dealing with the severe problem o f the fishing industry in Galicia?
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APPENDIX B: Interviewees
List o f Elite Interviews with Elites in Galician Region o f Spain
1. Manuel Barreiro
former Vice-President o f the Xunta
2. Andres Torres Queiruga,
University^ SdC professor o f  religion and author
3. Ramon Mafz Suarez, University SdC professor. 
Dean o f the Department o f  Social Sciences
4. Xosé Manuel Beiras Torrados, head o f 
the leading opposition political party, 
the National Block o f Galicia, the BNG
5. Xosé Alvaro Carbacho, University dSC Professor
April 23, 1998 
his office, USdC
April 28, 1998 
Cathedral, SdC
April 14, 1998 
his office, USdC
April 29, 1998 
Parliament, SdC
May 7,1998 
his office. USdC
6. Emilio Perez Tourino, head o f political party. 
Socialist Party o f Galicia, PSG
7. Xavier Carro Garrote, head o f  Galician 
labor confederation (UGT/UXT)
8. Manuel Saez Alcantara, University o f Salamanca 
professor
9. Ivan Llamazares, university professor and author
10. Nieves Llagares, University SdC professor
11. Pedro Donate, (elected) minister o f 
finance/Pres. assistant
May 5, 1998 
Parliament, SdC
May 8, 1998 
his office, SdC
April 3,1998
his office, Univ. o f Sal.
April, 1998
plaza mayor, Salamanca
April, 1998
May, 1998
his office, JTi/n/a de
Galicia, SdC
12. Roberto Blanco Valdés,
law professor USdC and author
May 7,1998 
his office, USdC
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13. Sr. Lopez-Veloso» University SdC Administrator April 13, 1998
his office, USdC
14. Fernando Jimenez Sanchez, April 22, 1998
University professor, USdC, and author his office, USdC
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List o f Elite Interviews in the Catalan Region o f Spain
June 1998
Name
15. Dr. Car lota Sole
16. Dr. Joan Botella
17. Dr. and MP Isidre Molas, PSG
18. Father Ignacio Faus
19. Dr. Robert Fishman
20. Dr. Joan Estruch (rel.)
21. Dr. Richard Zapata (immig.)
22. Miguel Salvados, grad, student
23. Antonio Comin
24. Rafael Ribo, MP of IC
25. José Luis Coscubiela. 
head(S-G)ofCC.OO.
26. Joan Pujol, head o f FMT
Date interviewed/place
June 9/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ. 
(Terra Bella campus out o f town)
June 5/ UAB, over lunch
June 9/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ.. the 
Faculty o f Law
June 10/ Theological Seminary o f the 
Univ. of Barcelona (downtown)
June 10/ UPF, his office
June 11/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ.. 
his office
June 12/ Univ. o f Pompeu Fabra (UPF^, 
Dept, o f  Social Sciences
June 12/ UPF, Dept, o f  Social Sciences
June 13/ his apartment, Barcelona
June 15/ Barcelona, his office at the 
Catalan Initiative
June 15/ CC.OO/BULA headquarters, 
Barcelona
June 16/ FMT headquarters, Barcelona
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L2,
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. 
11.
List o f Elite Interviews in the Andalusian Region o f  Spain
May 1998
Univ. Professor and lawyer
Univ. Professor
MP and head o f party 
(lU-United Left)
President o f the Parliament
May 26, 1998 (Granada) 
May 22, 1998 (Granada) 
May 28,1998 (Sevilla)
May 29, 1998 (Sevilla)
Head o f the business confederation May 28, 1998 (Sevilla) 
(CEA)
MP and head o f  party 
(PA-Nationalist)
Head o f  agricultural union
May 18, 1998 (Sevilla)
May 26, 1998(Granada)
Univ. Professor & regional expert May 22, 1998(Granada)
Univ. and law Professor
Researcher for Parliament
MP and assistant to 
regional President (Chaves)
May 15, 1998 (Sevilla) 
May 17,1998 (Sevilla) 
May 29,1998 (Sevilla)
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CHART: Evolution of the Galician Party System, 1964- @1998 
Sources; Mâiz (1994); Raimundo (1998); author’s interpretation
1964 1975 1979 1981 1982 1985 1989 1993 1994/5 -»
BNGBNGUPG BN-PG BNPG
PSG
BNPG
PSG
BNPG BNGAN-PG
PSGPSG
EG
^ UG ---EUEG PSG
EG
POG EG
EU-EG
AFG
PPG
PSG PSG-UG
PNG - PG
PG CG CG CG
EUEUPCG
